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Viewpoint

Values, politics
and the schools
Who would deny that values are inherent In schooling or that politics plays an Important part
In the process of formal education? Yet as obvious as these facts would appear, many otherwise
knowledgeable people would deny any essential connection between the two. While they mig ht
go so far as to say that schooling, now and In the past, has beeri frequently infected by political
considerations, they would not see these considerations as either necessary or desirable. Thus,
the way Is cleared for those who would get down to the practical business of teaching, as If
hesitating to consider the whys and wherefores of the case were some sort of crime against the
young .
The most recent large scale example of this can be found in the swing of American schooling
to the political right. Educational research is now turning up results that support a more con·
servative social climate, Just as In the 1960's it uncovered results that sustained an atmosphere of
reform . It Is no more accidental that educators are (re)dlscovering the need for "basic subjects"
(to say nothing of moral training) and are pondering the importance of mental discipline and
civility, than It was that a decade ago they found out (once again) that "flexibility" and "openness" are essential for sound psychological development and the emergence of an independent
and critical mind.
It would be easy to despair, looking at the cyclical nature of these trends. Where normally we
would like our values to dictate our politics, It seems that in this case the reverse Is true. That Is
to say, the virtues we promote In the schools appear to be a mere reflec tion of prevailing political
forces. Is there any hope founded on reason that it might be otherwise?
While there may be no simple answer to this question, we need not conclude that the
situation warrants cynicism. In the first place, we should recognize the perennial tension In
education between Its adjustment function and Its liberating function. On the one hand,
education helps the learner to adapt to the world, to "flt in," so to speak. On the other hand,
education works to free the learner from environmental constraints. to develop an inquisitive and
critical Intelligence that will generate an aptitude for change. An education that could not fulfill
both of these functions would be hardly worthy or the name. Yet, In recognizing this, we are
acknowledging a conflict which normally we can neither understand nor resolve In purely rational
terms.
Living with these circumstances, what alternative do we have other than to trust the dialectical workings of the political process? Where we are unable to achieve a conceptual integration
of the contradictory forces in education, where a philosophical synthesis is unattainable, we
might still be able to bring about a political synthesis. This would demand, of course, that the
political process be appropriately democratic, that political power be distributed and used In a
manner that is scrupulously fair. But given this proviso, we might not only find practical solutions
to practical problems, but, perhaps too, a basis for dealing with the philosophic
al
perplexities
that accompany o ur Involvement In this wondrous business of education.
P.L. Smith
The Ohio State University
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When teaching and learning become
divorced from ends, problems ari se.

Generic
behavior
and human
conduct:
Reflections
on an
educational
dilemma

themselves who are undecided between conceiving
education ~s an art and conceiving It as a science - with
all the ramifications lhat such a choice enta
i ls. To con·
celve education as an art is to recog nize those "non·
scientific" aspects of teaching and learning that have to
do with theory, aims, norms and Ideals that are continually
created and reconstructed within the ongoing educational
enterprise and that dO not readily lend themselves to
quantitative assessment. To conceive education as a
science is to emphasize the kinds of predictability, unlfor·
mity and precision In teaching and lear~i ng Iha! am
characteristic of the " exact" sciences. of which physics 1s
perhaps the paradigm. • What is overlooked when the
dilemma is stated in either-or terms is that education may
be viewed as neither exclusively an art nor exclusively a
science but .as a combination of both , each contributing
its proper share.
It should go without saying that the process of
ed ucation is dependent upon the process of teaching, the
process of teaching is linked with the process of learning ,
and the process of learning is shaped by the purposes for
which It is designed. Despite the apparent relatedness of
these factors. it is nonetheless possible to have been
taught without being educated and to have learned to no
purpose. One may, for example, have been taught how to
use a screwdriver without for that reason being cal led
educated; or one may have learned a mathematical
theorem that serves no purpose In one•s dally life.
Coalescence of teaching and learning with the ends that
education is designed to serve precludes artificial
lragmentation of the educational enterprise and allows for
its being conceived as a whole. It Is when teaching and
learning become divorced from ends that problems arise.
Notwithstanding, attention to the nature of learning qua
learnin
g is needed before its relationship to both teaching
and education can be fully understood.

l
l

I. From Mentallsm to Behaviorism

by Frederick C. Nt\ff
Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan

No special clairvoyance Is required to perceive that
American education Is presently In considerable dls~rray.
The confusion is partly due to piecemeal attempts to
respon-0 to '"ou tside"' or nonprofessional critics, many of
whom have urged that the schools become more flexible
In their academic and curriculum requirements, make
greater provision for Individual differences, promot~ self·
realization and self·identity, and give greater attention to
moral and social values-In short, that education become
less rigid and more humane. Equally vocal are those
critics who would have the schools become primarily pur·
veyors of skills and knowledge, go '"back to basics." institute stricter scholastic standards, and establish more
uniform criteria of achievement. Neohumanl sts have
called for various kinds of alternative schools, while
neoconservatives have advocated more disci pline and
greater regimentation within the existing school struc·
tu re.
But there is also a more "'sophisticated" kind of con·
fusion that emanates from among professional educators

During the first two or three decades of this cenlury
psychology was s truggling to shed Its metaphysical garb
in order to become a " true" science. It did not wi sh to
remain , as its name Implied, a " science of mind." The
classical notion of education as a matter of intellectual
development or of mind training simply wouldn't do. for
mentallsm was suggestive of nothing that was amenable
to empirical investigation. The then-current dictum that
only what was observable was a fit object ol scientific
scrutiny led psychologists to abandon pursuit o f an
elusive mind In favor of an almost exclusive concern with
behavior. Ontological problems of being were dismissed
by contending that whatever exists at all exists in some
amount; and ii It exists in some amount. II can be
measured. Recognition that mental states are nearly
alwa\'S a reflection of bodily states-for example, that eye
strain can cause a headache, that physical faligue can
d imin ish mental alertness, or that a severe blow on the
head c an cause amnesia-prompted psychologists to per·
ceive that mind and body are not two separate entities,
each operating under Its own independent laws, but that
they function interdependently. Attesting to such
recognition was the rise of the whole field of
psychosomatic medicine. Physiological psychology lhus
began to replace mentalistlc psychology, and the notion
ol a mind-body dualism was on Its way out. In its urgency
to dispose of all traces of mysticism and metaphysics and
move toward becoming a "true.. science, psychology em·
braced the thesis that all human behavior was explainable
F.OUC:/\ llON/\L CONSIOERA TIONS. Vol. 6, INo." all, 1978
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Jn physiological terms. " The tendency to make
psychology a study of behavior rather than an in·
trospectlve analysis of mental states eventually made
considerable headway and became known as
Behaviorism. '' 2
Instead of being an exclusively mental affair, learning
was now understood as a process o f physiological conditioning. It meant establishing neural connections by
means of which a particular stimulus became associated
with a "correct" response. Based upon the findings of the
Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov, most conditioning experiments were performed on rats, dogs, cats, guinea
pigs, chicks and pigeons. Although John B. Watson is
generally credited as being the founder of American
behaviorism, most pioneer learning experiments in this
field were performed by Edward Lee Thorndike, who set
forth the thesis that learning was governed primarily by
the Law of Exercise and the Law of Effect. The Law of
Exercise accounted for the strengthening of stimulusresponse (S·R) bonds through repetition; whereas the Law
of Effect meant that neural connections were
strengthened when a response was pleasant, weakened
when it was not. Learning thus became a matter of con·
ditloning the subject (the learner) to supply whatever
response the conditioner (the teacher) deemed desirable.
Mind was either ignored entirely or reduced to synaptic
connections, and even purposes were regarded as merely
mechanical. In Thorndike's own words:
I read the facts which psychologists report about ad·
justment, configuration, drives, integration, purposes, tensions and the like, and al I of these seem to
me to be reducible, so far as concerns their powers
to Influence the course of thought or feeling or action, to connections and readiness. Learning is connecting . The mirid is man's connecting system. Purposes are as mechanical in their nature as anything
else is.•
Intelligence, insight, understanding, intention and any
sort of abstract or affective thought were placed in limbo,
for they were not directly observable;
while
the conditioned response or the reflex arc, as it came to be called,
became the matrix of learning. Education thus became a
matter of conditioning, which in some areas of learning
amounted to no less than indoctrination, and the schools
were expected to turn out prespecilied products in much
the same fashion as factories turn out automobiles.
II. Perception and Meaning

Behaviorism has undergone certain modifications
since the days of Watson and Thorndike. Phrases such as
"positive and negative reinforcement," ''operant con·
ditioning," "Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation," "aversive
stimuli" and the like have been added to its vocabulary.
What remain, however, are the notions that (1) all behavior
is specific and identifiable in terms of its causal factors;
(2) human behavior Is essentially no different from
nonhuman behavior except in degree of complexity; (3)
human beings, llke all other animals, lack freedom; and (4)
choice Is nonexistent.
What the behaviorist fai ls to recognize is that all
human acts are whole, and not merely the sum of their
separate parts. Fragmentation of human acts into their
sensory stimulus, ideatlonal and response components- although tempting for analytic reasons-is
both arbitrary and artificial. In so far as human acts are
joined with and engaged In for a purpose, they are not sim·

ply motor responses to stimuli. The act of seeing, for
example, is all one with purposiveness. The object seen is
viewed in terms of its meaning, how it is interpreted, the
purposes for which it may be used. To see is to-see-for-a·
purpose. Viewing the Grand Canyon may mean for the
tourist seeing-for-picture·taking purposes; the geologist
may view it for the purpose of observing the erosive
processes of nature; while Ferde Grofe's "Grand Canyon
Suite" may represent its meaning to a composer of music.
No object or set of condlt ions constitutes a stimulus
per se. It becomes a stimulus by being caught up in the
process of ideation and response, of which it is an integral
part. Stimuli are responses in their incipien t stage. Nor are
responses merely to s11mu1;; ·they constitute stimuli trans,
formed, mediated by the motor phase of the so·called
reflex arc . Response requires a reconstitution of stimulus,
i.e., an assignment or reassignment of meaning. A
stimulus responded to, acted upon, undergoes transformation in terms of the interpretation it is given. Nor
can any ob;ect or phenomenon be considered a stimulus
apart from the eliciting of a response or without a taking
into account of the peculiar context in which it appears. A
sudden, staccato sound is ordinarily perceived as a
stimulus. It alerts us, it annoys us, it commands our at·
tention . We attempt to locate and identity it, to determine
whether it is cause for alarm. But if circumstances were
such that what is ordinarily perceived as a loud noise Is
obscured by a steady drone of still louder sounds, it Is
unlikely that any observable response or motor activity
would occur, in which case it would be unwarranted tocafl
the noise a stimulus.
Listening to high· pitched notes being played on a plc·
colo might be pleasing to the ear of a flutist, and so might
be judged as pleasant. A dog hearing the same high·
pitched notes responds also, but not with enjoyment. It
gives indication that the sounds are unpleasant by
whining or withdrawing. We are wont to say that the
musician and the dog are responding d ifferently to the
same stimulus, thus dissociating stimulus from response.
But is this truly the case? Are the musician and the dog actually responding to the " same" stimu lus? Or, as in the
first example, is the warrant of calling something a
stimulus contingent upon the presence or absence of a
response and, as in the second example, is the nature of
the stimulus part and parcel of the nature of both the re·
sponse and the responder? As Spinoza once observed,
"One and the same thing can at the same time be good,
bad and Indifferent: e.g., music Is good to the melancholy,
bad to those who mourn and neither good nor bad to the
deaf."•
If the synergetlc relationship between stimulus and
response Is still not clearly seen, the question might be
raised as to where a stimulus ends and where a response
begins. If no satisfactory answer to this question is
possible, the only conclusion to be drawn is that a
stimulus Is one with its response-just as a cause Is one
with its effect and an organism Is one with its environment. In commenting upon the inadequacy of the
reflex arc concept, John Dewey has written:
What we have is a circuit; not an arc or broken
segment of a circle. Th is circuit is more truly termed
organic than reflex, because the motor response
determines the stimulus, just as truly as sensory
stimulus determines movement. Indeed, the
movement is on ly for the sake of determining the
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s timul us, ot fixing what kind of a stimulus It is, of interpreting ii.'
This Is to say tl\at a stimulus and a response are not
separate segments of an arc but are reciprocal, each a
determinant of and determined by the other. Instead of
representing a linear progression, they constitute a cir·
cult. In the language of Dewey:
The stimulus is that phase of the forming coord ination which represents the conditions which
have to be met in bringing it to a successful issue;
the response Is that phase of one and the same forming co·ordlnation which gives the key to meeting
these conditions, which serves as Instrument In effecting the successful co-ordination. They are
therefore strictly correlative and contemporaneous.•
To suppose that a given s timulus always presumes a
fixed response Is to presuppose certainty where un·
certainty may exist. To be confronted with an uncertain
response-not to know how to respond-is to be con·
fronted with an uncertain stimulus-not to know how to
interpret It. A knock on the door ordinari ly elicits the
response of opening it. But if one has had a prior ex·
perience of opening the door to an Intruder, both the
stimulus and the response take on a character ol In·
determinacy. The qualitative nature of both Is in question,
and a choosing among alternatives is called tor. Should
the knock be Interpreted as that of a friend (Stimulu s A), In
which case the door would likely be opened (Response A);
or should it be Interpreted as the knock of an intruder
(Stimulus B), in which case the door would likely be bolted
(Response B)? Or are still o ther interpretations possible,
which might call for still o ther kinds o f response? As
Dewey states it:
Generalized, sensation as stimulus is always that
phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that
a co-ordination may be completed. What the sensation will be in particular at a given time, therefore,
will depend entirely upon the way in which an ac·
tivity is being directed. It has no fixed quality of Its
own. The search tor the stimulus Is the search for
exact conditions of action; that Is, tor the state of
things which decides how a beginning co·ordinatlon
should be completed.'
To the nonplayer or the overly tired, a tennis court, racquet
and ball are not a stimulus to play tennis; to the nonsmoker, a cigarette Is not a stimulus to smoke; to the
satiated, food is not a stimulus to eat. " ... what makes
some physical thing or trait a stimulus Is the cond ition of
the whole organism at the time, its needs and the kind of
behavior in which It is already engaged."'
.

Ill Conditioning and Intellige nce
The argumen t is sometimes advanced that human
beings and the so-called higller animals have more in com.
mon than they have differences. Indeed, a strong case
could be made for the contention that the physiological
equipment of all mammals Is basically the same. All
engage in eating, sleeping, locomotion, procreation, riving
and dying . All likewise confront and resolve problems, i.e.,
all are capable of exercising intelligence.
hough
Alt
nonhuman forms of animal llfe rely to a considerable extent upon inherited o r genetically programmed behavior
patterns, commonly referred to as instinct, it cannot be
said that human behavior Is without its Instinctive component. For present purposes, instinct may be taken to

mean those special kinds of behavior that are not a result
o f learning or reasoning but are native to a specles-e.g.,
the web·buildlng Instinct of spiders, the nest-building instinct of birds or the storing-of.nuts Instinct of squirrels.
The fact that squirrels have been observed to store nuts
persistently even In regions where nuts are available the
year round tends to d iscount th e notion that such
behavior is consciously purposeful or intelligently directed. It is not a result of reasoning or learning but is endemic to a species, which is largely what is meant by
call ing it instinctive. The human infant likewise displays
such Instinctive forms of behavior as crying, reaching
and grasping, restlessness, yawning, sleeping , etc. The
homely remark that a baby is a yell at one end and com·
plete irresponsibility at the other is nonetheless descriptive ol an instinctive rather than a learned behavior pattern . However sophisticated, however subtly or grandiloquently manifested in adult life th rough the media of
art, philosophy, science and religion, it might be maintained that most human endeavors are but highly refined
ex tensions of o ur inborn tendencies Jo seek pleasure and
satisfaction and to avoid pain and annihilation.
The foregoing argument has its merits, but It also has
Its share ol flaws. One of its merits consists in Its compellingly simplistic explanation of human behavior in terms
of analogous nonhuman behavior. Its major flaw lies in
a confounding of the necessary with the sufficient conditions ol human behavi or. Physiological equipment is a
necessary requirement tor thought, judgment, choice,
Ideation and the like-just as concrete and steel may be
ng.
necessary requ irements tor the construction of a buildi
But physiology itsel f does not cons titute thought, any
more than concrete and s teel them
lvesse
constitute a
building. II Is what human beings are capable of doing
with their physiological equipment that represents their
distinctiveness, just as what they may have decided to do
with concrete and steel consti tutes the distinctiveness o r
a building . As Psychoanalyst Robert Stroller puts it,
"Anatomy is not destiny. Destiny is what people make of
anatomy." Nature furnishes the raw materials, but man
creates the patterns. The tact that the physiological equipment with which we -are born is a necessary condition tor
intelligence is no guarantee of how or even whether It will
be exercised. Intelligence is not an autonomous
possession of human beings which manifests Itself in
vacuo; nor can it be written off as merely responsive behavior to environing situations. What role, then, does in·
telllgence play In the behavioristic framework?
If, in the words of Dewey, "to act with an aim is all one
with acting Intelligently," It could scarcely be argued that
to respond to the strongest stimulus is all one with
responding Intelligently. Lewi s Terman o nce defined intelligence as the ability of an organism to adapt to a new
sl luation. In his later years he said that he reg relied having
used the term "adapt," for It suggested passive response
Instead of active control. If choice Is understood to mean
deliberate
lection
se
of a preferred course of action, and if
Intelligent choice implies selection on the basis of considered ends In view, then the absence of choice-making
ablllty is tantamount to the absence of Intelligence. To put
the matter differently, if by intelligence is meant the ability to choose dlscriminately among alternative courses
of action, then to the extent that ability to choose is
dimini shed or eliminated altogether, Intelligence Is
likewise diminished or eliminated altogether. Whereas
selective ablllty-or what Darwin called " natural selecEDUCALl'IONA
CONSIOfRATIONS
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tlon"-is a common trait of all matter and all life, at the
human level such selective ability has been sufficiently
refined as to warrant the term choice, implying that
peculiar kind of selectivity that is conscious, deliberate,
reflective and undertaken for the purpose of realizing a
foreseeable end. If by conditioning Is meant the
preprogramming of a response, then it becomes a sub·
stltute for deliberation, intelligence, and purposiveness. It
leaves out of account the "inner being" of things and
deals instead with external relationships only. If not to In·
telligence, to what do we resort in coping with situations
for which we have no preprogrammed response?
As John Hott has rightly pointed out, " The true test of
intelligence is not how much we know how to do, but how
we behave when we don't know what to do."' The young
man who, having read a book on etiquette, began conversation with his girl friend by asking, "How's your
mother and little things like that?" and who started his
business letters with " Dear Sir or Madam as the Case May
Be:" may serve as a prime example of rote learn ing but
scarcely of intelligence. To suppose that conditioning will
provide for acting intelligently requires either a
redefinition of intelligence or acceptance of the premise
that life presents no uncertainties. Moreover, it is con·
celvable that persistent conditioning can lead to chronic
anxiety, flattened emotions, depression and feelings of
guilt. Men have been conditioned in some cultures to
believe that weeping in time of sorrow is an unmanly trait
that should be suppressed. Conditioning an affective
response deprives it of its genuinely emotional quality and
substitutes instead only a shallow, overt kind of behavior.
Joys and sorrows are not merely forms of behavior; rather,
they are deep-seated emotions that may or may not
manifest themselves in behaviora
l
terms. Behavior is but
the tip of the Iceberg we know as self. To regard the tip as
constituting the whole is to construct a human
psychology that ignores all but the most trivial and overt
elements of the nature of man.
To conceive man as primarily a responding organism
is to cast him In a passive role. Such a conception relieves
him of responsibility for his actions and excuses him for
his failures, for he has been victimized by external cir·
cumstances or genetic endowment-or both. To conceive
man as capable of exercising initiative casts him in an ac·
tive role, responsible for the choices he makes. Both
classical idealism and modern existentialism have attributed to humans a kind of self-sufficiency that permitted them to rise above the exigencies of circumstance.
In the language of Milton, "The mind is its own place, and
in itsell/Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." The
human mind was thought to be autonomous, capable of
rendering itself immune to external conditions. The power
of humans through the inescapabllity of choice to become
what they will themselves to be is echoed by Jean-Paul
Sartre:
If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is In·
definable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only al·
terward wl II he be somethl ng, and he himself will
have made what he will be.... Not only is man what
he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what
he wills himself to be after this thrust toward
existence. 10
" Condemned to be free,'' man is at every turn of his life
confronted with choice, without which he is nothing. Such
is the nature of the human predicament. Man becomes
human at that point in his life when he realizes that from
CDUCATIONAL CONS/OERA TIONS. Vol. 6, No. 1, "•"· "1978
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the burden of choosing, there is no escape. Whereas
classical
m idealis and modern existentialism have conceived humans as largely self·determined and self.
directed, behaviorism views th em as other-determined
and other-directed. What we are accustomed to call
selfhood is nonexistent. Since there is no self as such, it
becomes nonsense to speak of self-realization, selfactualization, self-fulfilment, or self-control. What we are
offered instead is a kind of mechan ism that responds to
extraneous factors, i.e., to causes outside our control. The
self, in short, cannot act, for it is capable only of reaction-if, indeed, there be any such entity as self at all.
IV. Was Dewey a Behaviorist?
It was stated earlier that much of the present con·
fusion in education is traceable to indecision as to
whether education shou Id be conceived as an art or as a
science -or as both. The argument might even be ad·
vanced that science itself is an art In the sense that it is an
artifact, i.e., a humanly devised, created or contrived
means tor dealing with phenomena. Matters of ethics and
morality would certainly fall within the rubric of art so
defined, for they represent human constructs rather than
raw data. If by art is meant the whole gamut of human
creations as distinguished from what exists in the natural
world apart from human intervention, the argument takes
on a semblance of plausibility. The so-called social sciences
in general and psychology in particular might then be
viewed from a different perspective and seen in a different
light. Obsession with measurement and quantification
might give way to concern for seeing life whole. It Is
recounted that Dewey, once found with a copy of the
Psychological Review in his hands, threw it down , exclaiming, " I despair of psychologists! They have no understanding of what science is. They think it has to do
v1ith measuring and counting.'' 11
To De"fey and other pragmatists, to be scientific in
the true sense of the term Is to be critical-minded, and
critical mindedness is not limited to physical concerns
but applies across the board. They viewed the term science
in broader perspective than those who fail to see the
woods for the trees, i.e., whose preoccupation with bits
and pieces of knowledge prevents them from seeing life
whole. Both Dewey and present·day behaviorists have
rejected mentalism, or what Gilbert Ryle has called "the
myth of the dogma of the ghost in the machine."
Piecemeal and out·of-context reading of Dewey might
even suggest that he embraced behaviorism, as when he
wrote:
.. . instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of
thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is
literally something which we do; that analysis is
ultimately physical and active; that meanings in their
logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and
methods of behaving toward facts, and that active
experimentation is essential to verification. >i
Context aside, does the above passage qualify Dewey as a
behaviorist? The answer is that Dewey was a behaviorist
in the sense that he rejected the notion of thought as an
arcane process of noesis with no necessary issue in con·
duct, for he held that the whole purpose of thinking is to
provide warrant for a given course of action. Behaving or
acting he regarded as proving grounds for hypotheses.
Behavior is not an end in itself but a means for testing the
adequacy of a formulated course of action, for deter·
mining the justification of a theory by observing how It
5
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works out in pracllce. Dewey was not a behaviorist to the

~xtent that he joined theory with practice, thought with ac·

hon. thus obv1ahng any need for viewing reflection in
1solallon from behaviOf or behavior apart from reflection.
Whereas behaviorism has little concern for reflection to
Dewey reflection was viewed as the indispensable me~ns
for rendering action intelligent and purposeful, thus
preventing It from becoming random, accidental or blind ·
while action was seen as intelligent and purposefu l only
as It represen ted a consummation of thought.
V. Some Caveats re Social Engineeri ng
Both behaviorism and pragmatism reject the notion
or absolute human autonomy, i.e., the Idea that human
beings have some kind of inner will that enables them to
cut themselves ott from environing circumstances or past
experience and to act in vacuo. There is a dlfterence
however. between rejecting absolute autonomy and
recognizing a degree of autonomy that provides for the
exercise of intelligence in circumstances that are highly
Indeterminate and hence unpredictable in their outcomes.
But whereas In the writings of Dewey the role o f in·
telllgence is nearly everywhere paramount, It Is significant
to note that virtually no mention Is made of Intelligence in
the writings of the behaviorists. To Dewey, the learner is
brought to maturity through the cultivation of critical
social Intelligence. Every conception or the good 1~
ullfmately social, which is to say that ii has to do with how
we conduct ourselves in reference not simpl y to our own
individual or selfish desires but to the general or social
welfare; this, in turn, creates conditions whereby inrealized. This is to
dlvld uar freedoms may be more fu lly
say that an Individual is no more or less free than the
society in which he lives either restric ts or protects his
abi lity to exercise choice. Dewey likewise believed that
scientific inquiry Itself is a basically moral and social un·
dertaking and therefore laden with moral and social
obligations.
Except in a strictly biological sense, human nature is
not given at birth; rather, it consists of those specific
traits o f character that have been deliberately cultivated
through the medium of education. Human beings at blrlh
are predisposed to act neither morally nor Immorally.
Moral conduct is learned rather than innate, and It Is
socially oriented rather than privately intuited. Nor Is that
kind of behavior that has been conditioned or In·
doctrinated in accordance with some set of rules govern·
Ing "propriety" worthy of being labeled moral, for It lacks
the undergirding of reflective accountability. In Dewey's
tho ught moral intelligence is neither reifled nor auton·
omlzed. Rather than referring to a person as having,
owning, or possessing intelligence. Dewey prefers to
speak of an individual as conducting himself Intelligently.
Use of the adverbial form prevents viewing intelligence as
a thing or entity possessed and shifts the emphasis to Its
practical issue, i.e., to its consequences in action.
Behaviorist B.F. Skinner, on the other hand, ap·
parently rejects intelligence as an avenue to the good me.
Distinctions between gOOd and evil are to be accounted
for In terms of positive and negative reinforcement.
Whatever reinforces us positively-1.e., elicits a pleasant
response-is good, moral and right; whatever reinforces
us negatively-1.e., elicits an unpleasant response-is
bad, immoral and wrong. The survival of good over evil is
thus guaranteed in the scheme of things, for, according to
Skinner, ii Is our '' nature" to seek positive reinforcements
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and to avoid negative ones." This sounds as though it is
"na.tural" f<!r human beings to seek what is good and to
avood what 1s evil. Reminiscent of the romantic naturalism
of Rousseau, it Implies some sort of built·in mechanism
instinctive moral sense, or Kantian "immanence" thai
enables man to select positive reinforcements and to
avoid negative ones-the very thing that behaviorists have
elsewhere denied in claiming that all behavior is conditioned behavior. Moreover, ii fails to note that many ex·
periences may be satisfying that are not at all moral, and
that many others may be unpleasant that are not for that
reason evil. Acts of brutality may be gratifying to those of
sadistic inclination, but are they for that reason good?
Acts of self-sacrifice and deprivation may be unpleasan t
because of the hardships they entail, but are they for such
reason bad? As Max Wingo states it, " If we grant .. . that
goods are positive relnforcers ... how do we know that
those things that reinforce us positively are really
good-that 1s, thal they are desirable and worthy of being
prized and sought after?"" The ultimate criterion that
Skinner employs In determining the worth of a culture is
survival. A culture survives to the extent that control is
exercised over the behavior or Its members."
In
view of
the fact that few social orders can be cited wherein
greater control was exercised over the behavior of their
members than that which prevailed during the Nazi
regime, this appears to be a rather odd contention.
Perhaps Skinner had best confine his efforts to ex·
periments with rats and pigeons. When he undertakes 10
pl~y social engineer, he Is venturing into a domain that Is
ahen to nonhuman animals, viz., culture. His social
utopias convey no profound recognition of what Unamuno
has called "the tragic sense or fife," but appear to be spun
out of a cotton.candy kind o f euphoria. Nor can his
utopias in any way be regarded as guaranteed outcomes
of the methods he employs; Indeed, identical methods
can be and have been used to produce and maintain
human bondage. The notion that only "good" cultures sur·
vive-that is, that survival is the test for the worth of a
culturebelied
is
by the fact that tyrannical monarchies
oligarchies and other forms of predemocratic soclai
arrangement have a far longer history or survival than does
democracy. The power of chol~e which democracy prizes
has always been understood as ability to select freely
a~on~ alternatives and to act accordingly. Only in
sotuahons where no alternative exists is choice denied as
i~ ~he drudging I.ire of the slave or the slrictured living c'ond1hons o.f the pnsoner, for such lives require no more than
conformity 10 rules already laid down. At authoritarian
political levels what In simple psychological terms has
been called stimulus becomes the prod of brute force, and
response be.comes submission to the whip of authority.
Although Skinner carefully avoids reference to tyranny in
rejecting all semblances or human autonomy, what he
substitutes are external controls as formulated by
"enlightened" social engineers-which amounts to a
euphemistic phrasing of authoritarianism. That such a
view is sharply at odds with a fundamental precept of
democracy is illustrated In the following passage from
Dewey:
0

Since a democratic society repudiates the principle
of external authority, II must find a substitute In
voluntary disposition and interest; these can be
created only by education. But there Is a deeper ex·
planation. A democracy Is more than a form of govern·
ment; ii is primarily a mode or associated living, of
EOUCATIONAL CONSIOr:Rll TIONS
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conjoint communicated experience. The extension
in space of the number of individuals who par·
tlcipate in an interest so that each has to refer his
own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own,
is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers
of class, race and national territory which kept men
from perceiving the full import of their activity.••

J

self

VI. "The Hypothesis That Man Is Not Free . .."
Frequently overlooked in discussions of Skinner's
brand of behaviorism is a key premise upon the warrant of
which much of his psychological structure stands or falls.
He stales it as follows: ' 'The hypothesis that man is not
free is essential to the application of scientific method to
the study of human behavior."" In the first place, it should
be noted that this is a hypothesis, an assumption without
proof, a provisional or suppositional statement,
verification of which has never been estab I ished. In the
second place, the assertion begs the question, for it
requires us to assume the warrant of a statement that is it·
self open to question, viz., that scientific method is ap ·
plicable to a study of human behavior only If It is first
hypothesized that human beings are not free. This is
equivalent to holding that scientific study is not only ham·
pered but impossible where the object studied behaves
unpredictably, thus vlolaling humanly formulated laws
governing its behavior. In the third place, despite in·
clusion of the word scientific, the statement Itself is
patently unscientific, for it flies in the face of a major
requirement of all scientific propositions, viz., that they be
in fact or in principle testable. Untestable hypotheses for
this reason cannot be viewed as truly scientific. In the
fourth place, application of scientific method to a study of
human or any other kind of behavior would begin, not with
a prej udgment-in this case, that human beings are not
free- but with impartial inquiry. Indeed, not to do so
would be the antithesis of scientific method. In the fifth
place, the assertion is covertly prescriptive in Its claim
that the hypothesis must be accepted ("is essential")
before study of human behavior can be undertaken, and so
is hortatory rather than descriptive. It shows, to
paraphrase Bertrand Russell, that the worse your premise,
the more curious the conclusions to which it gives rise.
If human beings were not free to act in unanticipated
ways, their behavior would of course more easily ·lend it
to study and prediction. What Skinner may be thinking
is-to phrase it In the vernacular-that accepting the
hypothesis that man is not free would make the study of
human behavior a helluva lot easier. " Sit still! Don't
move!" the professional photographer often says to his
subject, meaning that the photograph will be clearer ii the
subject engages In no unpredictable movements. The portrait painter makes a simi lar request of his subject. This is
suggestive of Michael Scriven's remark that "the
logician's perennial temptation is to make the portrait
neat and perhaps the sitter will become neat."" Just as it
is easier to take aim at a nonmoving target, so It is simpler
to s tudy an object that " stays put." Whether it is of the
nature of the object to stay put is conveniently Ignored. In stead of beginning with disinterested inquiry Into human
behavior, we are asked to begin with an assumption about
human nature that is not only unsupported by the evidence but, indeed, is denied by it. Even so exact a science
as physics recognizes the indeterminacy of atomic par·
ticles, to say nothing of the questionableness of the
il\ll, 197&
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cause-effect principle as an adequate explanation of
natural phenomena. Moreover, theorizing about human
nature is a different undertaking from studying human
behavior and, if engaged in on a scientific basis, would
properly follow rather than precede the latter.
Only a wholly static universe would be entirely pre·
dictable. Hence, predictability is related not only to sim·
plicity and mechanism but also to fixity, not to mention its
reliance upon an outmoded physics. If, as William James
once observed, ours is "a universe with the lld off," if
universal processes are charged with novelty and
burgeoning with change, if life is an ongoing and dynamic
affair, if novelty Is in the scheme of things and not merely
superimposed upon it, then a radically different approach
to a study of human nature and life processes ls called for.
Mechanism needs to be supplanted by field theory, and
prejudicial hypotheses by inquiry. To hold that It Is essen·
tial that we begin a study of human behavior by
hypothesizing that human beings lack freedom is
equivalent to assuming without question that they have
no ability to engage in acts of choice. Since the only kinds
of choice that deserve the name are those that are freely
undertaken, choice Is essential to democracy, for the
ability to choose without undue restraint and to act accordingly is precisely what is meant by freedom.
If there is to be a science of human behavior-and If II
is to be truly a science and not merely an
apologetics-then it is obligated to divest itself of Its
biased premises in order to become descriptive, objective
and impartial. Inquiry into the nature of human behavior
will need to displace " the hypothesis that man is not
free," for the former is open-ended, whereas the latter
begs the question. The question, " Is man free to behave in
unpredictable ways?" Is thus bypassed; and the
hypothesis remains undisturbed. This is not unlike saying
that the hypothesis that ghosts exist is essential to
studying their behavior, thus circumventing any question
as to their actual existence. To begin with the hypothesis
that man is not free demands corollary acceptance of
human beings as capable of no more than responsive
behavior- as devoid of choice, as deprived of any k ind of
self.control, and as essentially no diflerent from
nonhumans. Yet, even a trapped animal struggles to be
free, just as animals in captivity are restricted in what they
are free to do. As the noted prlmatologist Scott Lindbergh
has observed: ' 'Monkeys in zoos are like convicts. They
have no choice in anything. And choice is essential to
keep intelligence alive. Animals are li ke people. They need
to be able to do things for themselves." To say that man's
most prized possession is freedom may be to use
figurative language. But it may be worth noting that such
an assertion is more often made with greater fervor and
understanding of its import by those who have experienced bondage than by those who have never been enslaved.
VII. Concerning Poets, Women, and Hens
Are human beings responsible for what they do?
What role does the self play in determining human con·
duct? Or are all hu man acts prompted by forces ex·
traneous to themselves, and is the term self merely a
metaphor? We shall examine these questions in greater
detail in a later section. Suffice it to say at this point that
to em brace behaviorism is to accept the thesis that
selfhood is nonexistent. What we are accustomed to
calling self is simply genetic endowment plus conditioning
;
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and has no e.xlstence of its own. Human being s are thus
relieved of assuming any moral obligation for what they
do, for instead of having chosen to do this or that, their
behavior has resulted from factors over which they had no
con trol. Neither saints nor sinners are responsible for
their actions; hence moral acts are no more deserving of
praise than are criminal acts deserving of condemnation.
Nor are artistic accomplishments any more suitable Ob·
Jec ts of admiration than are diabolical schemes flt objects
of scorn. According to Skinner, " having " a poem, for
example, is essentially no different from "having" a baby.
Nor is it any different from a hen laying an egg. In each
case it is simply descriptive of a natural phenomenon for
which neither the pregnant woman, nor the "pregnant"
poet, nor the laying hen is primarily responsible. The poet
Is no more deserving of acclaim for having written his
poem than is the woman for having had her baby or the
hen for having laid its egg . " Writing a poem ," says Skinner, "is the sort of thing men and women do as men and
women, having a baby is the sort of thing a woman does as
a woman, and laying an egg is the sort of thing a hen does
as a hen." We are able to discover the causes of our actions " by analyzing the genetic and individual histories
responsible for our behavior... .""
But suppose we were to choose a different cast of
characters without altering one whit Skinner's line of
reasoning. Suppose we were to say that committing
crimes is the short of thing men and women do as men
and women, becoming a prostitute is the sort of thing a
woman does as a woman, and stalking prey is the sort of
thing a wild an Imai does as a wild an ImaI. And suppose we
were to add that, just as the poet had no responsibility for
writing his poem, neither can criminals or prostitutes be
held accountable for their criminal acts or prostitution. In
the case of the wild animal, Skinner's explanation will suflice. But this Is precisely the point. The wlld animal
behaves as II does because it cannot behave otherwise;
accordingly,
would II
be foolish either to praise or to
blame it. It lacks developed powers of reflection, II lacks
moral sensibility, it lacks ability to choose one course of
action over another-and so condemning its behavior
would be like condemning a tornado for its destructive
force. Having committed the genetic fallacy, Skinner then
proceeds to commit the fallacy of overgeneralization. To
suppose that because man is an animal he is therefore
nothing but an animal is to commit what the gen eticist Sir
Julian Huxley has called ,""the no thlng·but fallacy which
results from an equation of all human traits with
nonhuman animal traits. What we are being asked to accept is that, since nonhuman animals (or, to use Skinner's
example, hens) are not responsible lor what they do,
therefore human beings are equally nonresponslble lor
what they do. The flaw in thi s sort of reasoning might
become more apparent if the argument were reversed,
resulting in the conclusion that, since human beings are
responsible for their actions, therefore nonhumans are
equally responsible, in which case a sow could be
arrested and brought to trial tor the crime ol devouring her
young. One argument has about the same amount of
credibility as the other-which Isn't much.
Arguments against the thesis that human beings are
absolutely autonomous in all their thoughts and actions
constitute child's play. No philosophic profundity is
required to recognize that we are at all times engaged in
interaction with some kind of environment-be it
physical, psychological, religious, cultural, social or
A
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whatever-and that previous experience plays a
significant role in shaping present and future behavior.
But II is one thing to acknowledge that prior experience Is
taken into account, Is influential, becomes a contributing
factor, or has a bearing in respect to our behavior, and
quite another lo hold that it predetermines our behavior. In
rejecting human autonomy, what behaviorists do, in ef·
feet, is to substitute environmental autonomy. By casting
the human being in a passive role of responder, they cast
the environment (plus genetic history) in an active ro le of
controller, overlooking the fact that abject submission on
the part of one or autonomous control on the part of the
other is virtually never the case.
If we were to lall lrom an airplane without a parachute
at a height of 16,000 feet, we would likely have lost control
of our destiny, and the environmental field might be said
to have taken over almost completely. In times of
catastrophes such as cyclones, earthquakes and strikes
of lightning, our powers of choice are temporari ly
minimized; and we are said to be at the mercy of the
elements. But such Instances are comparatively rare; they
are far outnumbered by examples of man 's ability to con·
trol the conditions under which he lives. Each time an
engineer constructs a dam, each time a physician In· enes
terv
in the natural course of a disease, each time new
and better means of communication and transportation
are devised, human beings are playing an active role In
shaping and controlling their environments.
The concert artist who holds an audience enthralled,
the conductor whose every gesture conveys subtle nuances of interpretation to an orchestra, the writer whose
literary gen ius captivates the reader, the actor or actress
whose performance is acclaimed as brilliant-all are
likewise in control of what they are doing, all are shaping
and creating a special kind of environment. In such latter
instances, the argument is not that they are absolutely
autonomous, for they must enlist the co-operation ol fac·
tors other than themselves. But they are nevertheless
exercising a significant degree of autonomy in that they
are creating, inventing, or bringing into being a different
set of conditions than would oth erwise prevail. Human
beings both act upon and respond to their environments.
The relationship between Individuals and their environments is transactional rather than unilateral. In fact,
it Is this peculiar ability of human s to conceive and to ao·
tualize modifications of their environments that con·
stllutes their uniqueness as human beings and thus
distinguishes them from other species.
VIII. The Concept of Selfhood
Throughout our discussion the role that self plays In
this transactional process still remains clouded, perhaps
for the reason that the terms self and self hood have yet to
be clearly defined. Behaviorism would of course reject the
notion of selfhood, just as it would discount the existence
of free will. Rejection o f such terms as existences or entities, however, is not equivalent to their rejection as concepts. Behaviorism Itself is a concept In the sense that it
cannot be pointed to as " existing" anywhere. Not·
withstanding, little is gained by dogmatically maintaining
that the self exists or that human beings have tree will,
and letting It go at that, without bothering to clarify what Is
meant when such assertions are made. What, then, does It
mean to say that the self exists? To exist is, in familiar
terms, to have weight and occupy space. Obviously, the
self cannot be so classlfled. To say that to exist means to
£DU(1\ TIONAL CONSIDERA
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have temporal-spatial d imensions doesn't help much
either, for this wou ld require that the self be locatable in
time and space. The edge that the behaviorists have on
those who understand the self to exist in some
autonomous sense Is that the notion of a hypostatized
self is scien tifically Indefensible. And so the behaviorist
confronts us with deciding between discarding the self as
a discredited entity under the guise of scientific rigor, and
holding on to it in the name of some sort of metaphysics.
The fact is that we are not obi igated to settle for eit her of
these alternatives.
Just as water is not si mply two·parts of hydrogen and
one of oxygen but is a liquid exhibiting properties quite
different from either of its constituent elements, just as a
child evinces qualities quite different from those of the
parents who produced him, so the self displays traits of its
own that are appreciably different from whatever forces
may have contributed to Its creation . The emergence of
consciousness, moreover, suggests degrees of self·
awareness and powers of introspection that neither genes
nor conditioning can account for. What is called self
emerges from the act ive interplay of human organisms
,tal fie
lds and especially from the inwith their environmen
teraction of human beings with their distinctively social
environments. Self is neither a thing or entity possessed
nor a mere metaphor; It is an emergent function, descrip·
tive of the various ways in which humans both respond to
and control the ambient fields in which they live, move,
and have their bei ng. Accord
, self
ingly
may be defined as
a conceptual term denoting an individual's peculiar
awareness of his own existence in relation to the world
about him, and especially of those unique traits that set
him apart from others.
Simil
arly, free wi ll is not an entity or metaphysical
substance; nor is it autonomous in the sense that it exists
in isolation from contexlual circumstances. It is simply an
iii-chosen term that needs to be redefined as the power to
choose without unwarranted restraint from among competing alternatives. Si nee no choice deserves the name
that is not freely undertaken, it carries with it the burden
of moral responsibil ity for the consequences to which it
may lead. The fact that nonhuman animals give no indication of acting in any moral sense but behave on the
basis of Insti nct, hab ituation , o r conditioning
necessitates the conclusion that morality is a uniquely
human construct. Nor can any human act be dignified as
moral except as It Is an outgrowth of reflection, intention
and consideration of the desirabil ity of all its probable
consequences.
If
IX. The ls-Ought Dichotomy-A Backward Look
Two final considerations are in order. The first has to
do with an attempt to clarify the relationship between
statements of fact and statements of value; the second
concerns a neglected but much-needed distinction be·
tween generic behavior and human conduct. Pace David
Hume and latter-day British empiricists and philosophic
analysts, it has become fashionable to regard empirical
assertions and valuational assertions as constituting
separate universes of discourse-commonly referred to
as the is-ought dichotomy. According to this view, factual
(or synthetic) statements c onsist of assertions that can be
empirically verified; furthermore, on ly empirically
verifiable assertions may be considered to be
propositions. The assertion, for example, "It Is raining
today" is factually true in so far as evidence can be cited
t.()VCATJONAL C01'\'SIO£R1\ 110NS, Vol. (>, No. 1. faJ!, 1978

Published by New Prairie Press, 2017

in support of it, in so far as what constitutes evidence can
be agreed upon, and in so far as the evidence is public
ly
demonstrable. When such conditions are met, the
proposition wou ld then "compel the assent" of any im·
partial observer, i.e., it may be said to be true. A more
technical assertion, like "E ~ MC2," would need to meet
the same criteria, with the understanding, of course, that
evidence in this case might be quasi-mathematical, and
that "publicly demonstrable" would no doubt refer to its
demonstrability to a community of qualified physicists. In
neither case, however, could such propositions be judged
as true on any such basis as intuition, feeling or any other
sort of nonempirical "authority."
The corollary of this view is that statements of value
are of an entirely different order and are traceable to
emotion rather than rooted in fact. They are regarded as
•·veiled imperatival utterances," which is to say that they
are either direct or indirect exhortations to action. "Close
the window" is an obvio us exhortation to act in a specific
way, and so is neither true nor false. Sentences couched
in the indicative mood may pass as assertions of fact; but
if they conceal a value. an "ought," or an imperative, they
are said to be removed from the category of the synthetic.
The judgmental assertion, " The welfare system of this
country is in need of reform," appears superficially to be a
statement of fact. It is phrased in the indicative mood. It
om its the word " ought" and seems to be an observation of
fact, of a particular state of affairs. But what is actually
being asserted, It may be argued, Is not a fact but a
feeling. What the assertion really says is, " I feel that the
welfare system needs to be reformed," or, "The welfare
system ought to be reformed, " or, more directly, "Reform
the welfare system!"
The judgmental assertion about the wel fare system
is, like all other judgments, reduced to no more than an e*·
pression of emotion. So conceived, truth assertions
(propositions) are regarded as scientific and testable,
while judgmental assertions (valuations) are regarded as
emotive and untestable-and never the twain shall meet.
In the words of A.J . Ayer: " , .. since the expression of a
value judgement is not a proposition, the question of truth
or falsehood does not here arise.•• . . exhortations to
moral virtue are not propositions at all, but ejaculations or
commands which are designed to provoke . .. action of a
certain sort. According ly, they do not belong to any
branch of philosophy or science. As for expressions of
ethical judgements, we have not yet determined how they
'
should be classified."'
philosophy differs from science in any cogent way,
the difference lies In recog nition of science as largely
descriptive and phenomenological and of phi.losophy as
Interpretive and judgmental. The phi losopher is, as it
were, an I mpresslonist
; while
the scientist Is a
photographer. Althoug h appropriate distinctions may be
made, the mistake commonly made is to presume a gap or
disparity between these two domains instead of viewing
them as complementary. "How satisfying," says Mr.
Gradgrind in Dickens' Hard Times, "is the possession of
fact, which does away with any mystery surrounding our
daily lifei"-forgettlng that to know all facts and possess
no feelings is not to live at all. What does it mean? Is
everywhere the paramount q uestion. for no factual or
descriptive statement has any significance except as It is
interpreted in some way or assigned some kind of
meaning. An out-of-context fact-i.e., a fact devoid of its
bearing upon human intE?rests and human concerns-is
9
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ce,

tellectio
n.
To argue that there is utterly no relationship
utterlyngless.
meani
Thus, the assertion that Sanskrit was
between what is true and what Is valued is not only unthe ancient Aryan language of the Hindus of India, despite
warranted but untenable. As Dewey has observed, "The
Its factual accuracy, is infinitely less meaningful than that
notion that valuations do not exist In empirical fac t and
a close friend o r relative has been seriously injured in an
that lherefore
lue·concept
va
ions have to be imported from
accident.
a source outside experience is one of the most curious
Like the stimulus of our earlier discussion, a fact has
beliefs the mind of man has ever entertained."" He goes
no intrinsic meaning. II assumes meaning when we j udge
on to say that
or interpret It in some manner, value or devalue It, assign
. . . at the present time the widest gap In knowledge
Importance or unimportance to it, react to it in a particular
Is that which exists between humanistic and non·
way- which is 10 say that facts are what they mean. To
speak of a value·fr
ee fact is to speak of a fac t with no utter
humanistic subjects. The breach will disappear, the
gap be filled and science be manifest as an
significance, ror meani ng consists In what Dewey has
calledemotion
" the
it stirs, the thought it sustains." The
operating unlly fn fact and not merely in idea when
assertion " II Is raining today" Is understood in terms of
the conclusions of impersonal non-humanistic
what it means as disting uished from what It merely in·
science are employed in guiding the course of
distinctively human behavior, that, namely
forms. It may mean that a proposed picnic wlfl have to be
,
which is
Influenced by emoti on and desire in the framing o f
canceled, or that crops wil l now have a better chance of
surviving, or that an intended visit
l
wil need to be post·
means and ends; for desire, having ends·in·view, and
paned, or any of countless other things, each of which is
hence invotions,
lving
l va ua
is the characteristic that
likely to be fraught with pleasure or frustration. Even so
marks off human from nonhuman behavior. On the
apparently dispassionate an assertion as "E = MC2" Is
other side, the science that Is put to distinctively
modified and takes on meaning by virtue of its affective
human use is that In which warranted ideas about
the nonhuman world are integrated with emotion as
content. II may simply mean that mass and energy are in·
terc onvertible and summon visions of the benefits to be
human traits. In thi s integration not only is science
Itself a value (since it is the expression and
derived from nuclear fission. Or it may symbolize the
ato mic bomb, mushroom clouds, and the tragedy o f
fulfill ment of a special human desire and interes t)
Hiroshima, and cause us to recoil in horror. All of this is
but it is the supreme means of the valid deteranother way of saying that the moral, judgmental or
mination of all valuations in all aspects of human
valuational content of propositions is not something
and social life."
apart; on the contrary, it is precisely what endows them
Joining of the factual with the valuational is not
with meaning, without which lhoy have no value or
without its educational import. Alth
o ugh It may be argued
significance.
that how learning occurs is a fac tual question, and that
what Is valued is a philosophic one, the two become lnex·
Equall y indefensible is the notion that valuationaf
assertions are unrooted in or somehow disconnected
tricably interwoven when it is recogniied that what Is
from any empirically verifiable context, or that they in
learned and how it is learned assume significance only in
some way transcend experience. Judgments are properly
terms of ends or purposes. Of what value is such-and·such a
rendered and valuations properly made o nly by taking into
learning? thus overrides the question of how a particular
account existing situations, i.e., facts. What ought to be
kind of learning occurs or how it is best facilitated.
Ex·
done in a parti
cular circumstance depends upo n what is perlmentatfon
co ncerning the nature of the learning
process may yield the conclusio
n
the case. " Oug ht" assertions are thus subject to criticism
that, given a certain
as to their warrant in much the same way as are synthetic
organism and a specific set of environing c ond itions, this
is the way learning occurs. But such an assertion leaves
assertions. To say, tor example, that a street ought to be
paved would be warranted onty If the facts indicate<! that
untouched the larger question of whether a designated
Its present condition was unsatisfactory, that it had
learning device ought to be used, or whether what is
learned by means of it ought to be learned at all.It is
chuckholes that Interfered with safe driving. that It had a
heavy llow of traffic, etc. To say that a greater abundance
becoming ever more apparent that an ls·oug ht dualism is
o f food is needed In a given area wou Id be warranted only
both tenuous and stultifying, suggesting as it does thal a
If the facts indicated that the particular area referred to
fact need have no relevance to value and that a value need
was in short supply of food. That certain things are prized,
have no referent In fact. Dissolution of such a dichotomy
valued and revered and that others are scorned, devalue<!
would bring about recognition of the scientific and the
and condemned Is not only itself a fact but it is derived
valuatfonal as reciproc
al
rather than as disparate
from fact, i.e., It Is warranted by knowledge. Clean air is
categories. II wou ld join science of learning with
prized because of the fact that It is c onducive to health,
philosophy of education In common cause by utilizing the
while pollut
ion Is
c ondemned because it is known to c on·
knowledge that research supplies toward a real ization of
tribute to respiratory di sease. The growing of vegetables
lued
ends that are ind ividually and socially defensible. It might
Is va
because of the fact that their consumption Is
even provide for the emergence of some sort of
necessary to a balanced diet, while malaria-carrying
wholeness or coordinating principle that may enable us to
mosquitoes are decried because they are k nown to be
regain our educational perspective.
harmful to health.
The traditional argument that an "ought" assertion is
X. Generic Behavior and Human Conduct- A Needed
not deducible from an " is" assertion will no longer suf·
Distinc tion
li
not because It is invalid bu t because it substitutes
It Is commonplace that everyth ing that exists Is In
"slide-rule" logic for fruitful Inquiry. It represents a
some sense unique. No two atoms, no two flowers, no two
holdover from an Obsolescent syllogistic or Aristotelian
snowflakes, no two sunsets, no two twins are precisely
sort of reasoning which is rooted not in human experience
ldentlcal. In the animal kingdom It Is the unique charac·
and human affairs but in not much more than esoteric in·
teristlcs that various organisms exhibit that enable us to
10
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Identify them as belonging to a certain species, not.
withstanding the fact that they may share many traits in
coinmon with other species. By contrast, to say that every
form o f life and matter engages in some sort of behavior,
or that behavior characterizes all that exists, Is a loosely
grandiose rather than a sharply definitive assertion. for II
falls to account for any uniqueness among the entitles to
which II Is applied. So used, the term behavior rs all·
encompassing, rangi ng all the way from the actions of
subatomic particles to those of galaxies, from the actions
of amoebae to those of human beings. What Is probably
being taken Into account in asserting that all things
behave Is that movement of some sort Is everywhere
present - be It the slow progression of a glacier or the
speed of light. When the term behavior is thus used, no
distinction Is made between behavior that Is a result of an
object's being acted upon (as the case of a glacier) and
behavior that Is self·in itiated (as in the case of human
beings). Such a view fails to differentiate between reactive
and creative behavior. If, in reply to asking what does not
behave, we are told that nothing exists that does not
behave, then the term behavior ceases to have any
definitive meaning, for it cannot be distinguished from
nonbehavlor. By way of analogy, if everything were wet,
dry would have no meaning; or, if there were no darkness,
light would have no meaning. Terms have meaning and
thus are definitive only as they can be differentiated from
other terms.
Does this Imply that the term behavior should be
restric ted to nonhuman forms of life and matter and that ll
Is Inapplicable to human beings? Does ii mean that human
beings do not behave? Does II d iscount the validity o f a
science of human behavior? Not at all. Human beings,
along with all o ther living organisms and physical entitles,
dp act In ways that may properly be termed behavioral, If
for no other reason than that they engage in movement.
But whereas all engage In movement, and whereas many
human activities may constitute no more than movement,
all such activities fall within the rubric of noninitlated or
responsive behavior. In response to nutrients in the soil,all,
rainf
and conducive temperatures, a plant grows and
blooms; in response to proper training, a dog obeys Its
master; as a result of the pressing of certain keys, a
typewriter responds by producing typewritten woras and
sentences; In noticing the changing of a traffic light from
green to red , a motorist responds by applying the brakes
of a car. All such behavior is responsive, and responsive
behavior Is as characteristic of human beings as it Is o f
nonhumans. But ll wil l scarcely do to conclude that
because human beings engage i n responsive kinds of
behavior, therefore all human behavior Is responsive, I.e.,
that human behavior Is Identifiable in no other sense. This
would be like saying that because machinery Is used In
the manufacture or automobiles, therefore all machinery
is so used and Is Identifi
able
in no other sense.
Not long ago arguments about such Issues as tree
will vs. determinism and hered ity vs. environment
dominated the educational scene. The unexamined
assumption that exclusive attachment to one position or
the other was our only option precl uded consideration
that a qualified acceptance of both positions was not only
possible but reasonable. Inquiry is thwarted and
dogmatism creeps in when it is supposed that only one
point of view Is completely right and that any other is all
wrong. The mis take that behaviorists make is to conclude
that because so·called free will cannot be relfied, man is
fAU, 197(1
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therefore not free, and so is Incapable of choice. What is
overlooked is that to choose Is to engage in a kind of
behavior, I.e., that choice has Its behavioral d imensions. It
is crucial to add, however, that a "choice" that has been
predetermined is not a choice at all, for to speak of a "con·
ditioned choice" is to employ mutually contradictory
language. Thus viewed, selective behavior is not choice it·
self, nor is it the whole of it; rather. It represents but the
observable tip or overt culmination o f choosing. Whereas
the existentialist would have us believe that we are always
con fronted with choice, the behaviorist would have us
believe that we are never tree to choose. Why not say that
we experience some situations In which the possibilities
for choice are virtually unlimiled and others where they
are severely restricted?
This suggests that in situations where individuals are
relatively free to control, take charge of, or assume
responsibility for their actions, the term conduct be used,
and that the generic term behavior be applied in
describing actions and movements that are merely
responsive. One does not speak, for example, of atoms,
worms, hens, dogs, trees or stars as in any sense con·
ducting themselves, for their behavior is for the most part
in response to forces over which they have virtually no
control. Even here, however, It Is important to add that an
object itself is as much a determiner or Its behavior as are
external forces that play upon II. A marble and a wad of
chewing gum may be placed on th e same inclined plane.
Both are in the same gravitational field . Yet each responds
differently. The marble selects to roll , while the wad of
gum selects to remain in place. Such selectivity is, of
cou rse, neither conscious, deliberate nor purposeful. It is
simply il lustr
ative that lhe nature o f an object itself is as
much a selec tor of Its behavior as are the external forces
to which it responds. Selec tive ability thus understood is
characteristic of all forms o f matter; whereas choice
represents that peculiar refinement of selective ability
that renders it reflective and purposeful, and that makes
possible a realiwtion of foreseeable ends. According ly, in
so far as it suggests a significant degree of conscious,
purposive self-regulation, conduct is a uniquely human
trait and cannot be applied to any other form of life or matter.
We are often misled Into denying the uniqueness of
human beings by the argument that their biolog ical and
physiological equipment is essentially no different from
that of their nearest nonhuman relatives, all of which
display varying degrees of intelligence. But this argument
misses the poin t, for the distinc tiveness of human beings
lies not in their physiolog ical equipment but in the
uniquely human ways in which they are capable of putting
such equipment to use. As some geneticists maintai n,
human evolution in a s tric tly biological sense has
probably run its course, but human evolution in terms of
the development of moral and social intelligence has
probably just begun. Mastery of the forces of nature out·
side us has o utstripped our abili ty to master the forces of
nature within us. We have succeeded to a terrifying extent
in controlling our physical envi ronment, but we are only
beginning to learn the importance of controlling ourselves
in a moral sense. This means, first. that man's future
evolution will likely be in terms of developing and refining
his intellectual,
ral
mo
and aesthetic powers; and, secondly, that for the first time In human history the course of
man's future evolution will be within man' s collective
power to control. This is neither an optimistic nor a
11
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pessimistic observation, for it opens up possibilities for
both dire and beneficent consequences. Impartial ly It
the burden of choice in regard to the kind of future
world man prefers to live in squarely on man's shoulders;
it places man in charge of his own destiny. Whatever out·
comes emerge will depend upon how human beings
choose to conduct themselves, and how they choose to
conduct themselves will depend largely upon the kind of
education to which we choose to expose them. How, then,
should education be conceived?
To ask, What are the purposes of education? is to ask
a meaningless question, for it assumes that purposes are
ready-made, lying about, extant, waiting to be discovered .
A better question to ask would be: In light o f past ex·
perience, present condit ions and future posslbllilles. how
shall we best formulate the purposes of education? This is
a perennial question . It needs to be addressed again and
again, for as conditions change and as further experience
is gained, purposes will be correspondingly modified: and
suitable answers for one generation may be unsuitable for
the next. This Is not to advocate a wishy-washy relativism;
nor does It mean that whatever ends have served us well in
the past must be discarded simply because they are not
new. On the contrary, i t means that no educational Ideal
can claim exemption from periOdic review, and that en·
during values may as often be found worthy of relentlon
as innovations may be found wanting. Whether or not It
reflects a paucity of educational thought, the fact Is that
most recent educational Innovations have appeared in the
form of teaching and learni ng devices. What is lost sight
of when eduoa11onIs so narrowly conceived is that no
teaching or learning device is worth its salt that divorces .
ilsell lrom the ends It Is designed to achieve. Devices are
by definition means, they are instrumentalities, and so
they are not self·contained but are to be judged only In
terms of whatever purposes they are meant to serve.
Behavior manipulation or conditioning cannot be
faulted on grounds that It doesn't bring resu lts. Massive
evidence could be cited to refute such a charge. Indeed,
much of human history is an account of the conquest for
control of human thought and human behavior. But
desired results need to be carefully d istinguished from
results that are truly desirable. What is merely desired
may be based upon no more than impulse, caprice. habit
or tradition, to say nothing of self-serving interests; while
what is In fact desirable requires enlistment of powers of
reflec tion, Judgment and evaluation. Awareness of what is
merely desired Is shared by humans and nonhumans alike;
but formulation of what is desirable is characteristic only
of human beings, for It demands choosing among alter·
natives in regard to their long.range individual and social
benefits.
Preoccupation with fads, devices and gadgetry has
distracted us from attending to education's more Im·
portant functions. Preoccupation with behavior
manipulation has deflected our concern from the at·
tltudes. values and ideals of the learner. As a result, we
have prized not knowledge, reponslbillty, and un·
derstandlng but a semblance of them; we have forgotten
that to live without purpose is not to live in any human
sense at all. If, with Dewey, we hold that "the ideal aim of
education Is creation of power of self·control""-and If
such aim Is taken seriously rather than as platitude-a
shift from preoccupation with behavior to concern for
conduct Is In order. Concern with reflection for its own sake
divorces thought from its practical issue in conduc t, while
12
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exc lusive concern with behavior falls to provide for its
being a culmination of reflection. Although all behavior
may be regarded as in some sense controlled, that unique
kind of behavior over which Individuals exercise self·
control and that is not 11xcluslvely shaped by factors ex·
traneous to themselves is precisely what is meant by C·On·
duct.
Use or the term conduct has the advantage or
distinguishing thoughtful, purposive and morally sen·
sitive activities from those that are merely accidental or
habituated. Conduct requires acceptance of responsibility
for actions deliberately undertaken as over against in·
different and merely responsive kinds of behavior: it
represents a conjoining of reflec tion with action. In so far
as self-control is not Inborn, It Is a crucial task of
education to create, nu rture and develop it in individually
and socially produclive ways. To learn Is to grow in
powers of responsible decislon ·making ; and to educate is
to foster utili zation of such powers in the intelligent con·
duct of life. All skills and knowledge are necessary means
to this end.
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This article raises questions con·
cerning the focus of research in
teacher effectiveness.

Research in
teacher
effectiveness:
A case of
mistaken
identity
by John Holton
The Ohio State University
A common sense notion in teacher education goes
something like this: "to discover the things we ought to
teach teachers, we need to discover those teaching
behaviors which seem to make a difference in student
achievement and student satisfaction and teach them to
teachers." As Francis Fuller and Oliver Bown have It in
their contribution to the 75th NSSE Yearbook, we need to
discover "what kinds of interventions by what kinds of in·
terveners in what contexts elicit what responses from
what subjects."'
These discoveries will be made by using the methods
of empirical science. Em pirical science, the wonderworking steed, which has discovered so much about
nature, will produce the necessary information about men
and society.
As Robert Merton describes them, the social sciences
have as their goal the discovery of theory. This theory
is defined as "clear, verifiable statements of relationships
between specified variables."' The unspoken assum ption
in the search for theory in the social sciences Is that
human enoeavors are similar to natural events and
therefore can be reduced to the same sorts of laws and
theories as natural events. The lynchpln of this analogy is
the notion that human behavior, like the behavior of
molecules and atoms, is determined by external forces.
Once all of the requisite conditions are met to boil the
water, there Is a high probability that the water will boll;
once all of the requisite conditions are met for the student
to learn, the studen.t will learn. The task for the
educational researcher, then, Is to discover the requisite
conditions for learning.
14
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In teacher education, some researchers have been
looking for those teaching behaviors which are associated
with student gain and student satisfaction. One con ·
venient compendium of such research Is Dunkin and Bid·
dle's The Study of Teaching.' In this work may be found
discussion and summaries of some hundreds of ob·
se
studies of classroom teaching. While this
rvational
book is a worthwhile conllibulion to the literature of
teacher education, it suffers from the difficulties that
seem to plague research in teach er ef ·
fectiveness-inconsistent results. It Is common to find
entries like the following In the summary tables:
1) Teacher's use of questions is unrelated lo f)upif at·
tltudes, and, in contradiction, it Is also found that
higher teachers' use of questions is associated
with more positive pupi l attitudes.• (Dunkin and
Bidd le, p, 139).
2) Experimental treatment given to teachers is
unrelated to the amount of pupil initiation. In con.
tradiction it is also found that Experimental treat·
ment given to teachers increases the amount of
pupil initiation.• (Dunkin and Biddle, p. 141).
3) Teacher indirectness Is unrelated to cognitive level
o f classroom discourse. In contrad iction it Is also
found that greater teacher Indirectness Is
associated with higher cognitive levels of
classroom discourse! (Dunkln and Biddle, p. 115).
The general explanation given by social scientists for
problems has two parts. Dunkin and Biddle describe the
methodological problems-problems of sampling, research
design and the like-and
hope
that as more work is
done, these problems will be lessened. The other part of
the explanation is historical. We have not discovered
Newton Ian laws for the social sciences as yet because we
haven't been working at It long enough. In Merton's words,
;'Between twentieth century physics and twentieth cen·
tury sociology stand billions of man-hours of sustained,
disciplined, and cumulative
research."'
It will be the purpose of this essay to suggest that
some o f the contradictory results in research on teacher
effectiveness are rooted not solely in methodological or
historical factors. Rather, it will be suggested, the con·
tradictory resulls have th eir origin in a conceptual muddle
which will not be resolved by methodological
sophistication or by more investments in man-hours. The
suggestion of the muddle is based on the work of Richard
Taylor In his book Action and Purpose.• It seems to me
that Taylor provides us with a valuable Insight into the
nature of human action and purpose. His Insights seem
especially germane to discussions about teaching.

•

'

The Muddle
Science deals with facts. The theories of physical
science explain relationships between facts. Heating a
pan of water makes the water molecules move laster. (Or,
when the pan of water Is heated, the water molecules
move faster.) In order for the scientist to create his clear
s tatements about the relationships between the specified
variables, he must be able to translate the verbal descrip·
lion into a factual description . Water becomes H20 and
heat becomes degrees Celsius. A statement about H20
needs less inference than a statement about water. Low
inference statements mean that investigators can be more
or less certain that they are dealing with the same c;uan ·
titles as other investigators. So much HCI (of a certain
fVUCA TIONAL CONSIDlRA TIONS
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standard of pufi ty and concentration) wi II react with so
much CU (of a certain purity) to form so much H2 and so
much Cu Cl and so much heat.
The ability to reduce general statements to tangible
quantities is crucial to scientific investigations. The social
scientist who wishes to use the methods of empirical
science must abide by its canons. Researchers in teacher
effectiveness recognize this imperative. Investigators of
" higher order questions" or " teacher indirectness" recog.
nize that they must reduce these general statements
to tang Ible quantities. The variables must become " low in·
ference" variables. This is done by reducing the general
statements like "higher order questions" to certain
behaviors- to movements which signal "higher order
question" or "teacher indirectness." In the Flanders In·
teraction Analysis Categories system, for example, one
category of indirect teacher influence is described as
follows: "praises or encourages students action or
behavior. Jokes that release tension, not at the expense of
another individual, nodding head or saying " uh huh?" or
"go on" are included."'
Richard Taylor makes a distinction between human
movements and human actions. Movements are events
like the beating of a heart or the growth of hair. Such
movements can obviously be reduced to tangible quan·
titles. For example, it is known that the pH of normal blood
ranges from 7.39 to 7.41. The C02 combining power
(venous plasma) is 50·70 ml/100 ml of blood = 21 30mEq/L." Taylor distinguishes such movements from
purposeful human action. Unlike movements, human ac·
tions are goal directed. "My heart beats" describes a
movement. "I am reading a novel" describes an action
which is directed toward a goal-"1 want to read the
novel." My movements to get a book are means to my goal
but they are meaningless in and of themselves. Actions
have intentions behind them. Intentions cannot be
discovered by observing one's movements:
They are notions that are read into a situation .. . and
never concepts that are empirically derived from any
situation . They are, In fact, derived entirely from
one's own understanding of himself as a purposeful
being . But one never observes-notes, notices, in·
fers from signs-that he himself is trying to ac·
complish something, that it is striving toward an end
or a goal. He sometimes knows that he is, but not
that way."
Here then is the mudd le. Events which may be pur·
poseful-llke teacher use of higher order questions-are
treated as though they are simple movements. When an in·
vestigator reduces the concept of "higher order question"
to its low inference movements, he misses the Intention.
Indeed, it is impossible for him to discover the Intention
no matter how careful he is to define and describe the
movement. The contradictory results about higher order
questions reported in Dunkin and Biddle might come from
the undiscovered intentions of the teachers and the
students in the studies. As recenlly as 1976, higher order
questions were sti II giving i nvestlgators problems. Barak
Rosenshine commented that " The lack of significant
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results for complex or higher level questions has puzzled
all the researchers, and has led us to conclude that we
need to rethink what is meant by types of questions and
their effects.'"'
A more careful definition of "higher order" questions
in purely behavioral terms will never solve the problem o f
what a " higher order" question is. Of all human en·
deavors, language is at once the most hurnan and the
most dependent upon the intentions of both speakers and
listeners. While much language "behavior" is litlle more
than formulaic-we communicate with each other in
unambiguous formulae- it is difficult to carry o n much
communication that is interpretable in terms of pure formula. A simple question wheo judged by its syntax (in ·
version of the subject and verb) may or may not really be a
question. " Isn't it a nice day?" "Am I going to the store for
a carton of milk?" Without an understanding of purpose or
intentions on the part of the speaker (an understanding
that does not come from empirical evidence), much
language becomes an uncomprehensible verbal hash.
- The shooting of the hunters was terrible.
-My luve Is like a red, red rose.
-His sins were scarlet but his books were read.
The failure of translating computers perhaps exemplifies the problem of attempting to rely on purely
behavioral information in the interpretation of language.
Does intention really make a difference to the common sense notion set forth at the beginning of this essay?
What difference does it make If we can identify certain
behaviors that seem to be associated with student suc·
cess if we don't perhaps know what the behavior Is?
It makes a great deal of difference. If one is going to
operate by the canons of empirical science, one must
operate by them. Unless a general concept can be trans·
lated into low inference behaviors, then it is impossible
to know whether one has that behavior. So long as general
conceptions about human behavior can only be partly
translated (into movements rather than Into actions), it is
impossible to k now what one is observing.
Consequences of the Muddle
The danger in all of this is perhaps in the promise that
someday teaching will be based on research of the sort
reported in Dunkin and Bidd le. What if research continues
to show no positive effects from higher order questions?
Will colleges of education begin to teach their students to
ask only factual questions (for which there is support in
the research literature)? The focus of research in teacher
effectiveness shifts over the years. In the 1960's research
was looking for teacher effectiveness in terms of affect,
indirectness and the like-the intentions of the time. More
recently, research is "finding" .t hat the best teaching is
direct and carefully structured. IS the research simply
reflecting once more the shift in intention in a country in·
terested in "back to basics" and accountabi lity? So lorig
as we ig nore human purpose, research becomes a mask.• a
cloak, a way to make desires into facts-desires which
may be pure or foul. Science becomes dogma.
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How c an ed nal
ucatio
experiences be most effectively
organized? How can we evaluate? Tyler and others who
use this approach commonly d r aw o n three foundationa
l
sources: the nature of the individual; the nalure of society;
and the nature of knowledge. A diagnosis o f needs 10
arrive at the answer to the question o f purposes analyzes
data from these sources.
There are many modifications of this mode of
theorizing, but in general,
s
It lead to a rather clear·cut set
of steps to be followed. The his1
icor
al
roo ts of this approach, as Klieb
ard has poi nted oul , run deeply into the
curriculum development processes projec ted by Bobbilt
and Charters in the early 1900's, Fortunately for
curriculum as a Held of study, lhoughtful criticism of this
mode of curriculum theorizing has developed . The major
point of the criti cism is that the approac h is fundamenlally
grounded in a 1echnological ratio nale that is neither
al
losoph
phi
ic nor scientific. Neverth eless, any survey of
the s tate of l he field would still show this to be lhe
dominant approach. In practice, it tends to raise a series
of " how" questions. For example, practitioners who com·
monly enroll in a graduate course In curriculum come to
that field of study expecting to get rather specific answers
to specific questions of how to do this o r l hat In their
classroo
ms.
A ce llular,
nt erc hangeable
"i
par ts"
by Paul R. Klohr
framework for curriculum is assumed . Cremin points out
The Ohio Sta te sts
Universi ty
that historically this fra mework dates from the period
following the Civil War.
A second, much smaller group o f individuals
Mac
donald views as scientific curriculum
orizers.
lhe
This
group follows the canons o f science. In Macdonald 's
Futurologi
who attempt to project altern
ve
a ti
words: " The purpose o f this theory Is primarily conceptual
fu tures point to the possibility that our culture now faces
in nature, and research would be utilized for empirical
a watershed situation that differs signi ficantly from the
and relationships."'
validation of curriculum variabl
es
pas t Whether or not such a claim holds for all of culture or
Among the individuals who might be viewed as lune·
i
for education in general, there is Increasing evidence that
t1on ng in this way are Mauritz Johnson, George
the study of curriculum as a subfield of education does,
indeed, face newly-recogn
undational,
ized fo
or theory,
Beauchamp and Decker Walker. At The Ohio State UniverIssues. A concern with such Issues calls for a resi ty, Jack Frymier, James K. Dunc an and John Houg h
examination of some of the judgments made in the last
work wi th a basic scienti fic model for curriculu m and in·
ten years that the field Is either ahistorica
s truc tion. Frymier's efforts with the Annehu rst School' lo
l,
or dead, or
a curriculum
on
classiflcali
system is a good
develop
both.
example o f these individuals at work.
In some respects, the situation has in it the strong
Finally, Macdonald c alls attention to a third even
possibility of a paradig m shift in a Kuhnian sense. To un·
derstand what supports the assertion that such a shift
smaller group of theorizers- namely, those who " look
might be taking place, we need to be aware of: (1) lhe s tate
upon the task of theorizing as a creative intellectual 1ask
of the field of curriculum theory; (2) efforts underway to
which lhey maintain should be nell
her used as a basis for
reconc eptuallze the field; and (3) the significance o f these
prescription or as an empirically
b
1es1a le set of principles
efforts for curriculum development In prac tical school
and relationships."'
The interest of lhese individuals is to view curriculum
situations.
In 1971, In an essay for tile Journal of Educat
ional
phenomena in new and different ways with the exResearch, James Macdonald surveyed the field of
pectation that such alternative perspectives will raise
curriculum theory and made a functional analysis of work
fresh sets of questions. In effect, they demon
s trale what
then underway. Typically, the c onven tional wisdom of the
Dwayne Huebner has c alled attention to many times: the
field had been reviewed In a thematic approach. In c on·
tact lhat theorizing In a malure field ought to reflec t a
range of different modes of inq uiry. However, lhe intrast, Macdonald iden tified three groups of curriculum
theorists in terms of the functions they assumed their ef·
fluence of this view, although significant, Is not
widespread for there is still a predominant mylh. This
forts might serve.
The largesI number of ind ividuals, by far, viewed their
myth holds that many of the fields drawing on the social
sciences- the study o f curriculum for one-are passing
work as guiding practical curriculu
m
development ac·
tlvities by prescribing di rections such activities should
through a kind of Dark Age, and that If we keep worki ng
take. Most curriculum textbooks, elementary and sechard to become " more
ic scientif ," we shall emerge with a
ondary, res t on this interpretation of an appropriate
clear-cut set o f laws that meet the crlleria o f physical
theoretical foundation. The widely used Tyler rationale Is
science. All phenomena may then be q uantified with more
an example of this approach. Tyler raises four questions:
highly sophlstlcaled measures.
What are the purposes of the school? What educ
onal
ali
This brief overview might lead one 10 believe that the
experiences can be provided to attain l hese purposes?
cu rriculum theory field is largely constrained by con-

There is evidence that the study of
curriculum faces newly-recognized
issues.

Emerging
foundations for
curriculum
theory
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ventional approaches to theorizing drawing upon
traditional c-OllCeptlons of foundations. Such a view might
be warranted were it not for some promising develop·
ments which do, Indeed, suggest the possibility of a
paradigm shift. In the view of some, these developments
constitute significant break throughs. If there 1s to be a
genuine shift, ii is likely to come from the efforts of those
Macdonald has placed In the third category.
Reconceptualizatlons of the Field
Chief among the ellotts that have the potential f0< a
basic paradigm shift has been a series of curriculum
theory conferences and a curricu lumurnal
Jo
devoted to
curriculum theorizing to be published In the autumn of
1978. Involved in these is a loosely-knit group of ind ividuals who have been called the Reconceptualists.
Whether or not that term continues to be used is of little
Importance.
One Is
reminded of Peter Schrag's use of the
"New Romantic Critics" to describe certai n of the critics
of education in 1968 who had certain Ideas In common
despite their diversity. McNeil simply divides the current
field Into "hard currlcularists" and "soft currlcularists.'"
But this two-fold categorization seems overly simplistic,
overlooking some significant distinctions among the indMdual theorists. Whatever else is associated with the
term reconceptualist, It seems clear that these Individuals
intend to worK In the third realm that Macdonald Identified - namely, Individuals who conceive of curricu lum
theory development as a creative intellectual task with no
attempt initially to make a direct relationship to practice.
The Reconceptual ists, it should be noted, have no
formal organization as a group, and in 1978, there Is rather
wide diversity among them. However, one can trace some
of the events which have Influenced their work. Such a
tracing might well start with the Rochester Conference of
1973. One might also note some beginnings in the Radical
Caucus of the Association tor Supervision and Curriculum
Development several years prior to 1973. At Rochester,
James Macdonald, Maxine Greene, and Dwayne Huebner
gave papers along with several other relative newcomers
to the field. These papers were colleoted and published
under the title Heightened Consciousness, Cultural
Revolulion, and Curriculum Theory (Mccutchan, 1974)
which had also served as the theme of the conference.
William Pinar, who called the conference at The University
of Rochester, served as edi tor of the publication. He
spoke o f this work as a "reconceptualization" of the field
and viewed the efforts as an example of Macdonald's third
group of theorists.
The following year, 1974, Riordan Invited those who
had been at Rochester to participate In a follow-up
conference at Xavier University In Cincinnati. A nu mber of the
Rochester Conference participants again presented
papers, among them, Macdonald, Greene, Huebner and
Pinar. Michael Apple of the University of Wisconsin also
gave his views, making public a divergent approach which
had been identified at Rochester but not fully developed.
For example, the papers by Donald Batemen and William
Pilder anticipate Apple's stance.
Al so In 1974, Pinar edited a collection of essays titled
Curricu lum Theorizing: The Reconceptuallsts which in·
eluded works by Macdonald, Greene, Huebner and Apple
as well as pieces by Kllebard, Cremin, Phenix and
Mooney. Plnar recognized the divergence of views that
had developed more fully since the Rochester and the
Xavier conferences. In his organization of the book, he
18
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Identified "politica
l
and methodological criticism" and
"post critical" theory efforts. The autobiographical
prefaces to the pieces written by Apple, Mann and Molnar
also reflect a division. The question of which is critical
and which is post-critical is not, in itself, significant at this
~~-

.

The divergence is even more strongly underscored on
the 1975 Yearbook of ASCD, edited by Macdonald and
Zaret Schools In Search of Meaning in which the editors
write'. " We felt we must call attention to political freedom,
not simply existential freedom ."' The content of the Yearbook underscores a conviction that most currlculum
theori zing has "backed out" of significant political
· im
plications. Pushed all the way, this issue turns up to be
one of the individual vs. the collective .
Additional conferences were held In 1975 al University of Virginia, chaired by Charles Beegle. and the
following year at University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee
with Alex Molnar as chairman . In the autumn of 1977, Kent
State University hosted a theory conference followed in
the spring of 1978 by yet another at the Rochester lnstilute of Technology. In this latter conference. a special
effort was made to refocus on some of the issues raised
in iii ally at the 1973 Rochester Conference.
As one reflects on these conferenc es and reads the
papers presented, It would be easy to assume that a split
ls Inevitable among those In Macdonald's third category,
or in Plnar's terms, the Reconceptuallsts. Certainly, the
1975 ASCD YearbOOk suggests such a split. In the realm of
metatheo ry, the split often turns up to be one between 1he
phenomenological mode of inquiry and critical Inquiry
that draws heavily on Marxian or Neo·Marxian ideology.
II ls too early to Know what wil l be the eventual out·
come. but for this writer, two individuals seem to posit an
alternative to such a split: Theodore Rosz.aK and Richard J.
Bernstein. Both transcend the dualisms that characterize
those caught up In polarized positions. It is beyond the
scope of this writing to explicale in detail the alternative
me1a1hoory of their respective positions. However, sO<ne
aspects that underglrd what migh1 be viewed as promising
" emerging foundations" for curriculum theory can be
sKetched. These seem not to distort the basic tenets of
those who take differing positions within the Reconceptualist group.
An Alternative Metatheoretlcal Base
Theodore Rosz.ak's Identification of a thi rd tradition
wh ich he calls ' 'the personal" suggests something of the
direction a resolution to the issue mi ght take. He posits
this in contrast to the "Individ ual" and the "collective"
traditions. This tradition, he asserts, draws on the thinking
of Berdyaev and Meunier In Europe and men like Dwight
Macdonald in America. He cites Macdo11ald's essay "The
Root is Man" as a good example of the expression of Per·
sonalist values.
Rosz.ak stresses the significance of this theOreticat
stance In rejecting the materialistic dialectics of Marx and
the equally encapsulating constraints of a capitalistic
culture. He views as crucial the fact that this view has not
crystallized in10 a systematic ideology:
Rather, they set themselves the task of being the
Socratic conscience or revolutionary politics, a stub·
born ethical sensibility that applied itself to all
systems, all ideologies. The core of their political insight was this: that moral sensitivity will always be
EDUCATI
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obliterated by a moral indignation that loses itself
among masses and class identities.•
He develops, therefore. the idea of a mosaic of
"situational groups" which are genuinely veh icles of "self
discove
ry."
In this sense, the historian Roszak seems to support
what Bernstein intends when he proposes a meta·theory
that will
cut·across the several modes we commonly posit,
regardless of how we perceive them. He expresses the
need this way:
What is requi red is a fundamental re-examination of
the very categories by which we understand human
action, and seek to relate theory to practice. The root
issues concern the most basic questio ns about what
human beings are, what they are in the process of
becoming , and what they may yet become.'
If we take Roszak and Bernstein together, we can finally
say with Bernstei n that we are not confronted with exclusive choices: either empirical theory or interpretive
theory or critical theory:
Rather, there is an internal dialect ic in the restructuring of social and poli tical theory: when we work
through any one of these moments, we discover how
the others are implicated. An adequate social and
political theory must be empirical, interpretative,
and critical (italics in original).'
ls
who are trying to reconceptualize
If the ind ividua
the theory base for curriculum are to succeed, it seems
clear some resolution of the issues which have arisen
must be resolved. At this point, the proposals of Roszak
and Bernstein offer a promise. But, one might ask, what
does a possible resolution at the level of meta-theory have
to do with curriculum -especially cu rricu
developlum
ment In sch ool situations? In this writer's view, it has
much to do with a newly-emerging foundations base for
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curriculum as a field of study. If such, indeed, can emerge,
a fresh and dilferent set of questions regard ing
curriculum
will resu
These questions will differ
lt.
markedly from the curriculum questions the conventional
empirically-oriented theorist or the philosophical analyst
have raised. Such questions will undou btedly have
significance for the applicatio
ns
we attempt in curriculum
development. Much would remain to be done to bridge the
theory-practice gap, bu t the rationale underlying what is
done would rest on a more rigorous and defensible foundation.
Footnotes
1. James B. Macdonald, "Curricul um Theory" in
William Pinar, editor, Curriculum Theorizing: The
Reconceptualists. Berkeley: Mccutchan Pub ·
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4. John D. McNeil
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A Comprehensive In·
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1977, pp. 3 14·317.
5. James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret, editors.
Schools in Search of Meaning, 1975 Yearbook of
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6. Theodore Roszak, "The Third Tradi tion: The In d ividual, The Collective, The Personal," American
Review, Autumn, 19 77, p. 71.
7. Richard J. Bernstein. The Restructuring of Social
and Political Theory. New York: Harcourt, Brace
Jovanovich, 1976, p. 227.
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Are traditional
foundational
disciplines
adequate
to
the
educational
experiences
they
dividual
analyze?

Moral
education
and moral
choice

by George Dixon
The Ohio State University

A question of continuing importance for the foun··
dations ol education is whether the traditional loun·
dational discipli nes are adequate to the educational ex·
periences they help us analyze. Of course, this is not ju st a
concern ol educators; researchers in foundational areas
are also led, at least occasionally, to ask how adequate
their methods are for the analysis o l human experience
generally. But the question seems more persistent and
bothersome for ed ucators who use the methods o f
philosophy and the social sciences to understand
ed ucational experiences. Somehow the greater need lo
connect theory with educational practice makes the
question of methodolog ical adequacy more immediate for
the educational researcher. who can•t as easily push this
con.cern into the backg round or wait lor another gen·
eratlon of research before translating theory into prac tice.
Certainly II is more c onvenient to push concern lor
method into the backgro und and get on with the research
at hand, for such problems are perennially troublesome
and usually tied into classical philosophical paradoxes
that defy quick resolution. One such paradox that is
especially lroublesom e in education generally and particularly puzzling
in moral educal lon is the In·
dividuallcollective relationship mentioned by Professor
Klohr in his essay "Emerging Foundations for Curriculum
Theory." '
20
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Most people concerned with moral education are
familiar with the individual/collec tive dilemma In terms of
two beliefs that seem to work in opposl lion to one
another. On the one hand. we assert that actions which
can be judged as moral or immoral necessarily
ve in·
Invol
choice. As moral agents, we can be neither
praised nor blamed If we have no degree of choice or con·
trol over our decisions and aclions; one of the defining
charac teristics o f ac tions that we call "moral " is just this
fac t of ind ividual responsibility. Ethical theories which
focus on this factor of individual responsibility and duty
share a Kantian emphasis on the formal aspects of moral
decisions.
Bu t there is obviously more to moral decision than in·
dividual d uty and private choice. We must also assert that
moral decisions are Influenced by circumstances outside
the individual, circumstances that are connected with the
time and place of choice, with specific rather than formal
factors, with the history of the individual as it is situated
between past experiences and expec tations for the future.
Moralists of the utllilarian persuasion would, in fact,
calculate just suc h factors to the point of explaining how
an Individual is most likely to decide a moral question.
Their emphasis on the collective or social side of the
relationship aligns them rather clearly with the methods
and emphasis of the social sciences. It is in this apparent
conflic t between Kantian or formalis
c eth ical
ti
theories
and their utilitarian or naturalistic c ounterparts that we
find one source of difficulty for the moral educator con·
cerned with the foundations of his field.
For example, if the moral educator looks to
philosophy to clarify this relat ionship between Individual
choice and social Influence, he finds that the problem
gets worse before it gets better. Philosophers In this cen·
tury, with a few notable exceptions, have regarded moral
decisions as matters of private preference and individual
feeling. They have preserved the necessarily Individual
aspect of morality, but only at the cost ol putti ng most
moral queslion s beyond reasonabl
e
discussion and public
evaluation. The resu lt for moral educators has too often
been one ol reducing their task to helping s tudents clarify
their individual values, and while this is a worthy vocation,
It just begins to scratch the surface of the process of
moral choice and value formation. For such clarification
must Ignore the social nature o f morality: moral con·
sensus becomes little more lhan the tabu lation of private
interests. After individual value preferences have been
clarified , the teacher must indeed be ready to move on
quickly to the next topic of discussion; modern subjectivist theories o f morality offer litlle help on the tough
issues that logi cally lollow Individual clariflcalion .
The moral educator can tu rn to the social sciences lor
help in understanding how external factors condition
moral choice. for the social sciences seem to concentrate
on exactly those social or external factors that the values
clarification approach tends to ignore. But that s trength in
explaining how and why people choose and act as they do
comes to the social sciences al Its own high cost. For the
conclusion that seems implicit In mos t social science
research is that external factors determine Individual
decisions and actions; the moral responsibility that
educators seek to enhance turns out to be an illusion.
From a social science perspective, actions can be explained and even predicted, but In the course of such
research we seem to remove the action being studied
from the realm of morality. That Is, we can hardly praise or
W VONAL
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blame a person for " having made a choice" if that person
has had a choice in the same way that Skinner's hen has
hadan egg.•
So far in this analysis I have stretched the opposing
ve paradox, simpli fying
i
poles o f the indi vidual/collect
each posi tion and ignoring those developm ents in
philosophy and the social sciences wh ich have worked to
miligate the split. Unfortunately, s uch developments tend
to fall outside the mainstream of the various foundational
disciplines, so that it is usually quite difficult for
educators to get in touch with them. This seems to me to
explain why those curriculum theorists called Reconceptualists often look out side mainstream social science
and som etimes to disciplines like literature and art for
redirection ; they deliberately seek out researchers
working on the fringes or crossing disciplinary lines In or·
der to reconceptualize problems that have resisted
traditional solutions. Thus we might say that even though
some philosophers and social scientists have begun to
address the individual/collective paradox and have un·
covered some promising d irections for resolution, the
paradox is still very much with us . And it proves to be
education, which has at i ts
ating In
moral
especially
debilit
center the problematic relationship between individual
c hoice and determining soc ial circumstances.
One philosopher and social theorist whose recent
work may be helpful lo moral educators is Jurgen Haber.
mas. For a variety of reasons, his work is not generally
known in this country, although ii is widely read in his own
country of Germany and th roughou t Europe.
Habermas ' work is admittedly difficult, especially f or
those with a philosophical background in the Anglo·
Am erican tradition of empiricism. Moreover, those works
Intolish
for
by Habermas that have been translated Eng
the most part do not address educational questions di·
rectly. His most widely known work, Knowledge and Hu ·
man Interests, is in fact a critique of posi tivism. And the
education-oriented essays o f Toward a Rational Society
foc us on problems of the German educational system
during the 1960's and thus resist quick application to
education
lems
al
prob
in this country.
Bui perhaps ii is this very foreignness that makes
Habermas· work significant to the problem s of ethical
theory and moral educat ion . For with his philosoph ical
roots in Continental phi losophy, especially in the works of
Hegel and Marx, Habermas has been able to bring new
li ght lo the individual/collective paradox that has defied so
m any Anglo·American researchers. This is not to say that
Habermas avoids or rejects philosophers and researchers
In our tradition; he has, in fact, been influenced by
phi losophers as diverse as the American pragmatist
Charles Sanders Peirce and the British anal yst John L.
Austin. He is also conversant w ith social science research
from Max Weber to Jane Loevinger and Lawrence
Koh Iberg.
In fact the one translated essay by Habermas that
directly addresses the problem of educational foun·
dallons is a c ritique and reconstruction of Kohlberg' s
theory of cognitive moral development.' That theory,
which has gained some popularity among moral
educators, posi ts six stages wh ich form a hierarchy ol
qualilative·dislinc
t
ways of deciding moral questions and,
thus, of guiding moral action . On the basis of 20 years of
investigation, Kohlberg has found that a child passes
through a number of discrete and invariant stages of moral
development, moving from an ego-centric basis for de·
FA LL.
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cision through a later adherence to social conventions
l"
stage. (See
to a more reflective or "post-conventiona
erg's labels,
most
Chart 1) As we might expect from Kohlb
people reach the th ird or fou rth stage of cognitive moral
developm ent and remain there for most o f their lives. Only
a lew, Socrates o r Jesus or Martin Luther King, lor exam
·
pie, seem to attain the broad universal principles of Stage
Six .
On the basis of this theory, Kohlberg has developed
an approach lo moral education that pushes students to
ima
ly development, pr
ri through the
higher levels of moral
use of ethical
emmas.
dil
Thus, a student at Stage Two is
presented in classroom discussion with a i iclional ethical
s ituation that demands a more comprehensive analysis
than is available within Stage Two reasoning. For example, a student is asked to formulate a course of action for
an impoverished husband who is tempted to steal the ex·
pensi ve medicine his wife needs to survive. Such a fie·
tional situation hel ps the student to realize that ind ividual
needs and desires may compete with or be over-ridden by
agreed-u pon conventions. Kohlberg carefu lly sets up the
term s of each fictional dilemma so that the student is
forced to look beyond his stage of moral development in order to arrive at a satisfactory resolution. The student may
be forced to move from an egocentric Stage Two decision
to a Stage Three fear of punishment or towards a Stage
Four refusal lo show disrespect for the laws against theft.
Confronting these dilem mas and examining possiblei l
reso ut ons is supposed to foster the cognitive develop·
ment of students in relation to these eth ical questions.
We should note how Kohl berg defends this approac h
from the twin dangers of Indoctrination and subjectivism.
First, his approach concentrates on the form of the moral
judgment rather than the conten t; it also demands a
al respect.
classroom atmosphere of dialogue and mutu
This emphasis on form and interaction among students
and teacher lessens the likelihood the teacher or the
student's peers will impose their moral decisions on the
individual student and thereby deny him the opportunity
21
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to make his own moral choice. Secondly, Kohlberg con.
tends that the greater comprehensiveness of the latter
stages of his hierarchy provides an objective progression
In the structure if not in the content of ethical judgments
and moral explanations. Thus the value neutrality or sub·
jectivi ty of the values clarification approach, for example,
Is replaced in Kohlberg' s curriculum with a formal objectivi ty.
There is much more to Kohlberg's theory of moral
development, and much of it is helpful and convincing.
But one quickly notices the Kantian emphasis in
Kohlberg's theory, especially as it focuses on the
cognitive factors involved in moral decisions and actions.
Kohlberg has indeed preserved individual choice through
the various stages of moral development, but seems to
ignore those factors that seem external and non·cognitive,
factors that have been analyzed in great detail by the
social sciences.
Kohl berg's justi fication for proceeding in this manner
is that the cognitive aspects of moral development are the
most important factor we have so far d iscovered. He
would admit that non·cognitive and utilitarian factors in·
fluence moral decisions, but he holds little hope for con·
necting internal and external factors, or individual and

ROLE

A9o

Level

COMPETENCE

R~qv isi te

Level of COirJr.vn i cation

Reci 1>rocit:;

social perspectives, beyond the limited connections now
made in Cha.rt I.
So, as valuable as Kohlberg's research and inter·
pr~tations have been, we are still left with the unre
·
solved dilemma of ind ividual choice in a world that is un·
avoidably social. We have not been able to approach the
strict standard that Robert Paul Wolff sets forth in his
analysis of Kantian ethics:
... an adequate foundation for moral theory requires
some coherent way of understanding men's actions
both as causally determined. predictable, natu ra
l
events and as rationally initiated, poliCy·directed actions. None of the famili
ar
dodges, relaxations of the
conflict, or reinterpretations designed to dissolve
the problem will do.... If any sense is to be made of
responsibility and action, then one and the same bit
of behavior which can be explained physiologically,
pred icted statistically, and brought within the scope
of a scientific theory must also be capable of being
consistently understood as issuing from the
autonomous action of practical reason.'
But this Is precisely the challenge that Habermas
takes up in his reconstruction of Kohlberg's theory. He

A.NO STAGES

Stages o f
irora l con-

OJ:

MORAL

CON S CIOUSNESS

fde-0. o f the
Good Life

Philosoph ical
Recon ..

~-Onge

~.c i o usoe s s

Ago
1.evel

s tructi on
maximum

pleasure/
i ncomp l ~t~

actions and
the ir conse
quences

I

reciprocity

cul tural l y
Rol es rpretecl
i ntP.
nP.eds
rm

llO
systems

thV'OuSh

Obedience
~Y

inco:np
i - ry
l et:e
recipY"-OCi ty

2

concre
vps teprin::>rgpr
o.vli
f ~y
O'l..at'y grOt.J PS

4

co nc re ~e

uni

o111p 1etP.
i ty
rec

versalized
nterpretat ion
of need

civi 1 li bel'ti es
pubI ic \'IP.I farP.

6

u:or-0; l fr"eedom

7

1Y.1ra I

-?i!ld
pol i ~ ic<\ l

f reedon1
Fro Dick i-toward,

m

"r-'.oral Ide
O
: evel
HI opmeot l'.11 Telos
t:go

22

https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations/vol6/iss1/12
DOI: 10.4148/0146-9282.1978

i la

ro
of
ma
reference
ons1)ers

lib
11'.()r u:embershi;;>
thovght
aci ty o r secon-calin ;>ol iti
cording to
darygrovps
C011'Jl1Vn"\ ty
ordered ru les ed al

5

(uses )

Princ i :1les
i zed
iv un c ersal
duties

nai\•e
hed.o nisin

<Ii tto through

3

al
uni\'ers iz
desi re/
ion
a•.•ers

n.1tur\l l ano
soc
cnvi ronmcnt

exc hang ~

(concrete
dut i es)

11!

rui n imu111 un-

I) 1e~1 S tir1 tness

general i zed
desire/
ia l
avers ion
comp
l e te
reci
proci

ll

I

ntity .~. C lar i fica tion/'

• ll as citi :.:e"s
all humans

rational
turn
na
l 1a. . .

as private
persons

formal i stic
i proc
e th i c
Ill
1

all as 1re1r.be,.
s
of a fictltiovs

sil
unil ... er
l in gu ist ic ethic

wor ld

soc i ~ty

27: 11.

tao .

EDUCATIONAL CONSIDCRA TION.5

24

Litz and Sparks: Educational Considerations, vol. 6(1) Full Issue

les,

adds to the developmental psychology emphasis of
Kohlberg's work a sociological dimension , one that
relates the six stages to the process of socialization
.
By
thus drawing on the work of George Herbert Mead and
Talcon Parsons, among others, Habermas moves
Kohlberg·s theory lrom a monologic basis to a dialoglc
basis. Another way to describe Habermas' direction Is in
terms of the social contrac t theory that underl
ies
so much
of our social and political thought. Habermas would pose
two questions of the fami liar social contract theory that
has its counterpart in Kohlberg's Fifth Stage: 1) How do
moral agents entering into a social contrac t become
responsi
agents in the first place? and 2) How do the Inble
terests o t Individuals combine to consti tute universa
l prln·
cip
that Is, how are ethical universal s formed?
From a his torical perspective, both questions can be
traced back to Hegel's critiq ue o f Kantian ethics. Both
point to the weakness in Kohlberg's theory, and in for·ic
malist eth ics g enerally, namety, their s tatic and In·
vidualistlc loundation. But what is most important here
di
is that Habermas calls our attention to the dynamic and
social nature of moral development. He brings to
Kohlberg's theory much-needed sociological insights Into
how w e become aware ol ourselves as agents acting In the
world, into how we come to see the interaction of In·
tentions and consequenc es in our actions, and of how we
gradually recognize norms and the conditions for applyIng
those norms to our decisions and actions.
Once again we must note that Habermas• recon·
struc tion is a detailed and complicated cri tiq ue, as one
can see from the variou s columns in Chart II. But his
broadening of Kohlberg's base gives moral educators a
better theoretical roundation for their work in schools, one
that moves beyond a s tatic conception of alre
ady·formed
ind ividuals aligning themselves with already·es tablished
moral principles or s tages. As a result, a s tudent's
question about why he can't follow hi s private value
position and cheat on the next test need no t create a crisis
In the moral education curricul um. In fact, from Haber·
mas· perspective, such a q uestion would provide the opportunity to consider a number of important ethical
issues. Rather than avoid the issue, a teacher could ad·
vance the discussion by asking the student to consider
the nature of c onventional classroom rules against
cheating, the tension that usually exists between private
Interest and social welfare, and the role that the teacher
often fulfills In the classroom as enforcer of society's
rules and regu
edly,
l ns.
iatio
A
dm tt
these topics may prove hazardous for the
moral educator. In the lirs t place, the teacher's own role Is
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likely to come under the scru tiny o f his students. Sec·
ondly, these topics are sure to provide the teacher with more
puzzling moments than are likely to occur within the supposedly neutral values clarilicatlon curriculum. The
teacher might even find that simple questions, like those
aoout cheating, lead finally to d iscussions concerned with
things like the function of testing In the schools, a topic
that seems complex no matter rtow advanced one's stage
of cognitive development.
This last example points, how ever, to an additional
benefit of Habermas' approach. That is, Habermas is able
to posit a Seventh Stage o f moral development, one that
moves beyond a Kantian base in universalized duty to a
basis in moral and politic al freedo m. Th is base is dialogic
and social rather than monologlc and subjective. At th is
stage, we have more than the formal
l goa of Stage Six to
serve as an end point for our theory o f moral development.
We can now consider the conseq uences as well as the
form of our moral deliberations, we can take into ac count
factors like human needs and welfare, and we can finally
add a c ertain degree of content and specificity to ethical
theory and moral education.
To sum up, we might say that Habermas wants to con·
sider social and external factors without reducing ethics
to a utilitarian calculation; at the same time, he wants to
preserve individual choice without adopt ing the ab·
strac tness of ethical malism.
for
His efforts certainly need
greater development and application, but they do offer us
a view o f moral educatio n that avoids the subj ective and
inconsequential flavor of so much o f what passes as
moral education. tn contras t, Habermas' recons truction
provides a basis for taking moral education seriously. It
no t only offers us a compell
ing
lanae
xp
lion o f the in ·
terac tive nature o f ethical un iversals and the in 1erplay be·
tween individual autonomy and social cons1rain ts, but it
accounts for those conditions thal surround moral
education and ultimately moral choice.
Notes
1. Klohr, Paul A., " Emerging Foundations for Curriculum
Theory" (This issue)
2. Skinner, B.F., "On Having a Poem," Saturday Review,
July 15, 1972, pp. 33·35.
3. Jurgen Habermas, " Moral Development and Ego Iden·
Telos,
lily,"
24: pp. 41 ·55. See also Dick Howard, " Moral
velopment
and
De
Ego Identity: A Clarification,"
Telos,
27: pp. 176·82.
4. Robert Paul Wolff, The Au tonomy of Reason (New York:
Harper and Row, 1973), p. 217.
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Moral education requires rigorous and
extended thought, study, analysis.

Values
clarification
and moral
education

by Eric H . Beversluis
Capital University
Columbus, Ohio

Suppose you are a teacher, counselor, parent or
friend and you have a student, client, child or friend who is
havi ng problems. Reflecting on those problems, you de·
clde that they involve one or more of the following symp·
toms: apathy, flightiness, uncertainty or indecisiveness,
inconsistency, drill, overconformity, dissentlousness or
rote playing. How can you help the person? What approach would be appropriate?
The Values Ctariflcalion movement olfers an answer
to just this question.•
In their
book Values and Teaching,
Raths, Harmin and Simon claim that people with these
problems are often not helped as they could be. The
l
reason Is that this set or disorders is neither Intellectua
nor emotional in natu re. Most of our helping acllvities in volve ei ther counseling people with emotional disorders
or teaching people who need to gain some form of
knowledge. Raths, Harmln and Simon maintain that the
cause of this set of problems (apathy, etc.) is neither an
emotional nor an intellectual problem but a values
problem. The reason people have these symptoms, they
maintain, is that they are not clear about their values. In a
world of change and future shock, in a world of competing
value systems and pervasive relativism, in a world wit·
nessing the breakdown of family and church, Raths, Harmin and Simo
n believe that many people suffer from the
lack of a workable set of values, and that these symptoms
(apathy, etc.) are due to this fact. Given this analysis, then,
what is needed is neither teaching nor therapy but help in
values clarification.
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To provide this help, Values and Teaching and other
bOOks on values clarification (VC) offer (a) a theory of the
valuing process and (b) many different acllvities, and
guidelines for devising activities, which will help the
teac her-parent·c
ou nselorfrlend engage In values
clarifying activiti es with the person needing help (which
may be oneself).
I want to focus on the question of how values
clarification should be considered in relation to moral
education,' so I will give jusl a brief summary of VC theory
and practice. What is important for VC is not the values
one has but rather the process whereby one arrives at
these values. In fact, values are defined as what one
arrives at after going thro ugh a certain process. VC is both
relativist
ic
and subjectlvlstic. It is relativistic in that it
claims that there is no one set o f values which is true,
valid or right for everyone in all situations. And it is sub·
jectlvlslic in that it claims that there is no basis for
evaluating standards ol right and wrong apart from what
the Individual believes-1.e., right or wrong are a function
of what the individual believes to be right or wrong .• VC is
different from some subjectivisms In hold Ing that it is important that one follow the right process If o ne's values
are to be valid . But, given that o ne has gone thro ugh the
right process (values clarifying), wh atever decisions one
makes regarding right and wrong are correct. So all the
emphasis for VC is on the valuing process. Essentially, vc
involves activities designed to get people to follow the
proper valuing process.
That valuing process, according to VC theory, Involves seven aspects or s teps. (These are discussed extensively in Raths et . al. and in many o ther VC pub·
licatlons.) To arrive at a "good " value, one should use
a process that includes: Choosing freely, choosing from
among alternatives, choosing after thoughtful con·
sideration of the corisequences of each alternative,
prizing and cherishing, publically affirming and acting
upon our choices. Only if something satisfies these seven
criteria is It a value.• VC then is a set of activities designed
to get a person to engage in a certain form of decision
making which, ii is claimed,
result
willIn
th e person's
having clear values and thus become more "positive,pu rposef u I, enthu siastic and proud " rather than showing
those symptoms we noted at the beginning (apathy, etc.).
Furthermore, VC is a theory aboul how values
education ought to be carried out, and since values
education includes moral education, it is also a theory
about how moral education ought to be carried out. It is
here that I find the most serio us problem with VC. What I
want to do in th is paper is to present a view of moral
nsistent
with certain featu res ol
education which Is Inco
VC and which, I will argue, can solve a problem which
arises for vc but cannot be settled as long as one holds
on to certain assumptions to which VC is committed. Let
me first lay out that problem as it exists for VC and then
show how a differenl view of moral education, one that
rejects the subjectivism of VC, can solve the problem in a
way that is consistenl with the basic obj ectives of vc.
I will state a lalrly long quotation from the book
Valu e~ ::md Teaching to Illustrate how the problem arises
for VC and also Illustrate thal VC is in fac t concerned with
moral education (so Its proponents cannot sidestep my
criticism by denying that they are concerned with moral
education). The interchange I will quote is one that might
occur in a class where the teacher is committed to VC but
also to enforcing certain behavior rules, in this case a rule
£DUCA TIONAL CONSIDfR
A
I IONS
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against cheating on tests. The tension arises between
these two objectives because according to VC theory, the
proper valuing process requires that one choose freely
from among altematives. But how can the student choose
freely from among alternatives ii some of the major alter·
natives are ruled out ahead of time by the teacher?
Teacher: So some of you think it is best to be
honest on tests, is that right'? (Some heads nod af.
firmatlvely.) And some of you think that dishonesty
is all right? (A few hesitant and slight nods.) And I
guess some of you are not certain . (Heads nod.)
Well, are there any other choices or is it Just a matter
of d ishonesty vs. honesty'?
Sam: You could be honest some of the lime and
dishonest some of the time.
Teacher: Does that sound like a possible
choice. class? (Heads nod .) Any other alternatives to
choose from?
Tracy: You could be honest in some situat ions
and not in others. For example, I am not hOnest when
a friend asks about an ugly dress, at least
sometimes. (laughter.)
Teacher: Is that a possible choice, class?
(Heads nod again.) Any other alternatives?
Sam: ft seems to me that you have to be all one
way or all the other.
Teacher. Just a minute, Sam. As usual, w e are
firs t looking tor alternatives that there are In the
Issue. Later we'll try to look at any choice that you
may have selected. Any other alternatives, class?
(N o response.) Welt, then, let's list the four
possibil ities that we have on the board , and I' m
going 10 ask that each of you do two things for your·
:
self (1) see if you can identify any other choices in
this issue of honesty and dishonesty, and (2) consider the consequences of each alternative and see
which ones you prefer. Later we will have buu
groups In which you can discuss this and see If you
are able to make a choice and if you want to make
your choice part of your actual behavior. That Is
something you must do for yourself.
Ginger: Does that mean that we can decide for
ourselves whether we should be honest on tests
here?
Teacher: No, that means that you can decide on
the value.
I
personally value honesty; and although
you may choose to be dishonest, I shall Insist that
we be honest on our tests here. In other areas of
your Ille, you may have more freedom to be dlshon ·
est, but one can't do anything any time, and In this
class I shall expect honesty on tests.
Ginger: But then how can we decide for ourselves? Aren't you telling us what to value? re,
Sam: Su you're telling us what we should do
and believe in .
Teacher: Not exactly. I don't mean to tell you
what you should value. That's up to you. But I do
mean that In this class, not elsewhere, necessarily,
you have to be honest on tests or suffer certain con.
sequences. I merely mean that I cannot give tests
without the rule of honesty. All of you who choose
dishonesty as a value may not practice it here, that's
all I'm saying. Further questions anyone? (Va lues
and Teaching, pp. 114-115.)
I-A LL. 1 ~78
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The ctass may not have any more questions, but I cer·
tainly do. Why do we and the authors tind this situation
strange? Why do we all feel that 1t requires explanation?
Well, clearly, because on the one hand we tell students
that they must make their own value judgments and that
these are valid, while on the other hand we tell them that
those judgments are not valid (that the teacher will not
respect them), in that, if they make the '"wrong " choice,
they will not be permitted to act on that choice in the
teacher's class and will have to "su ffer certain con·
ile Raths et al. believe that they can
seq uences."
dissolve the paradox by drawing a distinc tion between im·
posing values and imposing " .. . behavior rules that are
not defended as values, but meroty as devices for protect·
Ing individuals and groups against pressure from o thers,"•
I do no t believe that they are successful.
I cannot now develop
y
full my reasons to r thinking
them unsuccessful. Basically, I would suggest two
reasons. First, the objective of VC is to recognize, in fact,
to absolutize the autonomy and dignity of the person
making the choices. II seems to me. however, that to im·
pose rules without even trying to 1ustify them is to impose
what's been called an "'arbitrary authoritarianism•· on the
child and to fail totally to respect the child 's dignity. The
second reason for not accepting the solution is practical:
In tact, the teacher is telling the student what value to
hold. By telling the student, "I'm going to force you to do
this," one is sending a signal that the child receives as a
signal about what is, in an objective sense, right. That is,
to enforce behavior rules is, In effect, to contradict the VC
commitment not to tell the young what values they should
choose.•
Thus vc theory is s tuck with a real paradox: Despite
principled grounds for not imposing values on others, It
must accept the common sense requirement that childr
en
cannot be allowed to do whatever they want or choose,
and hence that sometimes the strong decide what the
weak will do, which amounts to the strong telling the weak
what values they should Choose.
can VC solve this problem? I suggest that to do so ii
must give up subjectivism but can maintain its objective
of avoiding moralizing and indoctrination. To give up sub·
jectivism will clearly require significant reworking of its
basic va.tue theory.
Let me begin my discussion with some basic distinc·
tions among kinds of values. When we think about values
(or, as I would prefer to say, about an individual's nor·
mative principles, that is, principles or belie fs concerning
what he oug ht to do), it Is use
ful to distinguish two kinds.
First. we can recognize "good life values." These are our
beliefs concerning what It Is reasonable or proper to do in
the pursuit of our own
being,
well
our own self-interest.
For example, t he fo llo wing bit of p ractical
reasoning-reasoning concern Ing what one shou Id
do-exposes one of Charlie's
values."
"good life
Suppose
Charlie decides to go out on a date with Linda because
"he will have more fun with Linda than with anyone else."
This line of reasoning reveals that one of Charlie's nor·
matlve principles, one of his vafues, ls that ii is reasonable
to do that which will give one the most tun. To state it
more precisely, Charlie may believe something like this:
"'Ceteris paribus, one is better off having more fun than
less." Any such value, one which acts as a guide to the
agent's own good life, I call a "good life value."
Bu t not all values are o f thi s kind. Many normative
principles do not tell us how to achieve the good life but

Wh

25

27

Educational Considerations, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 12
rather place limits, restraints, on our pursuit of our good
rather than " self·
life. They are "other-regarding
"
regarding ." Referring back to the previous example, sup·
pose that Charlie is again considering whether to go out
with Linda, but in this case he is married to Nancy. So now
he may reason thus: ''I should not go o ut with Linda, even
though I will have more fun with her than with anyone else,
because I am married to Nancy."
Analyzing
this bit ol
prac tical reasoning indicates that while Charlie is no t
rej ec ting the normative relevance of the fact that
· something will give him a lot ol fun, he finds that there is
an overriding principle which pu ls constraints on his
having fun. While the fact that ii would be the most fun
continues lo be a reason to date Linda, the fact that he is
marned to Nancy gives an overriding reason not to date
Linda. We can state the normative principle involved, the
"value," like this: "The fact that some action willlate
vio
one's marriage agreement is reason against doing that ac·
tion, even if doing it is in one's best self-interest." Such a
value or normative principle. which puts a moral limit on
one's pursuit of one's self-Interest,
call
I will
a " moral
value.''
Thus lhere can be said to be two kinds of values,
those of self-interest, which serve as guides to a person's
wellbeing, and those of morality, which indicate when and
how rights of others limit one' s pursuit of one's own
wellbeing. It should be noted that these categories need
not be mutually exclusive. What is best for me may be perfectly compatible with my moral duty. But in many cases
moral values will function as higher order values,
overriding those of self-interest. There Is nothing per se
wrong with Charlie's going out with Linda; however, the
reasons for doing so are outweighed In this case by the
moral obligation which Charlie has undertaken in respect
to Nancy.
I want to use this distinction to get at the causes and
cure of the paradox of VC. The paradox, to review, was
this: VC maintains that it is wrong to tell the young what
they should do, to impose values on them, yet it also
recognizes the need to impose behavior rules which,
however, turns out to be an arbitrary Imposition, given VC
value theory, and which willy·nillyInvolves telling the
young what their values should be. Basically, I will
suggest that the paradox arises because VC is mistaken In
believing that moral values are subjective. If moral values
are In some sense objective and rational, then they satisfy
a necessary condition of their being teachable; if they are
subjective, they cannot be taught. If they can be taught (as
opposed to inculcated or indoctrinated), then we may
legitimately do so; and if they are objective and grounded
In good reasons, then we may even require students to
follow them as behavior rules, even when they d isagree
with or do not yet understand the reasons for them.
I star! with the claim that moral values are not purely
subjec tive, but are in some sense objective. This Is a
major Issue in moral philosophy, and I can only outline my
position here. Let me begin by granting what seems
correct In VC value theory. There are many values whi ch
are in some sense subjective. About these one can say, as
does VC, that if one goes through the right valuing
process, then the value that one has at the end cannot be
considered Incorrect. For example, should I have beef or
chicken for dinner? Should I work the day or evening shift
(assuming my family obligations do not make a dif·
ference)? Should I read novels or go to movies for en·
tertainment? In many cases such as these, there is no
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https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations/vol6/iss1/12
DOI: 10.4148/0146-9282.1978

right answer other than what one would come lo after
going through a carelul process of value clarihcatlon.
These values might be called " pure procedural values," by
analogy with Aawls's conception of pure procedural
justice, for unlike other values, there is here no In·
dependent criterion for the correc t outcome.'
But for most moral values there is such an In·
dependent criterion. One ought to be honest on tests as a
ru le. II one comes out to a different conclusion, even If
one has clarified the value In the technical VC sense, one
Is mistaken. One ought to refrai n from killing people on
the street in cases not involving possible exceptions such
as war or sell-defense. II after the s tudent has clarified
herlhis values, she/he values
ng people
killi
on the street,
the student has made a mistake. In fact, not even all self·
regarding values are pure procedural values. ti's quite
possible for me to go through the proper values clarifying
process and be mistaken. For example, I may decide that I
should spend all my time in college playing basketball and
not s tudying. But even ii I have clarified my values In the
proper manner, this may be a terrible mistake. Thus I
suggest that most values are not subjective in the sense
that VC suggests but are rather In some sense objective.
To explain this notion of objectivity, let me refer to
the work of William Frankena. Frankena argues that
morality is a social institution, something that exists prior
to the individual and also continues on after the Individual,
but which also depends for its validation on the
recognition by Individuals, as they become morally
autonomous, that It Is a reasonable system, that one
ought to take the moral point of view. Frankena says:
Now morality ... Is, In one aspect, at least, a
social enterprise, no t j ust a discovery or invention o f
the individual for his own guidance. Like one' s
language, state or chu rch, It exists before the in·
dividual, who is inducted Into It and becomes more
or less of a participant In It, and it goes on existing
alter him . .. Morality ... Is also largely social in Its
origins, sanctions and functions. As first encountered by the ind ividual, at any rate, it is an instrument of society as a whole for the guidance of Individuals and smaller groups. It makes ·demands on
Individuals that are, Initially at least, external to
them .... If they come to disagree with the demands,
then, as Socrates thought and as we shall see later,
they must still do so from the moral point of view
that has somehow been Inculcated into them.
Having explained how morality is larger than the In·
d lvidual, how it has Its base In society, Frankena goes on
to explain how morality nevertheless Involves the
autonomy of the Individual.
However, morali ty • . . also has a more In·
dlvidualistic or protestant aspect. As Socrates im·
plied and recent philosophers have stressed ... ,
morality fosters or even calls for the use ol reason
and for a kind ol autonomy on the part of the In·
dlvldual, asking him, when mature and normal, to
make his own decisions, though possibly with
someone's advice, and even stimulating him to think
out the principles or goals in the light o f which he Is
to make his decisions. Even as a social Institution of
life, mor
a lity is thought of as aiming at rational self·
guidance or self-determination in its members.
Thus morality, the system of moral controls in society, is
objective both in the sense that it is a creation of the
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society and not of the individ
ual
and in the sense that it
depends ultimately on the fact that as members of the
society achieve matu rity, they come to recognize
autonomously the validity of the system.
While there may be different rules in different
societies, this need not imply societal ethical relativism,
and it surely does not imply ind ividual ethical relativism or
ethical subjectivism . Since VC's subjectivism seems to be
based on relativistic views of morality, a few words about
relativism are in order here. Whether or not there are dif·
ferent rules in different societies, the purpose of moral
rules is the same, to provide a system for resolving con.
flicts of interest. Differences among societies, like
disagreements among individuals within the society, can
be accounted for by (a) differing conditions and/or beliefs
about the conditions, and (b) differing levels of insight into
the principles of morality and the effects of different se ts
of rules.
(a) If one society believes that babies are healthier if
nursed and another believes that they are healthier if bottle fed, It may be thought right to bottle feed in the latter
society but thought wrong to do so in the former. But this
disagreement does not prove ethical relativism. Perhaps
because of other conditions, it Is health
ier
to nurse in one
society but not in the other. Then, though on one level of
moral rules we can speak of "cultural relativism, " this is
not really accurate because at a more basic level both
societies are using the principle, "Feed young babies the
way that will make them most healthy. " Or it might be the
case that o ne or the other society is mistaken about what
mode of feeding makes babies the healthier. In that case
also we do not have relativism but a situation in which one
society's moral rules are based on mistaken factual
premises.
(b) Societies may have different moral ru les because
of different levels of moral insight. Thus, segregation and
other forms of racial discrimination were approved in parts
of the United States until Martin Luther King, Jr. and
others forced us to recognize that this could not be
morally justified. Such a recognition would be impossible
if relativism were true. Consider the approach of South
Africans when criticized for aparthejd. They do not appeal
to ethical relativism-they do not say that it just happens
to be wrong In the United States but right in South Africa.
They grant certain moral pri nciples but then argue that
conditions are different in South Africa, and thus different
derivative moral practices are justified. Or, they maintain
that racial discrimination is morally proper and that
Americans are mistaken in thinking it wrong . Thus, we
need not jump to ethical relativism, let alone ethical subjectivism, when confronted with differences among in·
dividuals or among societies concerning what is right and
wrong.
Next, if morality does in fact have this objective
basis, it would seem that it can be taught and not merely
imposed or indoctrinated into children. For as Frankena
points out, morality must ultimately be based on the
autonomous acceptance of it by the members of
society-Le., they must rationally and freely recognize the
basis of the morality and adopt the rules for themselves.
Further, it is through this Individual analysis and appropriation that moral progress must be made, as individua discover discrepancies between the purposes of
moral ity and the present rules and principles by which it Is
expressed. So it does not follow that, if one has a definite
FALL, 1978
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theory of morality in mind, one must fall into what the VC
theorists fear,
the heavy "moralizing, incul
cating,
and in·
doctrinatlon" that dominated values education
before World War II and, in its extreme form, led to
the horrors of the Nazi regime.•
The objective of moral ed ucation, then, must be to
teach students (a} the current s tate of the art in one's
society, the current beliefs about what is right and wrong
and (b) the art itself - how to criticize and evaluate the
morality of society and develop one's own morality." The
first objective shows the content of moral education: One
does not ask each child to re·Invent the wheel, and neither
does one ask each child to re-invent morality. The second
objective shows the way In which morality respects the
dignity and autonomy of the individual: One does not
teach physics as a set o f revealed truths, but rather one
aims to get the ~tudent to understand and validate the
physicists' reason ing. Likewise, one aims to gel the
student of moral ity to understand and val idale the moral
reasoning of the society.
Es tablishing that morality can be taught and not
merely imposed or indoctrinated enables us to solve the
paradox of VC. For the paradox arises in precisely the
kinds of cases we are talking about: Cases such as that involvl ng honesty on tests are cases in which "common
sense" requires that rules of behavior be enforced, and
they are also cases involving moral values. So I would conclude that it Is not common sense at all but really the In·
stitution of morality which requires that these rules be enforced. And if what I have said about moral values is
correct, then we can avoid the paradox o f VC. If we believe
that there is an objective basis for morality, that the
demands of morality can be justified, then we can justify
imposing the relevant behavior rules on the chi ld without
arbitrary authoritarianism. For (a) if the rules are correct,
then the chi ld ought to follow them whether he/she understands them yet or not, and we can tell the child that
that Is why these behavior rules are being en forced. AM
(b) if morality is in fact a social institution, then to fail to
enforce it with children is to fail to discharge our respon·
sibiiity to society. So once we recognize that morality is
objective, we need not feel so sensi tive about imposing
rules, e.g., against cheating on tests. We solve t11e
paradox of VC by seeing that good theory does not ru le
out imposing these rules.
But these results take us beyond merely resolving the
paradox of VC. For if they are correct (and what I have
done is to lay out an alternative view of morality, not prove
it), then a real form of moral education is possible. Moral
education in the sense we described it, teaching the
young both the content and the rationale for the institution of morality, is impossibte for VC, since everyone
must discover or create or arbitrarily decide to prefer
her/his own set of values. But with the view presented
here, we can have a real moral education, for we can teach
the student what it is that morality requi res and also why
this is required and how to evaluate critically and
autonomously those requirements.
ff VC does not recognize the nature of moral values, it
will hardly be likely to dO a good job of teaching morality,
except Incidentally. The school teacher and the parent
ls must recognize this limitation to VC theory and practice.
One cannot be, In principle, nondirective and clientcentered'' if one is to achieve moral education, for there is
a definite subject matter for the young to learn. Itshould
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29

Educational Considerations, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 12
not be left to chance that the student will learn it through
values clarification. Nor should students be g iven the im·
press ion, as vc would, that It Is totally up to them whether
they should value honesty or dishonesty. Of course, it is
up to them in the sense that Ir I am to respect their
autonomy, I must not impose some normative belief on
them. But it is not up to them in the sense that whatever
they decide is equally correct. I have outlined a view of
morality which I belie ve is right and which fits our ordinary
notion of morality better than does VC, as is shown by the
fact that the non-subjectivistic view avoids the paradox o f

vc.

A word about the sense In which we say that it is
possible that the individual can make a wrong decision:
To say that it is logically possible that the Individual's
decision is wrong or mistaken Is not to say that I or anyone
can ever know Indubitably that the decision is wrong. It is
lo say that if you think you have made the right decision
and I think you have made the wrong one, one of us must,
logically, be mistaken.
Finally, this Is not to say that one cannot use any of
the VC activities for teaching morality, nor is It to forget
that there seems to be a set or "good life" values for
which the vc emphasis on valuing process rather than
specific outc omes seems to be appropriate. Many o f the
VC activities are excell
en t
for raising issues and for
stimulating the reflection that must take place . Insofar as
the techniques provide a way to stimulate Interest, to
reach students where they are, to broaden perspective
and increase consideration of alternatives and con·
seq uences, insofar as the techniques encourage one to
go beyond thinking to acting on and affirming one' s
values, they are valuable for moral education as well as for
other forms of values education . But moral education
must go much further. Moral education requires rigorous
and extended thought, study, analysis." It also requires
recognition of objectivity in moral values. Slnc,e VC
provides neither or these, the moral educator who relies
solely on values clarification will be making a serious
mis take.
Foo1no1es:

t. Values clarification is very popular right now in
American education. Its guru Is Sidney Simon, and
among the high priests are Howard Kirschenbaum,
Merrill Harmon and Leland W. Howe. The movement
claims apostolic success ion from John Dewey
through Louis E. Aaths.
Following are some of the basic sources: John
i ty of
Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: Univers
Chicago Press, 1939) is claimed to be the source of the
value theory which VC adopts. VC theory Is most fully
laid out in Louis E. Aaths, Merrill Harmon, and Sidney
Simon, Values and Teaching (Columbus, Ohio: Charles
E. Merrill, 1966). Other writings by main figures Include
Sidney Simon, Leland Howe, and Howard Kirchenbaum, Values Clarilica11on (New York: Hart, 1972);
Sidney Simon and Howard Kirschenbaum, eds.,
Readings In Values Clarification (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1973); and Howard Kirschenbaum, Ad·
vanced Value Clariflca1ion (San Diego, Ca.: University
Associates, 1976).
2. Many cri ticisms o f other aspects of VC have been wri t·
ten. Some I Ind icate here: Bruce D. Johnson and Bryce
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Nelson, " Values Clarification: A Critical Perspective,"
In Lindley J. Sti les and Bruce D. Johnson, eds ..
Morality Examined : Guidelines for Teachers (Prince·
ton, N.J.: Princeton Book Co., t977); A.C. Kazepldes,
"The Logic of Values Clarification," The Journal of
Educational Thought, XI (1977), pp. 99·111; Alan Lock·
wood, " A Critical View of Values Clarification,"
Teachers College Record, LXXVll (September 1975),
pp. 35·50; and John B. Stewarl
, arifying
"Cl
Values
Clarification: A Critique," in Phi Delta Kappan, LVI
(June 1975), pp. 684·88.
3. The term ethical subjectivism has a number of
meanings. Sometimes it refers to the view that right
and wrong are a function of some feeling of the
agent-an action Is right if I feel a certain way about it.
I will use the term In a somewhat different sense:
Ethical subjec tivism Is the opposite of ethical Ob·
Jectlvlsm; that is, It Is the view that there is no s tandard
for determining right and wrong apart from what an In·
dividual believes to be right and wrong - whatever an
individual believes about the rightness or wrongness
of an action is correct (true) because that is what he
believes.
4. There is, I beli
ev e, a serious theoretical difficulty here
for VC: What is it that one has after these steps? What
is It that satisfies these cri teria? Is It an attitude? a
belief? a pattern of behavior? a feeling? However, I will
not pursue this line of criticism in this paper.
5. Merrill Harmon and Sidney B. Simon, "Va
lues," in Kirschenbaum and Simon, eds., Readings in Values
Clarification (op. cit.), p. 11.
6. For elaboration of this point, see my paper, "The
Dilemma of Values Clarification, " rorthcoming In
Philosophy of Educ ation 1978: Proceedings of the
Thirty·Fourt
h
Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of
Education Society.
7. Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University
s,Pr
es 1971), pp. 65·86.
8. William Frankena, Ethics, Second Edition (Englew ood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentlce·Hal l, Inc., 1973), pp. 6-7.
9. Howard Kirschenbaum, Merrill Harmon, Leland Howe
and Sidney B. Simon, "In Defense of Values
Clarification," Phi Delta Kappan, LVlll (June 1977), pp.
743·44. William
10. See
Frankena, " Toward a Philosophy of Moral
Education," Harvard Educatlonal Review, XXVlll, 4
(Fall 1958), pp. 300·313; reprinted In Israel Scheffler, ed.,
Philosophy and Education, Second Edition (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, 1966), pp. 225·44.
11. Alan Lockwood in " A Critical View of Values
Clarification," (op. cit.), explores the similarities be·
tween VC and Aogerlan client-centered therapy.
12. An Important technique of vc is not to s tay very long
on any issue, to stimulate thought and reflection and
then move on. Raths et al. say:
Caution: many teachers do not end value-clarifying
discussions soon enough. Cut them at the rirst sign o f
dullness. What Is usually. effec tive Is a few sharp
Questions, some silence for students to use for private
mulli ng, a few student comments, and then out.
(Va lues and Teaching, op. cit. , pp. 115-116.)
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Higher grades may not be synony·
mous with higher ranking.

The role of
the school in
reforming
society
structures

In November, 1977, Donald L. Reidhaar, general coun·
sel for the University of Calilornla, reported on the present
status of the 16 studenls who had been admitted in
preference to Allan Bakke In the medical school of the
University of California at Davis. The experlmen1 here lay
in admitting a special group of students, traditionally ex·
eluded from medical schools, rather than In devising
special aids for them.•
We shall discuss these reports at the end of this ar·
tic le. But i t is important that we lay a groundwork that will
help us come to grips with lhese and other examples of
s tructural reforms that extend far beyond attempts 10 help
this or that ind ivldual.

I
Efraim Shmuel i has pointed out that liberal in·
tellectuals may reac t In one o f two ways to lhe need for
reform: they look for a change In social Institutions or in
the individual :
Historically the liberal intellectuals flucluate be·
tween two orientations. The one Is directed toward
perfection of man by eliminating the social,
economic and political sources of evll. The in·
tellectuals of this group are structure.oriented. The
second orientation allempts to purify lhe human
qual ities of reasoning and behavior by moral exhor·
tation or other educalional techniq ues In the hope
that the economic, social and political institutions
will gradually becomo manifestations of universally
accepted humane Inten tions.'
The second group of liberals , o f course, wou
ld
say that
changing individual men Is precise ly the way to effecl
changes in society; many ed ucators belong to this camp.
by Walter P. Krolikowski
We will begin by analyzing certain features of the con Loyola University of Chicago
tention of lhe first group. There are several reasons fpr
choosing lhis starting po int. The profound changes and
the increasing rale of social change push social scientists
and educalors to look for quicker and more efficient
methods of bringing about, in a planned fashion, desirable
social changes.
Changing society is not li ke changing individual men.
Society is more than the men who are its members. Since
E<lucational innovations continue to be In lhe news.
society consists of patterns of interlocking and in·
As long as the American public voices its dissatisfaction
teracting structures, changing societ y entails changing
wilh the progress of its children and as long as the
the structures of society.• Now this is no easy task. Ii
American schools remain a uniquely effective vehic le for
psychologists despair of changing the individual, social
getting ahead, schoo
l personnel
will continue to ex·
scientists despair of c hanging society. Most of society's
perlment. We have recently received reports on two suc h
s tructures have survived centuries o f efforl to abuse them,
experiment
s,
and phenomenally ex1ensive and expensive
on the one hand, and to reform them, on the Olher. The
one at the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of
origins of most instruments of society are hidden in
Illinois and another on the progress of those studen ts who
prehistory; their continuing prosence is taken for granted,
beat out Allan Bakke for admission to the medical sc hool
and they change with what Charles Sanders Peirce would
cular slowness
al Davis, California. Both are worth pondering .
For all their variations, primary in ·
call "se
In October, 1977, Ira W. Langston and E.E. Oliver
stitutions, like forms of the family, property ownership,
issued a summary report on special support programs at
subsistence economy and social mobility, have been ex·
the Chicago Circle Campus. Since 1968, the University of
.•
traordinarily impervious to c hange
Illinois has recruited and admi tted over 5,000 minority
Changing society through changing social struc·
stu<lents f or special programs: the Educational Assis·
lures, then, has been adopled not because such an ap·
lance Program, the Native American Program, the Latin
proach is Intrinsically easier than changing individuals. In·
American Recruitment and Educational Services program
deed it seems equally, if not more, difficult. But it has the
and the Confederation of Latin American Students.
personal
10
reform,
ser·specialadvantage of offering an alternative
Special orientation programs, advising and tutorialand
one which offers hope of greater effectivenss, simply
course were specifically designed for
v ices
because ot the scale on wh ich i t would operate, at a time
these s tudents. In additional to the usual federal and state
when time itself is at a premium.
monies available t o all needy studen1s, approximately $5
Finally, this approach Is congenial to some
million has been spent since 1968. Surely, a large scale ef·
fort.
educators. Educators, beginning with Plato, have been
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tempted to be hyphenated kings. Academic people are of·
ten tempted to think that one
social
structure in particu
lar,
the school, is precisely the best instrument to bring about
these reforms, less risky and "dirty" than direct poli tical
action and more likely to make an Impact than the writing
of treatises .•
For these and other reasons, the idea of the structures of society deserves close analysts. If educators are
serious, and I think they are, confusion of thought and purpose is to be avoided. " Full speed ahead!" is a legitimate
cry onlylswhen goa have been clarilled and agreed upon
and means are clearly ava
ilable and commensurate to the
task.
ff

For educators, the idea of the reform of the structures
of society can function in three different ways: as one
amo ng many objectives of the ed ucational enterprise; as
a criterion for choosing one set ol actions, possibly
ed
but possibly not, over another; or as a
ucational
crllerlon for improving the educational enterprise .
Historically, schools have purported to have and have
had different objectives or goals. Sell-realizatoon, lifeadjustment, vocational preparedness, the cultivation of in·
telligence, citizenship education and the reform of
society - separately and in tandem these objectives have
In fluenced theorists and practitioners alike. If the last of
them is taken seriously as an objective, two presuppositions are worth uncovering. It Is assumed that the
school is an apt Instrument of reform, but It Is not
assumed that the school itself needs reform. In other
words, such a reformer might say: " There is nothing wrong
with schools; what Is wrong with society will ultimately be
corrected because the schools are preparing reformers o f
society."
When the Idea of reform functions as a criterion for
choosing ooe set of actions over another, ditferent assumptions are operative. It is not assumed that the school is
an apt instrument of reform,• nor Is II assumed that the
school itself needs reform. Let me explain.
If we think of the struc tures o f society as the in·
stltutio
ns of agriculture, business. government, Industry
and intelligence; and If we ask ourselves how we can most
effectively participate in the reform of society, we are
asking which of these Institutions is in need of reform and
what actions on our part will bring about that reform. We
may say that agriculture needs reform or business or
several or ail of them. Further, we may ask whether our action through one or more o f these Institutions is the best
way to reform society . It may be that we will judge rather
that personal action outside these structures will be the
most apt instrument of reform. In all of these cases, we
are asking, among other things, where we should s tand in
relation to these structures. Several alternatives are
possible. Should we run for the Congress of the United
States, accept a position with Inland Steel, work lor IBM
?
Then we would be working toward reform within the structure itself. Should we seek a position on the s taff of a
national magazine, work for a lobbying group or a pressure
group? Then we would be at some distance from the structure, and the reforms we advocate would have to come
about through the mediation of an informed pu blic or
lngroup we had aroused. Or shall we operate within the
framework of the school and attempt to form men and
women who will be the agents of change? Then we are farther removed from the action of reform itself, but
ultimately we might have greater success than if we were
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participating in the daily skirmishes. From this perspective, the idea of reform reduces Itself to the question:
At what remove should we act? The answer may but does
not necessarily Involve the school.
Even If we decide that the schools offer the most el·
fective point o f departure, there are still two possible
tacks open to us. we can say we do not know what the
future will bring and , therefore, that we do not k now how
the structures of society should be reformed. If we
prepare young men and women well thro ugh the Instrumentality of a general education, they wi ll know what
to do when the time comes for adult action; and they will
be eager to do it. Or. secondly, we can say that the structures of society need or will need this or that particular
reform and we can prepare students explicitly to solve
those particular problems.
Let me offer examples of these two approaches. Marx
esto" Is
an
and Engels' program In " The Commu nist Manif
example of the first. After ni ne points that refer most
properly to the industrialization of the nation and the
collectivization of agriculture, Marx and Engels add a
tenth: " Free education for all children In public schools.
Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form.
Combination of education with industrial production,
etc."' Although the program does not lack all speci·
ficatlon, it is still quite general and, in the main, formal.
An example of the second might be Lenin's plan, as
described by Professor Pavel A. Kashutin, Rector of the
Moscow:
College In
Lenin Teachers' Training
Therefore, along with industrialization of the nation
and collectivization of agriculture, Lenin's plan for a
socialist socie ty advanced , as the third important
on. revolu ti
task, the carrying thro ugh of a cultural
Lenin pointed out that in the given case the matter
concerned a radical turn in the spiritual life of the
masses: shaping up an attitude towards property as
belonging to the people and towards work as not
being forced, but o f being free and creative for the
aneously of one's self and society:
benefit si mult
remoulding of the world outlook of the people. and
instilling to a greater degree In their minds the
psychology of collectivism, friendship and mutual
assistance, and, finally, involving broad sections of
the working people in running the state.•
Lenin's program spells o ut objectives with a degree of
specificity beyond that of Marx and Engels. It is at least
conceivable that similar objectives could be stated for the
reform of the structures o f American society and that
students' education could be planned In function of these
objectives.
Thus would run the second of three possible In·
terpretatlons of the reform of the structures of society;
reform would serve as a criterion for action, a criterion for
selec ting o ne Instrumentality over others. But the concept
of reform may al so function as a criterion o f seifimprovement. Here too, assu mptions are operative. It Is
assumed that the school needs reform, but there need be
no assumption that other structures in society require
reform nor that the school is an apt Instrument for the
reform of those struc tures. Here the reformer is Inward·
roo king.
From the perspec tive of the school as an ongoing
structure of society In need of reform. we have al ready answered the question of our distance from the structure.
w e are within one of the structures, and we assume It Is
EOUCA TIONALNSID
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an important structure either in itself or in relation to other
have fou nd that I do equally well, no matter how " in·
structures. We are no t asking about the school in relation
telllgenll
y"
or " stupidly
"
I play the game. For chance tac·
to the reform of society, at least not d irectly. The
tors are much more important than any other. Similarly, an
question, " How can we improve school?" can be sub·
experiment may show that an alternative is no better or no
sumed under the larger question, " Ho w can we improve
worse than the established procedure. What we may have
but it need not be. Either question assumes that
?"
society
tho ught of extreme importance turns out not to matter
improvement is necessary. The status quo is to be aban·
very much . In other words the null hypothesis is con·
doned . New procedures must be devised and im· ent
Some
fi rmed. The net result may be that we loosen up and relax.
plem
ed.
experimentation Is, therefo re; called for.
Alt
ernatives may turn out to be equally good (and equally
Abandon ing the tried and true but inadequate is th e
bad)."
very hallmark of reform, and It is simultaneously a
Carl Berei ter, in a paper presented at the December.
justification lor experimentation. Since the concept of ex·
1970, meeting of the American Association tor the Ad·
perimentation Is as loose as the concept of reform. the
vancement of Science, reported that he has been able to
possibility of compounding contusion is quite real. For
identify many unteachable areas of learning; by which he
this reason. a briel analys is o f the way the Idea of ex·
means that some things "are either not learned or are
perimentatlon funct ions in this context Is necessary.
learned j ust as well with or without teaching. "" It is his
contention that productive thinking skills; concepts and
principles, other than in science and mathematics; arilh·
Ill
I wou
ld suggest that there are at least th ree different
olv
g;
in
reading comprehenmetlc reasoning or problem-s
meaning s of experimentation. Firs t, an experiment can be
sion; appreciation o l li terature, art, music, as distinct from
institu ted to demonstrate on a small scale; and therefore
knowledge and preference; composition skills
, such as
as economically and prudently as possible. an imorganization, clarity, and s tyle , as distinguished from the
provement, which would then become the norm for pracmechanics o f writi ng; and citizenship or socialization to
tice generally. The whole intent of such an experimenl Is
the prevailing norms-all are unteachable in his sense. In
to replace what is presently being done. Inherent in such
other words, young men and women will or will not learn
these skills and attitudes no matter how much or how little
an experiment Is a note of threat to the established way of
proceeding.
the schools attempt to teach them. If his conclusions suc·
Let me offer an example. The Chicago Public High
cessfully resist criticism that will probably be proposed,
School tor Metropolitan
iladelphia's
Studies,
k·
li ke Ph
Par
they exemplif
y
the third meaning I am proposing for the
word experimentation: alter
way School, Is such an experiment. Ope ning in February,
natives
that make no dlf·
ference. For whether the sc hool teaches these materials
1970, with aboul 150 students and presently enrolling
about 3 50 studen ts, Metro attempts to give a represen ·
or not, the student wil l have the same chance of acquiring
tative group of Chicago high school s tudents an
them. Note too the implications o f this meaning o f ex·
educa 11onal experience which explo
s it the s tudents' in·
perimentation for reform : some reforms have, similarly, no
terests and abil ities and the learni ng opportunities
positive or negative impact. They ne ither speed up nor
available in the Chicago area. II attempts to furnish a new
slow down whatever changes are occurring.
and flexible curriculum model; a new school architecture-a "school without walls"; a new ad·
IV
mlnlstrative model - the democratically run school. II is at
Bereitefs work offers a convenient transitional
once a positive affirmation of the ways schoo l ought to be
bridge to the constructive part o f the paper. Befo re at·
operated and a polemic against the wa"f schools are
tempting to show the relative worth for the teacher of the
presently run.•
dlllerlng meanings of reform, I shall essay an explanat ion
Oth er experimenters are Intent on a different catch
gives evidence, the " un·
er
of the fllCI, for which Berell
. Present procedures may not be doing an
with their nels
teachability" of certain skll ls.
Explaining
why what
effec tive job for a c ertain population. Some young men
teachers do may sometimes make li ttle o r no difference
and women, let us co njecture, are incapable of profiting
may prepare the ground for o ther and larger questions
from the present program for academic, psychological or
such as why "planned change" may on occasion be no
financial reasons. An experiment could be launched, then,
more effec tive than unplanned change.
to help lhis group of students. For example, a group of
I would hypothesize that the self-activity of students
sixth graders, who most probably would be unable to at·
Is probably as important in the learning process as chance
tend high school specializing in science programs, might
Is In my game of solitaire. Let me explain why I think such
be placed In an intensive pre·hi
gh school program. This
may be the case.
kind of experiment might benefit students otherwise in- e
Charles A. Curran has expounded a theory of
capabl of going down a track of science studies.•
•
And ii
teaching which turns the ordinary conception o l the
does not threaten currently established programs in any
teacher-student relationship around .
way.
The teacher in our vlewopint should be seen as a
client . . . not as a coun lor.
se It
is the student who
Stil l other experimenters may simp ly be looking for
must ac t as a counselor and who should und erstand
interesting alternatives to accepted procedures. For
the teacher if learning Is to take place. The teacher,
example,
I pl
ay a sol itai re game. Four cards are laid down,
like the client, is in deep need o f being understood,
lace up. If there are two ca rd s showing of the same suit,
and to be received and accepted by the student at
the lower of the two is discarded. Then four more ca rds
the intellectual or emotional level of his struggle for
are laid down. Winning the game ls exceptionally difficult,
creative communication. Reversely, the student Is
for the player must end up with the four aces alone.
t
role but
not, in this conception, In the client-patien
Recently, I have tried to lose rather than win, always,
rather in the counselor-therapist role. The teacher
however, obeying the rules. I take the seemingly more
who is creative is suffering with ideas that are welled
unintelligent alternative when altern
atives
are available. I
M ll. 1978
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up within him and that he needs to express and have
understood. It is the student who can be in the
therapeutic position of understanding and genuinely
relating to the teacher as he unfolds, often with painful intensity, the ideas that he is invested in. "
The teacher comes to his s tudents like a client coming to
a counselor. He, the client, speaks, and the students, like
counselors, listen carefully, try to understand, nod en·
couragement, refelct what he has been saying, ask
questions and show their understanding of the teacherclient. If he has been understood, the session has been
successful. He goes away happy.
This model of the teacher-student relationship is not
unique to Curran. Although Israel Scheffler is by no means
using Curran's metaphor of an inversion of the usual con·
ception of the counselor-cli
ent
relationship, he is con·
ceptuall quite close when he wriles:
To teach, in the standard sense, Is at some points at
least to submit oneself to the understanding and In·
dependent judg ment of the pupil, to his demand for
reasons, to his sense of whal constitutes an
adequate explanation. To teach someone that such
and such is the case is not merely to try to get him to
believe it: deception, for example, is not a method or
a mode of teach ing. Teaching involves further that, if
we try to get the student to believe that such and
such is the case, we try also to get him to believe it
for reasons that, within the limits of his capacity to
grasp are our reasons. Teaching, in this way,
requires us to reveal our reasons to the student and,
by so doing, to submit them to his evaluation and
critlcism. 14

If Curran's model and Scheffler's analysis are per·
suasive, certain questions arise. Why do students put up
with a teacher? Why do they accept him as their client?
They are not being paid, as the ordinary counselor is. I
conjecture that they accept him because they " love" him.
Plato's insight into the erotic relation of teacher and
student seems to me to point to a necessary condition for
a flourishing teaching-learning situation." Out of love
students are willing to sit long hours listening to the
teacher and trying to understand him.
But why do students love the teacher? Perhaps the
students love their teacher because he is attractive and
compatible. Beyond these personal and unpredictable
reasons, i would guess that students love their teacher
because the teacher represents, indeed is, the adult
world, the world out there waiting to be explored, the great
beckoning unknown, the offer of infin ite riches. Curran,
from his psychological point of view, conjectures that the
teacher, by communicating himself In trust to others, is, in
opposition to the death-wish, choosing and affirming
life... Students are attracted to the llfe·chooser. There is
an additional reason, too. The teacher offers some dis·
lance from the adult world. He is a critic who sees that
"world he is" in relation to an ideal of what the world
might become; of what he, the worfd·embodying teacher,
might become; of what the students before him might

become.',.
The normal end-result of the student-teacher relationship is that students understand the teacher. They do not
necessarily end up loving what the teacher loves, doing
what the teacher does, even becoming the world that the
teacher is. The basic reason th is condition prevails is that
students are independent, self-activating beings over
whom the teacher has no ultimate or even intimate con·
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trol. What students accept from the world or accept of the
ideal depends on themselves. Possibly for this reason the
teacher and his methods make li ttle difference. How
students come to understand the teacher depends on
themselves, just as how the counselor understands his
client depends on the counselor's ingenu ity and patience.
Just as the counselor does not imitate his client:s mode of
life, so students do not necessarily imitate the teacher's
mode of Ille. It is true that parents often feel un·
comfortable sending their children to teachers of a social
class, and with political and relig ious beliefs, different
from their own. But should they? The name of the
teaching game, well played, is fr.eedom.
As a consequence, if the teacher is intent on reform·
ing the structures of society in a pre-determined way, it
y is likely that teaching is a relatively ineffective way to
bring about reform. If, on the other hand, the teacher is in·
tent on reforming the structures of society but without a
pre-determined ultimate plan or objective," teaching may
be a relatively effective method of reform.

v
This hypothetical explanation of the relation of
student and teacher has, then, led us to choose the Jess
rigidly structured approach to reform. What further im,.
pllcatlons can be drawn on the basis of this analysis? A
review seems to be in order.
Proposing that one of the objectives of the school is
the reform of the structures of society assumes that the
school ls an apt instrument of reform. If the self-activity of
the student is as important as I have suggested, "apt in·
strument" needs specification. The school's ef·
fectiveness will be mediated through the autonomous,
largely unpredictable (pace B.F. Skinner), and future activities of the students.
Second, the school as an instrument of reform is
committed to working at a third remove from the struc·
lures themselves. The universities as a moral community
have had a measure of effectiveness in influencing
political and community decisions, but the elementary
and secondary schools to my knowledge have had little influence. The teachers, throug h their national and local
organizations and through union activity, have, in some
small measure, been effective, but teachers are not the
schools.
Third, It seems preferable, because more realistic, for
the school to aim at general rather than specific
preparation of Its students. Not only the autonomy of the
student calls for this approach; the rapidity of change in
the social Problemalik militates against specific
preparations for specific problems. For the solutions to
these problems, short-term ins truction In para·
educational institutes or workshops seems likely to be
more effective.
Fourth, nothing that has been said would close out
any of the three forms of experimentation. Each seems to
have its own strengths and weaknesses.

VI
Let us now return to the two cases we began with.
How successful have they been? Norman Cantor, a universi ty vice chancellor for academic affairs and a noted
medieval historian, summarized the findings of the report:
"Groups of students with comparable ability made the
same academic progress whether enrolled in special support or regular support programs at the University of
fDU(A TIONAl CONSIDERATIONS, Vol 6. No. 1. F•I/, 1978
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lllinors at Chicago Circle." In other words, the money was
spent to practically no effect. Although the su.,,ey has
been challenged by James Griggs, director of the minority
group aid program and president-elect of Malcolm X
College, the two statistical sociologist from Urbana Insist
on the validity of their findings.
Reporting on the Davis experiment, Donald L.
Reidhaar used practically the same words as Norman Cantor but to quite different effect: "I don't think there is any
sign ificant difference in the rate of their (the 16 minority
students) success and that of non-minority students."
e On of the 16 has been named by his classmates "most
likely to succeed" and won the Senior Class Award. At
Davi s, the 16 who were not comparable to the other
students admitted on the basis of the usualnal
traditio
criteria, were comparable on the basis of their performances In medical school.
The contrast Is great. In the first case special efforts
were taken, efforts that do not seem to have helped. In the
second case no special efforts were made to offer extra
help to those who were admitted because of their minority
status, and no special help seems to have been needed.
We are, as we frequently are in human affairs, In the
presence of a paradox. Do something extra and ii does not
help; do nothing extra and it helps greatly.
The projects al the University of Illinois have brought
about no great changes in society. It is not even clear that
they were Instituted to change anything except the un iver·
sity itself. But surely these projects were begun because
educators at the University of Illinois saw a great need for
internal reform. As experi ments they were preceded by no
pilot study o n a small -scale. They were full·blown projec ts
Intended lo help a group of students traditionally considered unsuitable for college work. But it has turned ou t
thus far that the experiment Is empirically seeking no thing
more than an attractive alternative to more traditional
techniques. Nothing revolutionary has eventuated. In this
Instance, the Berelther claJm seems substantiated.
The new admissions policy at Davis has, however. tarreaching Implications. Although not yet realized, great
changes In lhe med ical profession can be expected. A
group of people tradllionally barred from a profession. at
least in such numbers, have doors o f opportunity open to
them. A reform in school policy may very well bring about
substantial reforms in the professional sectors of society.
The decision al Davis to open its doors to many more
minority students on a quota-like basis led to an experiment that has paid olf, an experiment whose im·
plications have yet to be fully spelled out. One such Im·
plication may very well be that the traditional criterion of
academic excel lence is a needlessly exacting criterion.
Students with lower achievement scores in academic sub·
jects may be as successful in medical (and other
professional?)
hool
sc
as those with higher scores. Higher
grades may not be synonymous with higher ranking. If this
conclusion stands against the criticism it Inevitably in·
vites, It will Indeed create not only a reform but a
revolution In that social structure called the American
school.
Footnotes
1. For information on these two programs I have relied on
the October, 1977, Summary Report of Research
Memorandum No. 77-8, " A Study of Special
Support
Programs at the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of Ill inois," by Ira W. Langston and E.E. Oliver; and
on reports by Milt Freudenhelm and by Fred Mann

which appeared in the Chicago Daily News for November 14 and 15, 1977.
2. Elraim Shmuel!, " MOdern Hippies and Ancient Cynics:
A Comparison of Philosophical and Political Develop·
ments and lls Lessons," Journal of World History, 12
(1970), 491.
3. I will not attempt to justify this statement, which has
become almost a commonplace . For a justification,
see Nei l J. Smelser. "Processes of Social Change," in
Neil J . Smelser (Ed.), Sociology: An Introdu ction (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 667-728. Nor do I
find sociologists, generally using "structures" to refer
to institutions wit h some. lasting power, guilty of the
same systematic ambiguities In their use of "struct~ res" as educational theorists. Josephs. LuKinsky, in
his article, " 'Structure' In Educational Theory"
E~ucational Philosophy and Theory, 2 (1970), 15-31.
discerningly spells out the difficulties "structure" as a
slogan is encountering In educational writings.
Possibly one of the difliculties educational
theorists and other social theorists are encountering
with the word "structure" Is that ii implies the status
quo and " changing lhe structures ol society"
therefore entails a contradiction. Erich Fromm' s d istinction between structure and order can be helpful
perhaps in persuading theorists to disavow identifying
structure with order. From Fromm, order allows only
mechanical changes which in no way threaten the
present style of life. Men llving under law and order are
threatened by the spontaneous and free aspects of
life, but they are not threatened by pure ly mechanical
changes which allow for adjust men ts that reduce con·
flict and make more secure the s tatus quo. On the
other hand, men who find the status quo under any terms
into lerable usually react to this mechanical stance
by over-reacting: freedom comes to involve anarchy
and licentiousness, the "absence of tradition, absence
of structure, absence of plan." Fromm would posit between the "death " of order and the anarchy of license
that structure, analogous 10 the structure ()( system
inherent in any biological organism, which precisely
allows the organism to Interact creatively with its en·
vironment. See Erich Fromm' s article in Summerhill:
For and Against (New York: Harl Publishing Co., 1970),
pp, 262·263.
4. Cf. Carlton H. Bowyer, Philosophical Perspectives for
Education (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Co.. 1970),
p. 235. For the term "primary Ins titution" which refers
to institutions which are essentially durable in the
midst of "secondary Ins titutions" which change more
rapidly, see Abram Kardlner and Ralph Linton, The In·
dlvidual and His Society (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1939), pp. 244·245, 326·327, 471-483.
5. A classic acc ount o f the relationship of education to
the reform of society Is Wllllam 0 . Stanley's Education
and Social
tegration
In
(New York: Teachers College,
Columbia University, 1953).
6. For a recent statement on the school as a reinforcer of,
rather than an agent of, social change, see Harold G.
Shane, " Social Decision Prerequisite to Educational
Change, 1975-1985," In The Future as an Academic
Discipline. Ciba Foundation Symposium 36 (New
Series) Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975), pp. 73·81.
7. Emile Burns (Ed.), A Handbook of Marxism (New York:
International Pu blishers, 1935), p. 46.
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8. Pavel A. Kashutin, "V.I. Lenin and National
Education," Convergence, 3 (1970). 80.
9. Written material on Metro Is hard to come by. The
January 19, 1971, issue of the Chicago Sun-Times and
the September 28, 1975, of The Chicago Tribune contain feature articles on Metro . The Chicago Board of
Education issued in September, 1969 a report entitled
icago
"Ch Public
High Schoof tor Metropolitan Studies:
Rationale and Program ."
10. Some features of Metro are eKperlmentaf in this sense
as well as in the first meaning .
11. Mayer reports that in some learning situations there
are " no significant differences in learning or posttest
performance on retention or transfer" between groups
who have learned materials In what would be con·
sldered a normally intelligent sequence and those who
have had the same materials presented to them in a
"scrambled" way. See Richard E. Mayer, "The Se·
quencing of Instruction and the Concept of Assim·
ilatlon·to-Schema," Instructional Science 6 (1977)
379.
•
'
12. Carl Bereiter, "What Is Teachable?" page 1 of a
mlme0 graphed abstract of the paper. For a more ex·
tended treatment, see his Must We Educate?
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice·Hali, 1973).
13. Charles A. Curran, Psychological Dynamics In
Religious Living (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971).
pp. 116·117. For an earlier formulation, see Curran's
Counseling and Psychotherapy. The Pursuit of Values
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), pp. 289·290. In hi s
Religious Values in Counseling and Psychotherapy
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), pp. 211·227, Curran
emphasizes a different relationship. He writes of the
student who learns by finding, In the teacher's ac·

cep
tance of himself as a total human being, a model
for, and the resources for, accepting himself as a
totality.
14. Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education
(Springfield: Charles c. Thomas, 1960), p. 57.
15. See H.I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity
(New York: New American Library, 1964), pp. 50·62.
16. Curran, Psychological Dynamics In Religious Living, p.
116.
17. It may be suggested that as a matter of fact children do
not love their teachers. We hear much or the dlf·
flculties compulsory schooling involves. Against their
, children are compelled to go to school. Teachers
wills
are the masters; children, the slaves. A love-relation·
ship between master and slave is simply a sick rela·
tionship.
It may be or some Interest to note Aristotle's
position that master and slave, so long as they love the
same things, can be friends:
The part and the whole, like the body and the soul,
have an identical Interest; and the slave is a part or
the master, in the sense of being a living but
separate part of his body. There is thus a community
of interest, and a relation of friendship, between
master and slave
, when both of them naturally merit
the position in which they stand. But he reverse Is
true (and there is a conflict of interest and enmity),
when matters are otherwise and slavery rests merely
on legal sanction and superior power.
Aristotle, Politics, 1255b (Ernest Barker translation).
18. Obviously, this formulation does not mean to deny the
possibility of a predetermined plan methodologically,
only substantively.
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The greatest danger to education is
the threatened loss of professional
freedom.

Goal-digging

by Arthur Brow n
Wayne State
ty Un iversi
Detroit, Michigan

There Is a pathos that characterizes the current
movement toward establ ishing uniform standards In
education, be they tests for promotion and/or graduation
in the schools or the proposed core curriculum for Har·
vard undergraduates.' As with a Greek tragedy, the end is
foreordained: what we are not certain about Is how the
plot will develop.
One can't help wondering why It is that Americans
are so attached to the idea that the best way to cure a
social illness is to set goals rather than eliminate un·
derlying causes.' Perhaps we are victims of a history of
almost unrelieved success in confronting challenges like
a continent, Pearl Harbor, Sputnik, the moon. Con·
temporary reflections of this national tendency to attack
our demons head on are affirmative action goals to
redress employment imbalances, a Humph rey-Hawkins
bill' to put a percentage goal on unemployment and a
"back·tO·baslcs" movement replete wllh specific
educational goals.
The difficu lties associated with implementing
promotion or graduation requ irements based on stan·
dardized tests have become almost immediately apparent.
Witness the outcry when nearly half of Florida's high
school seniors failed a graduation test this past year and
when a proposed New York State graduation exam was
rejected as far too easy and, therefore, of no academic
significance. As one might have guessed, an examination
of some rigor would prove to be politically unacceptable,
and one politically acceptable would be viewed as
academically impoverished. A Catch 22!
Nonetheless, it may be too much to expect politicians
not to respond with legislation In order to appease a
public they perceive as full of resentment about economic
pressures and the Increased difficulty of "making it" in a
world of decreasing opportunity and affluence. And
perhaps it is too much to expect the man In the street,
whose own education left much to be desired, to be
WUCA TIONAL CONSIDCRA TIONS, Vol. 6, No. 1, fall, ·1?7U
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sophisticated about such matters as education for life in a
democracy, the dismal history of efficiency movements in
education, the relationship between means and ends and
the distinction between test performance and competence. But those directly responsible for educational
policy and curriculum development should know better.
What is especially sad about the performance objectives
and accountability movements is the number of their sup·
porters to be found among school administrators,
curriculum directors and professors of education. No
lly
inspired, but
doubt some of this support is politica
some of It derives from a sincere belief that these
movements wi ll serve the cause o f education.
I propose in this short essay, therefore, to question
the three principal benefits which proponents claim for
s tandardized testing and accountability systems, viz., (1)
efficiency, (2) the development of competence, and (3) a
greater sense of responsibility on the part of students and
teachers. At the risk of seeming contentious, if not per·
verse, I should like to argue instead that the systems may
well be inefficient, produce incompetence and result in a
lowered sense of responsibility.
Efficiency
The argument that the educational system should be
made more business·like or ··scientific" is intriguing to
many critics of education. Education has been labelled
America's largest " industry." The costs per annum are in
the neighborhood of $140 billion. It Is understandable that
a public nurtured in a business climate and accustomed to
the visible fruits of scientific inves tigation and technology
should seek some proof that it Is "getting a dollar's worth
of education for a dollar spent." That the difference bet·
ween prod ucing an Apollo and "producing· · a moral agent
should not have occurred, however, to so many enamored
of the business or science models is difficu lt to com·
prehend. However that may be. It might be of some value
lo examine some of the myths associated with business
efficiency and to say something about the history of el·
ficiency movements in education.
Business efficiency is ordinarily associated with a
centralized, hierarchical , institutional structure, where
decisions from the top are Implemented by subordinates
who have little or no role In the decislon·making process.
This model of human organization has, of course, many
historical precedents, including the Church and the
military. its most pristine form is the factory system. Many
critics of ed ucation look with d ismay on the relatively
decentralized character of the educational structure with
extensive power in the hand s of local school boards and
with curricular decisions largely made by individual
teachers. It is no surpri se, therefore, that state depart·
ments of education are growing more powerful . And it is
no surprise, given political realities and a traditional
business mentality, that legislatures and even mayors like
Koch of New York and Young of Detroit should seek
greater control in running the schools. Education, apparently, has become too important lo leave to educators.
There is, however, a considerable body of literature
which puts into question the assumption that the hierar·
chical, central ized, institutional model, even for business,
let alone for education, is "efficient." Much depends, of
course, on the definition of the word. But if we should ac·
cept the criteria of business efficiency to include such
matters as productivity, quality of product, absenteeism
and em ployee turnover, it would appear that the evidence
35
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indicates that the decentralized, participatory model of In stitutional organization may be more efficient. For support, one can point to the studies of McGregor. Hertzberg
and Schumacher, as well as those frequently cited in
Working Papers and the World of Work Report.•
As for education, we should have learned from
Callahan's Education and the Cult of Efficiency about the
inefficiencies that attend applying traditional business
management techniques to education. Nevertheless Santayana's warning that an ignorance of history dooms us to
repeat it goes unheeded . As an accountability atmosphere
moves In to education, a noticeable increase is occurring
in administrative costs both in terms of the amount of
time expended In non -productive activities on the part of
teachers and the personnel c osts incurred in the attempt
to satisfy those who contro l the purse that monies are well
spent. In Detroit, for example, the recent decrease In
enrollment has been shown to correspond with a decrease
in the number of teachers but an increase in the number of
administrative and ancillary personnel. And The Chronicle
of Higher Education reports a similar state of affairs In
higher education.• Those of us engaged in the educational
enterprise are, of course, not surprised. My own stock
joke is that teachers will soon spend 50 percent of their
time accounting for the other 50 percent. ·
In addition to the question of institutional efficiency,
there Is the matter of educational efficiency. Proponents
of standardized testing are, of course, hopeful that its implementation will ensure satisfactory levels of attainment
for most students, particularly In so·called basic skills.
This problem has been the subject of much speculation .
There is no need to go over lhat ground. However, his tory
should tell us something. And if the English experiment of
the late 1800's with a model similar In many respects to
that which is being put Into place in almost every state of
the union Is any Indication, we can expect what AlanllSma
has described as a " disaster." Although the English plan
called for paymen ts to teachers based on pupil
achievement, a kind of performance contracting system,
which has fallen Into bad repute in this country, Its em·
phasis on uniform testing for specific objectives and
some sort of accountability was almost identical to that
currently advocated. Quoting J. Kay-Shuttleworth, an
education critic of the day, Small notes:
The (system) has constructed nothing; it has
only pulled down. II has not simplified the ad·
ministration ... It has disorganized the whole
system of training teachers and providing an el·
ficient machinery of instruction for school. These
ruins are Its monuments. It has not succeeded In
being efficient, for it wastes the public money
withou t providing the results which were declared to
be its main objec
t.•

that the appropriation of the term "competence" by ad·
vocates of "performance-based" education will go down
in educational history as a brilliant strategy. By opposing
the standardized testing movement, one Is automatically
labeled a foe of competence and a friend of all that is
wrong with education. A 1am1llar political device-but el·
fective nonetheless.
In human affairs, situations rarely repeat themselves,
and "right" answers are contingent. Therefore, com·
Dewey
cal led
"exec utive el·
pete nce-what
ficiency" -rests princi pally on such qualities as
theoretical understanding, objectivity and independence
of judgment, and its development Is Influenced much
more by the methods used in education t han by predeter·
mined goals. Insofar as an educatio
nal
program focuses
on a set of objectives to be satisfied as efficiently as
possible, it limits the use and development of Intelligence
on the part of both teacher and student and, therefore, is
productive not of competence but, rather, of in·
competence.
Objections are raised to this Idea on the assumption
that means and ends are separate matters, that any number of methods might be employed to arrive at particular
objectives. But one cannot have it both ways. If the at·
tainment of certain goals defines educational success,
and if efficiency is an overriding concern, methods
become prescribed: methods employed will necessarily
be those which most efficaciously produce the goals
regardless of their impact on competence. That fixed
ed ucational standards may be deleterious to the development of competence was repeatedly pointed out by
Dewey and no more eloquently than in the following
passage in Experience and Education:
What avail ls ii to win prescribed amounts of information about geography and history, to win abili ty
to read and write, if In the process the individ ual
es los his own soul; loses his appreciation of things
worthwhile, of the values to which these things are
relative; if he loses desire to apply what he has
learned, and, above all, loses the ability to extract
meaning from his future experiences as they occur?'

Responslblllty
Much of the literature on uniform standards is
devoted to the problem of making teachers (and students)
more efficient and competent through some form of ac·
countability. Whether the accountability system takes a
contractual form, where teachers are to be held accountable for certain performance levels on the part of
students, or whether it takes a consensual form, where
teachers become part of an "ecosystem,"' a total
educational community, Is o f little consequence. In either
case, the professional freedom of teachers is restricted.
The classroom door Is to be kept closed no longer.
Competence
Teachers must be prepared for Inspection. Such a
The foregoing discussion of efficiency leads
situation makes Bertrand Russel l's view about the
naturally to the subject of competence. I might say first
necessary independence of the teacher almost quaint:
• 1n '•*"no ~ "'- 011ic~ or psrtlctpa.lOfJ ll'kVliloement.1 am c;:QQrwno my1.n
The teacher, like the artist, the philosopher, and
Co fl• t'MCNnktl MOKtt. I " " .-ot h;M.dling (:m'J "'1arin other extrenMly iinoonMI
the man of letters can only perform adequately if he
~ to Dt C()fttlO~ ift U~"SlftO My tuaal'I ~lion. .WCh N Ill ~
qidity. P«tievWtr in 1eowo to llUMan nac>CJIHtt ana tunan t1ghts. nie nnllty of Pflt•
feels himself an Individual directed by an inner
llejpaliOn INI)' In tK4 be • l•t fllOf9 1,V.i~ <fheft$Jon OI the plfklpa{Otf tnOCMI
creative
impulse, not dominated and festered by
ll'lan etnci.M:Y. bl.It 1N.1 It *"'°lhOI' ~ Oeconlr.iiliu.Uon. an esaenUlil tMl~ of
piMt4c!Pftlor\. 11 4•H<!Dtd •• a 1oeia.1 dn;.,&r~.tv.M by A.nthfOl)OIOOlsl Lo'ri.;Str.uM: "tn
authority.
shOrl, 111"' •nUuoPOk>Ol•t wtre to mal'.e so bOlda~ to play U1e rotooner arid ••Y: 'Tl'll1 l1
The greatest danger to education posed by the
flOW °"' Cll.po(joniet or thouN11ds ol aocYtle-s
01use1oyou,
can be
thot men or tod1y1•
heelds
would
soiW>
lhal
doubt
the greateat
ld¥OCftlO
all
decentra!lzatlon In
tl
num1>t1 ot
current performance movement Is the threatened loss of
soclal and economic tc1Mllo$ c.ould bo carried out on the le¥el of authenticity at which
nowl
f(
9d<J9 of each othe1." Cl1ed In Foot• VOi 8, Nprofessional freedom. Not only, as I suggested earlier, will
the meml>trt ot a glVtl\ Qr'Oul) htt.vo Ii CO~ffl l(l
Ml•• IOPutur
11'1•
•,
O. 11{Fuh;fi'tMIC$,
)
11'1(.
restrictions imposed on teachers by a standards program
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2. I have often lhoughl goals are lhe oplale of the people.
tend to make teachers less competent by virtue ol the conOne of my favorite quotes wilh regard to the emptiness
straints applied 10 the use of their own intelligence as well
of goals is a stalemenl by R.S. Pelers: " The Puritan and
as that of their students, but such a program will also tend
the Galholic both though! they were promoting God's
to make teache rs less responsible. That an accountability
kingdom, but they lhoughl it had to be promoled In a
system should depress rather than enhance responsible
diflerenl manner. And the dlflerenl manner made ii
action may appear lo be an anomaly, particularly since the
quile a differenl kingdom."
See
Authority, Responterms "accountable" and "responsible" are so frequently
sibility, and Education (New York: Ather1on Press). 1966,
used synonymously. But there Is a crucial dilference be·
tween the terms, and recognition of that facl can have a
p.95.
significant Impact on educational policy.
3. For an interesting analysis, see the editorial, " The Cruel
In ordinary discourse, we mean by accountablllly the
Hoax of Humphrey-Hawkins," New York Times, Feb. 21 ,
holding of someone to account for the fulfillment o f cer1978, p.30.
lain s tandards, a rendering unto Caesar whal is Caesar's.
4. See, for example, Douglas McGregor, The Human Side
We are accountable to someone for somelhlng. On the
of Enterprise and The Professional Manager; Frederick
other hand, responsibility is predicated on sallsfylng perHertzberg, Work and the Nature ot Man; E.F.
sonal slandards, rationally arrived at, to which one has a
Schumacher, Small Is Beaullful. The World of Work
commitment. One may be said to have a sense of respon·
Report Is a monthly published by the Work in America
sibility, but It would be odd to say one has a sense of ac·
lnstitule, Inc.
countability. Responsible action is intelligent action; ac·
5.
For
a litlle humor on lhe subject, see Donald C.
lion taken to satisfy the demands of others is unintelligent
Freeman, "Higher Educalion's Malthusian Multipliers,"
action. As Plato observed, to the degree a person does
The Chronicle of Higher Education, January 9, 1978, p.
another's bidding, he is a slave, and, therefore, acting
56.
unintelligenlfy.
6. Alan A. Small, "Accounlabllity In Viclorian England,"
Insofar as unintelligent action is irresponsible action,
Phi Delta Kappan, March, t972. pp. 438-39.
we can expect an accountability system to lead to various
forms of Irrational and antisocial behavior, parlicularty
7. John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York:
lying and cheating.• And, in fact, this is exactly what has
Collier Books). p. 49. Echoing Dewey, Roger Farr,
been occurring. In order to protect their flanks, teachers
Associate Dean, Research and Evaluation, School of
leach for the test, they ask academically slow studenls
Education, Indiana Unlversily, writes in connection with
to appear on lhe day tests are to be given, they fudge
the recent drop in SAT and ACT scores: " It might ... be
test resulls, and they spend time almosl exclusively on
appropriate to couple the concern aboul SAT and ACT
what they will be held accountable for. All this shou ld not
scores to a concern aboul whelher the recent emphasis
be surprising, any more than it is surprising lhal malprac·
on the basics at the lower grade levels is slarving out
lice suits are forcing physicians to practice defensive
the kind of conceplual teaching of reading that the
med icine wllh its altendant medical and economic lnef·
college entrance exam measures at the higher levels
ficiencles. Any society or social organization which
... " See " Is John's/Mary's Reading Geltlng Worse?,"
depend s on surveillance inevitably corrupts its members,Educational
Leadership, April. 1977, p. 526.
and an educational accountability system designed to
S. A term used by John Goodlad in The Dynamics of
enhance competence will in tact do just the opposile:
k
It
Educational Change: Toward Responsive Schools (New
ill ill the one quality that ensures competence-a sense
York: McGraw·Hill), 1975.
of responsibility which when present makes ac·
countability unnecessary and when absent makes ac9. I am reminded In this connection of an inlerview wilh a
countabllily impotent.
defecting Russian mathematician which was reported
in the Humanist several years ago. To the question,
Footnotes
" What ls the prevailing ethic in Russia," he answered,
1. For an interesting description of the Harvarcl proposal,
" Lying. Everybody lies."
see lhe Saturday Review, April 1, 1978.

l
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If present-day dissidents are to
reclaim the belief that values are best
conceived empirically, they should
begin by considering the imposition
controversy as a possible dispute over
the means to be used in schooling.

The politics
of values
by P.L. Smith

The Ohio State University

The period of the 1930s was one of extreme tur·
bu lence In American life . Capitalism seemed to be Im·
potent In the face of massive economic collapse. Even
democracy was bei ng challenged. It looked to many as if
personal freedom were incompatible with the demands of
equality. The realities of the twentieth century were forcing the American tradition of liberty to give way to group
conceptions of human rights and responsibilities. Mallers
appeared even worse with the loss of faith in reform. The
1920s had shown the futility of the earlier progressive
movement and revealed liberalism as an ally of the status
quo. For those who rejected the established order and
wished to hasten Its passing, radical action was the only
acceptable response.•
Such was the atmosphere in which the founders of
progressive education were forced to confront a long·
standing anomaly in their thought. Can virtue be taught, or
must It somehow be imposed? Progressive educational
thinkers were never quite clear or consistent In trying to
answer this question. On the one hand, they recognized
that values were important and that education must foster
the good , but, on the other hand, they did not think that It
was ever wise to force others to accept a parllcular value
orientation.
The Normative Thrust of Progressive Education
More precisely, the founders of progressive
education revered democracy as a way of life and saw
deliberate education as the most effective means for transmitting democratic values in an urban industrial society.
When asked why they so revered democracy as a way of
life, progressive thinkers had a ready answer. They
believed that It supplied the necessary and sufficient conditions for scientifk: intelligence, or, put In negative terms,
for non-formalist thinking. And what was the value of
non-formalist thinking? Progressives believed It was two·
fold, both Instrumental and intrinsic. It was Instrumental
In solving practical problems and thereby contributing to
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human survival. It was intrinsic in contributing to human
welfare and improving the quality of life. This belief in the
inherent value of scientific Intelligence is rarely understood or appreciated by the critics of progressive
education. But those who conceived the movement were
convinced that the ultimate value In non-formalist thinking
and, thus, in democracy itself, as a way of life, was found
in the fact that it created and developed the capacities to
thi nk and to experience human emotions. Without these
capacities human bel ngs are essentially the same as other
living things. But with them, they are unique; they possess
the necessary tools for deliberately converting the hOstile
forces of nature lo human advantage. And of even greater
signifi cance, these powers of mind have intrinsic value
because they provide the source of human culture and the
foundations of human dignity. Progressive thinkers were
humanists by Inclination and naturalists by philosophy.
Given their convictions and their belief that the realization
of human mental potential was tied to democratic living by
empirical necessity, it is easy to understand the normative
thrust of progressive education .
However, acoompanying this thrust was abhor·
rence of indoctrination. Regardless of motivation,
progressive thinkers eschewed all forms of imposition.
Here, too, they had a reason. Indoctrination or imposition
was seen as contrary to democracy. In so being it stilled
the growth of scientific intelligence. And this, in turn, had
the dual effect of decreasing the chances of survival and
detracting from the quality of li fe. By itself, the rejection
of indoctrination or imposition In the ed ucational en·
terprise of schooling may not seem Incompatible with the
acceptance of a normative thrust in schooling. But there
was a kicker in thi s mix.
Progressive educational thinkers rejected the
Aristotelian idea of development from within. They were
unanimous in the belief that the cultivation of human
nature was not enough. On the progressive view human
nature Is virtually created by natural forces; and if it Is to
be created intelligently, it must be understood and con·
trolled by the only source of Intelligence there Is, man
himself. But ii there is no guarantee, if, Indeed, it is
unlikely that human beings will develop in desirable ways
without human control of the process of development;
and if the individual or individuals being educated cannot
be expected to possess the capacities to understand or
control this process, at least at the start, as vi rtually
everyone, including progressive thinkers, will admit, how
in the world can indoctrination or Imposition be avoided;
assumi ng, of course, we shou ld all develop in desirable
ways?
Progressive Education in the Limelight
The failure of progressive education to provide a clear
and decisive answer to this question represents a serious
soft-spot in its theoretical posture. So long as
progressives were on the offensive, attacking the enemy,
"traditional education
"
or "formalist educational
thinking," this soft-spot was hard to detect, and was easy
to avoid even when recognized. Supporters believed that
the opposition had a strong ideological hold on public
thinking, and that this hold had to be broken before the
progressive alternative could be completely spelled out.
But by the 1920s the victory was pretty much won.
Traditional education was In considerable disrepute, at
least theoretically. The Immediate effect was to produce
an intellectual vacuum . Theoretical Issues were simply
EDU CA TJONAl CONSfOIRA TIONS, Vol. &. No. 1, fa ll. 1978

40

Litz and Sparks: Educational Considerations, vol. 6(1) Full Issue
not seen as Important. People were intellectually free to
think pretty much what they liked. So long as they were
doing somethi ng and claimed guidance from some
rationale, they were effectively left alone to function as
lhelrown philosophical critics.
But the press of events soon brought this period to an
end. And the 1930s were to change the ro le of the
progressive tradition in American life. Eyes were no longer
solely on the opposition. There were real and serious
problems to be faced, probl ems that threatened the
welfare of everyone . If what had been accepted
theretofore could not provide solutions to these
problems, people were ready to consider alternatives. The
mooo was at least congenial 10 tho practical examination
of new ideas. Where old ways would not work, new ways
would be encouraged. What could be better for the type of
education that was founded on the philosophy of experimentalism?
But with this newfound status came critical
examination, and, more specifically, self-examination by
proponents who were at last put on the spot to produce on
their promise. If their theory of education was to be finally
accepted, It would have to meet the test, theoretlcally as
well as practically, supplied by the realities of the
depression. Progressive education was finally on the hot
seat. If it had weaknesses, they would soon be apparent.
And once apparent they could not be ignored. Progressive
tioflal
u ed ca
thinkers began to polish up their Idea in order
to present a defensible, unified and effective front to a
beleaguered and eager, but still demand ing, public.

1

The Official View on Imposition
The progressives were soon to disc over that on the
question of imposition they could not present the type of
front they desired. Indeed, there arose a controversy that
led the aforementioned soft-spot or anomaly in their
revea
thinking. There was, it should be said, an "official
position" on this Issue, but it could hardly be described as
acceptable to everyone, or even acceptable to the majority
of those who shaped opinion in progressive education.
The official view was the one given by John Dewey
and supported so ad mirably by Boyd H. Bode and William
H. Kilpatrick. Dewey claimed that education need never
rely on Imposition, even when concerned with life's basic
orientation. He agreed that education must wor1< to transmit the values of democracy, and must thereby foster
, but he
particular dispositions about and towards reality
insisted, nonetheless, that school learning could be
purely experimental. Teachers could avoid indoctrination
and still be effective.
Indeed, indoctrination was seen as an obstacle to effective schooling in a democratic society. In a democratic
society effective schooling provides a democratic orien·
talion to life. Indoctrination either fai ls to give any orien ·
talion at all, or else brings about an orientatio n that is
Inherently undemocratic. Accord ing to this offlclal view, a
democratic orientation to life can only be provided by
means that are themselves democratic. Indoctrination
was believed to be anti-democratic. It was said to hinder
personal development and destroy the roots of genuine
community. With this position, there was virtually no hope
that schooling under indoctrination could effectively
foster unders tand! ng and acceptance of democratic
dispositions.
Why were supporters of this official view so adamant
in relating educational means to educational ends? The
fAlL 1978
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answer is not hard to find, although it Is amazing how few
have found it. In the first place, they justified a democratic
orien tation because it contributed to mental development.
If In the process o f acquiring a democratic conception of
reality there was no advancement o f mental capacities, as
there surely would not be under conditions of indoctrination, then supporters of the official view would
have been less enthusiastic about democracy as a way
of life. But In the second place, and more Importantly,
they did not believe that a democratic orientation could
be acquired save through Intelligence. Democratic
self
dispositions were said to be founded on intelligent
selection. While they may contribute to mental development, they also presuppose Intelligence in both their un·
derstanding and acceptance. With a democratic orien·
on
tali we can roster mental growt h; but only by reaching a
certain point In mental development can we acquire a
democratic orientation .
Dissenters from the official view saw this position as
paradoxical. But supporters would say that it only appears
paradoxical if we assume that things exist prior to
relatlons, that os, only if we presuppose that intelligence
and a democratic orientation must exist independently
and before they are interconnected. But in fact, supporters would say, this is simply no t so. Both come about
as a result of an evo lutionary process wherein the reality
and charac ter of each is a result of its transactions with
the other. Here, democratic values and mental capaciti
es
are assumed to be mutually dependent. Each Is a
necessary condition for the other. As we become more In·
telllgent, we are made increasingly aware of democracy as
a way of life, and as we come to see democracy as a way o f
life, we are, by that very fact, made more Intelligent. Each
Is instrumental for the o ther as well as being an end In ft.
self. A democratic orientation creates an atmosphere
essential for mental growth. But mental growth must attain a minimum plateau before a democratic orientation
can be had .
Dewey was not at all bothered by this apparent conflic t. He saw the process of transmitting a democratic
orientation as necessarily rational. In being rational ii
fosters mental growth. A person is required to engage in
practical action, that is, action with a practical purpose,
and to undergo the consequences of his own behavior. Ex·
periences are to be more o r less unbridled. Imposition or
Indoctrination o l any sort was seen as a retarding agent.
Indeed, it was in great measure because of its reliance on
the authority o f the teacher that progressives were opposed to traditional forms of schooling . Imposition and indoctrination stifled educational aims. They suppressed
mental potential and made it Impossible to foster
democracy as a way of life. Progressives holding the of·
flclal view were surely not going to allow it in their own
educational scheme.
The Dissenting View on Imposition
Other progressives saw it dif ferently, however. They
believed the olficial view was mistaken for the same
reasons liberalism in pol itics was mistaken. It assumed
that rationality could be a fundamental force in the world,
that progress was directed by the human mind step by
step, and that the advancement o f Individual and social
welf
a re was g rad ual and requi red no quantum leap of
faith.
Having been thoroughly radicalized by the 1930s,
progressives who criticized the offlclal view simply did not
39
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believe that the recognition of goodness, or what was
most desirable, was a process that was characterized by
rationality. And later in the decade, when they witnessed
the rise of fascism, they had further confirmation they
were right. There were limits on rationality in the
educational enterprise of schooling. Dissenters con·
eluded from this that the normative thrust of the
progresslve's educational plan cannol always rely on in·
telligence. In order to achieve his aim the progressive
teacher must sometimes employ tactics that are not them ·
selves congenial to rational student choice.
Progressives like George S. Counts and John L.
Childs saw the process of understanding and accepting
an orientation to life, including a democratic orientation,
as requiring something like religious insight. And when
the process represented a change from one orientation to
another, It required something like religious conversion.
But Jn neither case is intelligence enoug h by itself. Basic
democratic truths, like basic truths generally, can only be
seen through faith, at least in the beginning.
Take the propositions that define the democratic
outlook. We say, for example, that people are politically
equal, that every adult person should have one. but only
one vote. And we say this because, among other things,
we believe people are equal morally as well, and that the
political realm is one wherein moral considerations must
bear. Counts and Childs saw these beliefs as much like
church dogma. They were true, and every democrat could
see why they were true, l:>ut they could not be demon·
strated or empirically established as formal arguments or
scientific judgments, especially to the young or the im·
mature. To be committed to them morally and emotionally,
even to understand them intellectually, we must somehow
transcend rationaflty. While it may In fact be rational to ac·
cept a democratic orientation and to reject any orientation
that is not, the acquisition of democratic dispositions is a
complicated extra-rational affair, It Is rarely Itself rational.
The pedagogical distinction l:>etween what we accept
rationally and what is rational to accept is the same as the
distinction some say is part of the philosophy of science,
the distinction between the context of discovery and the
context of verification . Once we see that a proposition is
true or false, we can set about to formulate a rational
demonstration. But the recognition or Insight Itself cannot
be explained In procedural or rational terms.
The progressives who dissented from the official
view believed that the problem of education was to get
students to understand and accept democracy as a way
of life, and that this was a process of discovery which
went beyond the bounds of Intelligence. They valued
rationality and thought it impartant f0< education to foster
mental capacities, but they believed rationality would be
valued and mental capacities would be fostered after a
democratic orientation was established, not before.
Acquisition of the orientation, they said, did not require
rationality, and Indeed, was sometimes hindered by an
overemphasis on reflection and choice. How, then, was
education to fulfill its normative thrust? Through im·
positron, of course. That is, by a process that recognized
the complicated extra·rational factors that bear on our
conceptions of reality and our acceptance of basic values.
The Controversy as a Bogus Dispute
Progressive educational thinkers never fully resolved
this dispute. And it remains something of a soft·spot In
their theoretical posture. Must it remain a soft.spot
40
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forever? I, for one, do not think so. In the first place, It
looks to me as if the dispute were more apparent than real.
Those who supported and dissented from the official view
can easily be seen as talking past one another. And if they
were, they might well have been in agreement and not
known ii. In the second place, the official view rests on a
naturalistic conception of value, such that the official view
Is correct if and only ii this conception is sound. The
theoretical posture of progressive education can be freed
from vagueness and contradic tion so long as its con·
ception of value can be presented as a clear and defen·
slble philosophical doctrine.
On the first point, could we not say that neither party
to the dispute fully understood the other? Moreover,
might we not account for this failure by the fact that the
contending sides did not fully understand their own
position, or at least were unable to enunciate it clearly?
But, of course, we cannot say either of these things
unless we know what it was each side meant to say.
From our present vantage point, however, it seems rather
obvious. However difficult It was to lormulate or eKpress
their ideas in the original situation, it looks now as if one
side to the dispu te, those holding the dissenting view,
wished to discuss what we should teach and the other
side, those who advanced the official position, wanted to
talk al:>out how we shOuld teach. In most cases the two
concerns are quite d istinct , although, admittedly, the
more one pushes at their differences the harder it is to tell
them apart. We all know, for example, that the way we
teach affects what we teach; our instructional techniques
have consequences too. By teaching In a certain way, we
may foster attitudes like tolerance or Intolerance, and
these are surely legitimate curriculum concerns.
Unquestionably, It was because progressive
educational thinkers were reluctant to make a separation
between curriculum and Instruction that the parties to the
Imposition controversy continually talked past one
another and failed to formulate their particular views In a
clear and decisive manner. In refusing to make the distlnc·
lion absolute, they were making a conceptual point that
was far in advance of the thinking in their times. But In
sometimes acting as If the distinction could never be
made, they fell victim to an Internal dispute that cost them
dearly in public support. They were unable to present a
un ified front. Instead of an Intellectual perspective that
could be linked to educational practice, people saw the
eKtremes of emotional slogans like those they associated
with political confrontation.
For this reason It Is unfortunate that progressives
seem never to admit a distinction between the ideas of
curriculum and instruction. Although it may always l:>e
relative, it is still quite clear within its limits. What we
teach is one thing, how we teach is quite another. We
might explain the imposition controversy as an un·
successful effort to deal with both concerns at once.
Dewey and other supporters of the official view usually un·
derstood imposition, and always un derstood In·
doc trination, as having to do with how we should teach,
with instruction or manner of Instruction. Dissenters from
the official view, like Counts and Childs, understood these
Ideas in terms of what we should teach, with curriculum,
or the aims of education.
Supporters of the o fflclal view would sometimes
make a distinction befween Imposition and indoctrination.
They would define imposition as the normative thrust of
education and indoctrination as a strategy, albeit inef·
EDLJCA TIONAL CONSIOtRA llQN$
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fective, one might employ to realii,e this thrust. Th us, they
would admit that the former was unavoidable and consider
it desirable when conceived as a curriculum theory aiming
to provide a democratic orientation, and they would
repudiate the latter as a scientifically unsound and
morally undesirable theory of instruction. As a theory of
instruction they would say that it c annot transmit a
democratic orientation, and, furthermore, that it retards
mental growth.
On th is analysis Counts was right to say that Imposition was unavoi
dable,
but wrong to conclude that the
choice of what to impose is the only educational choice to
be made. For the conditions of imposition, or how we Impose, makes all the difference in the world. Whether II be
restricted or generous, authoritarian or free, whether facts
and values be ins tilled dogmatically or explained and sub·
mltted to the independent judgment of students makes
the difference between what is and is not taught. ' This is
not to deny that it is often hard to distinguish in practice
between what and how we impose, and thus to separate
the ends of curriculum from the means of instruction. But
still there is a distinction at work here. And the occasional
reluctance of some progressive educational thinkers to
equate imp0sitlon with Indoctrination was a recognition
this distinction must be made.
Nonetheless, II Is true that supporters of th e official
view generally saw this distinction as Counts saw ii, I.e.,
as a d istinc tio n wi thout a difference . Progressives were
easy 10 convinc e that the point at issue lacked prac tical
significance and was, therefore, unworthy of intellec tual
support. We can see this reluctance to separate ends from
means, curriculum from instruction, as a source of con·
fusion ln progressive education. And as a source of confusion It can be seen as an explanation of the imposition
controversy. Thi s is not to say that the parties to the Im·
position cont roversy were insensitive or unsympathetic lo
each other's concerns. It is simply to say that the official
• view on Imposition was a view of instruct ion, and that the
dissen ting view on imposition was a view of curriculum;
and that the means-ends doctrine subscribed to by both
parties made It difficult lo specify their respective con·
cerns. The confusion that came about made it hard for the
two sides In the dispute to c ommunicate clearly,
, or for
that matter, for each side to fully understand its own
position.
We need to be clear here ourselves. This is no t lo say
that there Is anything wrong with the means-ends doctrine
In progressive thought. Undoubtedly, it is one of the more,
if not the most, significant philosophical Insight of our
times. But the doc tri ne only claims that the separation o f
means and ends is relative and not absolute. II does not
deny the dis tinc tion itself. Participants in the Imposition
controversy seemed often to forget the difference be·
tween a relative distinction and no distinction al all. But is
it not obvious from what we know of their work as a whole
that these progressive educational thinkers held to a
distinction between curriculum and instruction, albeit a
relative one? To insist they wanted to abolish the dlstinc·
lion altogether simply does not make sense. To say, as the
progressives d id, that decisions of the one sort affect
decisions of the other sort, or even that decisions of the
one type mig ht en tail decisions of the other type, is not to
assume that the decisions are one.
The imposition controversy was by and large a bogus
dispute. Those who argued for the official view did not
mean to Imply that teachers should be neutral on critical
fAll, 1976
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questions of the day. They recognized that neutrality
would deny the normative thrust o f progressive education.
Surely no one could show they were indifferent towards
the inculcation of values, or lacked a commitment to the
promotion of a d emocratic orientation through formal
education . It may well be that they saw a democratic orientation, like happiness, as best achieved if not directly pur·
sued. And in this there mig ht have been a genuine dl f·
ference with their critics. Their critics wanted to do the
good by the most direc t means. They proc eeded im·
mediately to teach democracy and hoped to foster mental
capacities indirectly as a by-produc t of democratic living.
But with the official view there was a tendency to begin by
fostering mental capacities and ·then 10 teach democracy,
or even to let democracy leach Itself as a resu lt of exercising intelligence. It was as if supporters of the official
view believed that doing well, or achieving excellence or
perfection in conduc t or In practical actions was a more
worthy goal than doing the gooo, at least as a proximate
objective. Doing well, or doing a goOd job, as opposed to
doing the good, seemed lo be held out as a more reliable
gu ide for achieving moral perfection than that supplied by
the motive to do what was morally right.• But this em·
phasis on mental capacities does not deny the ac·
ceptance of a democratic orientatoon as a moral ideal. It
only indicates the s trategy adopted by those who ac·
cepted the official position. One Is no less committed to
democracy as a way o f life simply because he believes it is
most likely to bec ome a reality If pursued by a roundabout
route.
Correspondingly, dissenters from the official view did
not want to clai m that education was merely a process of
shaping beliefs or c onditioning behavior. They accepted
restrictions on manner of teachi ng. The normative thrust
of education must employ moral means. Although they
emphasized teaching a democratic orientation over the
develo
pm
ent of mental capacities, they accepted the tat·
ter as a goal of equal prominence, at least. Their em·
phasis, too, was one o f strategy, not moral priority. They
simply did not believe that education could realize mental
potential in a decadent society, and that education for a
democracy must temporarily precede individual
·
d evelop
men I. But they never meant this lo be interpreted as a lack
of respect for personal in tegrity. After all, they accepted
the means- ends doc trine too. They acknowledged the in·
trinsic value of mental life, and k new the manner by which
it was fos tered could never be Ignored altogether. And
they agreed with supporters of the o fficial view that in order to be Justified. a democratic orientation to life must
have instrumental as well as Intrinsic
lue.va
And, fu rthermore, they believed that In a just society we must all
be able lo satisfy our spiritual as well as our material
needs. By maintaining this belief. they recognized that the
quality of life was as Im portan
t as life Itself. They, as well
as supporters of the official view, wanted to foster in·
lelligenc e. And why was intelligence valued? Not simply
because it provided the mechanism for self-direction and
control, but because it was a source of enjoyment as well.
In the end, both sides 10 the imp0sltion controversy ac·
cepted the same educational goal-to tree the mind from
the forces of nature that created it.
The Commitment to Ethical Naturalism
There is one last matter to discuss. In many respects
it represents the most important Issue o f all. Undoubtedly,
ii deserves considerable attention, more than we wil l give
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it here. Slill, enough can be said In brief to Il lust
rate the
essential point. On Its face, it is simple enough. Even If the
imposition con troversy was more apparent than real, It did
demonstrate the commitment of progressive educational
thought to ethical naturalism and to the theory of value
inherent In ethical naturalism.
Dewey and the supporters of the official view were
quite clear on this. They argued that values were objective
natural properties and that they could only be known
through the intelligent analysis of experience, that Is,
through reason and empirical Investigation . This bears on
education in a most crucial manner. For it Implies literally
that students cannot acqu ire and/or understand a
democratic orientation to life unless they engage in prac·
tical action and reflect on their resultant experiences.
At times dissenters from the official view d id not
seem to recognize this requirement. Where they expressly
repudiated it, the on ly explanation can be that they failed
to recognize, or would not accept, the theory of value
which underlies ethical naturalism and defines its basic
tenets. They sometimes, perhaps inadvertently, took a
subjectivist's position. They would say, In effect, that
values have no referon ts at all, that they are a creation of
the human will or a function of perception. At other times
they would presuppose the first tenet of ethical
naturalism, that values are objective natural properties,
but deny the second, that they can only be known through
the intelligent analysis o f experience.
In either case, however, imposition is essential, not
only in regards to curriculum, but In regards to instruction
as well. Since values are defined as having no source, no
referents, other than human will, there is no role for in·
telligence to play in their detection or jus tification. They
are arbitrary, and if the educator wants to transmit them to
students, he must use the means of imposition. Where
subjectivity reigns, Intelligence has no place. The
teaching of subjective reality
requires
n-rational
no
means
of instruction.
Even if subjectivity is denied, even If the first tenet
which underlies ethical naturalism Is assumed, non·
rational means of instruction must still be employed so
long as the second tenet is not also accepted. For even If
we assume that values are objective natural properties, we
severely limit, or even exclude. the role of Intelligence in
th eir acquisition if we deny the capacity of the individual
to know them through practical action and reflection on
resultant experiences. It is necessary to use imposition as
the means of education whenever and wherever we wish
to teach something to someone who, for any reason what·
soever. cannot grasp or understand what we want to teach
through the exercise of intelligence. Values lhat cannot
be understood through intelligence would be like con·
cepts, postulates or axioms that the student was not
matu re enough to understand. It they are to be taught,
they must be imposed by non-rational means and only
later, perhaps, be seen by the student as rational or
necessary.
On this point the official view on Imposition, and any

42

https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations/vol6/iss1/12
DOI: 10.4148/0146-9282.1978

view implied by It, can only be correc t If the theory of value
which underli es ethical naturalism is a so und
philosophical doctrine. Otherwise the view supporting Imposition as a theory of Instruction as well as a theory of
curriculum would represent a necessary condition for er.
fective teaching. But if the theory of value which underlies
ethical naturalism was unsound, it would do more than un·
dermlne progressive education. It would pretty much
d iscredit progressive thought generally, because
progressive thought itself Is based on this theory of value.
Progressive education wo uld be inherently defec tive
because progressive educational theory would be Inherently defecti ve . And progressive educational theory
would be inherently defective because lhe philosophy on
which it was based would presuppose a false conception
of value. On the other hand, II this conception of value was
sound, progressive ed ucation would receive, perhaps, its
strongest support.
Suppose we were to look at the imposition con·
troversy as a d ispute over the means of education. In fact
it was not, but It could have been. And If It had been, it
would have represented a genuine and profound
d isagreement. The controversy would not have been
limited to educational or political differences, but would
have included a philosophical dispute over the ontological
and epistemological features of values. Whether the of·
flclal view, or any view implied by it, could have won out
would have been contingent on the merits of pragmatism
itself. Without being fully aware o f It, dissenters from
the official view issued a challenge to the whole ol the
progressive movement. During this century ethical
naturalism has been constantly on the defensive. If
present·day dissidents of the progressive lradltion are to
reclaim the belief that values generally, and moral values
in particular, are best conceived empirically and most
readily acQuired through experience and intelligent ac·
tion, they would be well advised to begin by considering
the Imposition controversy as a possible dispute over the
means to be used In schooling. If they can show that
progressive education brings out the best in people
without relying on imposition, they will reestabl ish, and
not just reaffirm, the laIth of their intellectual ancestors.
Footnotes
t . Richard H. Pelis, Radical Visions and American Dreams.
New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 1·95.
2. Israel Scheffler, The Language of Ed ucati on.
s:
Springfield
, Illinoi Charles C. Thomas Publishing Co.,
1968 printing, p. 99.
3. This distinction is, of course, an old one, dating back at
least to the time of Aristotle. But Its application and
force in this context was made apparent to me by my
friend and colleague John B. Hough ; but here again,
only after considerable effort on his part. Perhaps, the
same could be said of the distinction between
cu rriculum and Instruction Itself.
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We should rethink accountability in
terms of what the student needs as a
person.

Some
characteristics
of being
accountable
by Loui s E. Barrilleaux and
James C. Carper
Tulane
rsUnive ity
Few proposed "reforms" In education have been as
voluminously written abou t, frequently spoken about, or
as intensely debated as the subject of accoun tability.
Cr
condemn the concept as " inhumane,"
while
zealots proclaim it as the latest "panacea.'"
A salient feature of the recent movement has been
the lack of general agreement on the meaning of "ac·
countability." Indeed, the term Is freq uently used in a
highly abstract manner that suggests a political purpose.
For instance, advocates assert that the " public"
Is
the en·
tity to whom the educator is to be held accountable. This
"public" is presumed to have a common point of view,
value system and set of expectations. The concept may
not be as clear as its advocates claim when im·
alistic commu nity.' Th is
plementation is to occur In a plur
results in misguided expectations, unreasoned resis tance
and unanticipated consequences.
People working in the field of human services need to
know more about the use of accumulated knowledge. But
to follow current thought in a mechanical way would
destroy the sense of caring, em pathy and genuineness
which our work in human services has shown to be
valuable. So rather than adding operational prescriptions,
the writers speak to the issues that observations, studies,
and experiences have raised about accountability.
1. To what extent is the distinction between
education and sc
hooling important? That there Is confusion between "ed ucation" and "schooling" is obvio us.
As Americans, counseled by professional educators,
heaped many and varied expectations on the schools over
the past one hundred years, there emerged a tendency of
view most learning outcomes as a direct result of formalion
Instruct .• This phenomenon has escalated the confusion between "education" and "schOoiing." Important
informal learn ings were assumed to be outcomes of
schooling.
~spite current questions concerning the validity of
FALL, 197U
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this assumpti on, the escalation continues. So let it be
fully rec og ni zed that today both public and private In·
stitutlons of schooling represent the aspirations of people
who hold increasing concerns for outcomes over which
the schools have marginal influence and control, such as
moral d evelopment, political sensitivity, and economic
success.
Some essential learnings occur only outside the for.•
As a
ill
mal structures; schooling
Is st not all of education
possible necessary precondition for clarifying school ac·
countabilities. Is it not appropriate to first articulate
realistic social policy for education? The Issue for our
society becomes, ''Who Is accountable for education?"
2. To what extent is accountability consistent with
the work culture of simple, absolute institutions? Long
ago, McGregor disUnguished between the X and Y assump.
lions which one may hold about the basic nature of the
"average human being.'" With the set of X, one assumes
that people inheren tly dislike work; they prefer to be di·
.
rected and closely supervised while avoid ing respon·
slbll ity Research does not support the se t of X assump.
lions. Even in under-developed regions, these assumptions are largely Ineffective tOday.•
Can we avoid using accountability concepts as
though they were strong frameworks put up to help weak
and dependent people to function effec tively? We ask ourselves, "How can we avoid, in the practice of accountability, the enhancement of a self-fulfilling prophecy
In which there are lwo kinds of people: the elite with intelligence, ambition, psychological matunty, creativity
(like us) and the masses who are lazy, Irresponsible, in,.
terested o nly in mo ney, needing di rection and
psychologically ill ?"
The principles of institutional accountabili ty are now
extending beyond fiscal and legal connotations to include
intellectual, attitudinal and other aspects of schooling. In
this context, Is holding an Institution accountable the
same as holding an individual
untabl
acco
e? How can conditions for complex ethical choices be salisfied by a
collection of people? Given the charge that "School
s have
failed ," is the accountabillty movement an attempt to
avoid individual responsibility by assigning It to an institution as a surrogate conscience? If accountability in·
eludes an ethical component and only individuals are
capable of ethical choices, can an institution be held ac·
countable?'
3. To what extent are participants in the " schooling"
enterprise accountable for resu lts? As professionals In
the field of human services, we cannot assume respon·
ty
slbili for the behavior of our subordi nates, clients. or
students but only that we have behaved with them in ways
I hat are defensible.
We desire responsiblll ty for the things that we do. On
the basis of research, theory and experience we assume
responsibility for being increasingly able to give reasons
why we do what we do, and we must be even more pers,
Of ourselve we
sonal iy responsible for our own behavior.
ask, " How can we somehow guarantee our professional
services with greater specificity and presumptions of
'goodness· without digging ourselves Into a hole of
guaranteeing results-the equivalent of assuming responsibility for the behavior of others?"
profession Is ely
lik
to assume
ng
No one in a helpi
responsibility for a result over which he has no control. It
is ludicrous to attempt holding him answerable for a result
If he is unwilling to assume responsibility.
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While it Is possible to extend, give, or delegate
authority to others, an Individual cannot be made respon·
sible; he must be willing to assume it. The establishment,
then, of what service an individual agrees to be an·
swerable for is perhaps the logical conclusion of the
acountabillty process. The fundamental issue may
become, " What kinds ol controllable results can we ex·
peel participants in the ' practice of schooling· to be di s·
tinctlvely answerable for?"
4. To what extent does the movement sharpen the
destructive conflict between humaneness and &C·
countability? Clearly, there are t wo conflic ting
philosophical positions now operating and directing
demands on schools. While leaders are being called on to
make an accounting tor the time, money and energy
poured into their institutions, there is an opposing force
to make school s more humane with great stress on spon·
tanei ty, tlexibllily and creative experience. All participants
in the schooling enterprise are demanding more
autonomy for themselves-consistent, of course, with a
work culture characterized by increased ambiguity and
recognition of the importance of developing lndependenlly strong people.
In schooling, one alternative over the other os unac·
ceptable. The execution of skills alone is empty, while
"love" and neo·humanism
alone
are not enough. How can
we assist In the resolu tion of the accoun tabilityhumaneness forces? Is this conflict our base of OP·
portunity as mature human service professionals?
May we begin by rethinking accountability in terms of
what the student needs as a person, rather than what it Is
the public wants-which is often defined in self-serv
ing
economic and social terms? The principles and
techn iques that are now being heralded as new are
derivatives of those that captured education during tho
early decades of this century, altho
ugh the labels have
been upda ted. The consequences of those early
procedures are well-documented .•
5. To what extent Is the accountability movement and
the condition of schooling an appropriate pairing of
solution and problem? In education, practitioners tend to
deal with " solutions" first; minimal attention is given to
the analytical aspect ol solving problems. This inability to
find lunctlonal problems and communicate them to others
Is a serious obstacle to improvement.
Educators have a reputation of being a source of an·
swers. The pub Ile demands a close correspondence be·
tween questions and answers, and schools are general ly
not al lowed or (equlr ed to adop t a problem l lnding s tance
to obtain resources for Improvement.
e
Consequently, littl
or no relationship may exist betwee
n what reformers say
needs to be done and the problem as perceived by those
who must Implement an "improvement" program .•
The Interest
y, In accoun tabilit as it is currently ex·
pressed in the quantifying of outcomes, might lead to
disastrous effects. Those whO most enthusiastically
promote accountability as a lever for improvement are ac·
customed to mechanistic models which have been useful
to engineers, economists and business firms. Some
school problems do yield to mechanistic analysis. Bui
when it is people with whom we deal, and when the goals
we seek are complex human attributes, mechanistic
models may be of less help.
How can we, then, account for our greater aims in the
current movements? Can we avoid the small scale
suggestions of mechanistic models? In fact, are we suf·
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ficiently
secure about the nature of the fundamental
problem to adopt the accountability model as the wise
solution?
6. To what extent are we able to speci fy the necessary
preconditions under which accountability might be a
viable process? The following is o ttered as a beginning:"
a. The special function of " school ing " is agreed upon
and objectives are clear. (This assumes the larger
task of identifying the components of the
" educational" configuration.)
b. Schooling outcomes are within the power of the ac·
countab persons to cont rot.
c. Ind ividuals and g roups negotiate the conditions
and results for which they agree to be held an·
swerable.
d. Standards for quality are clear and measurable.
e. Particular plans of action are focused upon the
achievement of particular students.
I. Professionals at all levels of the schooling hierarchy are accepted as experts In the various phases
of the learning and management process.
As the current advocates of accountability be<:ome
genuinely concerned, they wllt talk more about the
problems of recruiting intellectually mature peopte into
the field of teaching, the kind of education that teachers
need to be culturally literate and the kind of preparation
and continuing support that educational managers need.
And we would, therefore, hear less about fearfully
monitoring teacher performance, aud iting student outcomes, and technolog ical aspects of the movement.
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